

Transport Workers in the Urban Informal Economy: Livelihood Profile

INTRODUCTION

Over the last 20 years, the urban centres of developing countries have exploded in size. Formal economy, often state-owned, public transport services have not had the necessary financial or institutional capacity to meet demand, and have been decimated by the effects of deregulation, and privatisation. Most state-run bus and rail services in developing countries have in effect collapsed. As a consequence, the urban informal transport sector has grown rapidly and substantially, spurred on also by rising unemployment and rates of urban poverty.

Notwithstanding this global trend, there is a paucity of data collection and systematic analysis of informal transport services. The sector is often ignored in policy-making circles, not least because compiling both quantitative and qualitative information is exceedingly difficult. It is not surprising, therefore, that there are little reliable and up-to-date data on the livelihoods of transport workers in the urban informal economy.

The available major sources on the sector indicate, however, that the defining features of informal transport workers are:

- Many are amongst the poorest of the poor
- Their working and living conditions are at the survivalist end of the spectrum
- They are excluded in law and/or practice from labour and social protection
- They lack representation and voice, and are unorganised or ineffectively organised
- They endure job insecurity, low and fragile incomes, harassment and corruption, poor (and often dangerous) facilities, and no access to training.

Access to robust and relevant information is a pre-requisite for public scrutiny, political understanding, informed policy-making and, above all, improving the life-chances and livelihoods of urban workers in the informal transport economy.

WHAT WE KNOW

Transport workers in the urban informal economy share the underlying conditions that face all poor workers in the informal economy: low income, lack of economic security, legal and social protection, basic health and safety measures, and few opportunities for poverty reduction, and social exclusion. In addition, many transport workers face particularly hazardous working conditions and daily harassment.

Within the limitations of current statistics, this section attempts to describe the size and significance of the informal transport sector and its workers, in developing and transition countries. The dearth of reliable, comparative data paradoxically highlights the extent of their invisibility.

Occupations of informal transport workers

There are numerous jobs within the urban informal transport industry and its sub-sectors: passenger transport, goods and freight, and rail and air services.

Employment in the Informal Transport Economy¹		
Sector	Examples	Workers
Passenger Transport		
Conventional Buses (Class 1)	Larger (25-100 passenger) vehicles. e.g. <i>Molue</i> , <i>bolekaja</i> , <i>ongoro</i> (Nigeria), <i>Camellos</i> (Cuba)	<i>Employers:</i> owners of single or small number of vehicles who employ others, including family members with or without pay <i>Own account:</i> owner- drivers, vendors, caterers <i>Dependent 'self-employed'</i> drivers <i>Casual wage labour:</i> conductors, call-boys, mechanics, cleaners, guards <i>Employees:</i> drivers, clerks, queue marshals, security guards
Minibuses (Class 2)	Minibuses, elongated jeeps, and passenger-carrying trucks <i>Jeepneys</i> (Philippines), <i>Mikrolets</i> (Indonesia), <i>Colectivos</i> (Mexico).	<i>Employers:</i> owners of single or small number of vehicles who employ others, including family members with or without pay <i>Own account:</i> owner- drivers <i>Dependent 'self-employed'</i> drivers (leasing vehicles etc) <i>Casual wage labour:</i> conductors, call-boys, mechanics, cleaners <i>Employees:</i> drivers, clerks, queue marshals, security guards
Microbuses & Taxis (Class 3)	<i>Kombis</i> (Africa), <i>Anggana</i> (Indonesia)	<i>Employers:</i> owners of single or small number of vehicles who employ others, including family members with or without pay <i>Own account:</i> owner- drivers, fuel-vendors <i>Dependent 'self-employed'</i> drivers (leasing vehicles etc) <i>Employees:</i> queue marshals
3-wheelers and motorcycles (Class 4)	Three-wheeler motorised rickshaws: <i>Tuk-tuks</i> (Thailand), <i>Auto-Rickshaws</i> (India), <i>Bajajas</i> (Indonesia); and motorcycle taxis: <i>Ojeks</i> (Indonesia); <i>okada</i> (Nigeria), <i>moto-conchos</i> (Dominican Republic), <i>moto-dub</i> (Cambodia).	<i>Own account:</i> owner- drivers, fuel-vendors <i>Dependent 'self-employed'</i> drivers (leasing vehicles etc)
Non-motorised passenger transport (Class 5)	<i>Pedicabs</i> , or <i>bicycle rickshaws</i> (Bangladesh), <i>becaks</i> (Indonesia), and horse-drawn vehicles: <i>calesas</i> (Philippines), <i>tongas</i> (India).	<i>Own account:</i> owner- drivers <i>Dependent 'self-employed'</i> drivers (leasing vehicles etc)

Goods & Freight		
Trucks & Lorries	Long distance haulage, cross-border traders, market suppliers	<i>Employers:</i> owners of single or small number of vehicles who employ others, including family members with or without pay <i>Own account:</i> owner- drivers, traders <i>Dependent 'self-employed'</i> drivers, maintenance workers <i>Casual wage labour:</i> mechanics, loaders, packers <i>Employees:</i> drivers, security guards, warehouse workers
Vans and light trucks	Delivery vans, short-trip haulage, waste collection trucks, etc	<i>Employers:</i> owners of single or small number of vehicles who employ others, including family members with or without pay <i>Own account:</i> owner- drivers <i>Dependent 'self-employed'</i> drivers, <i>Casual wage labour:</i> mechanics <i>Employees:</i> drivers
3-wheelers	Goods 3-wheelers (goods auto-rickshaws.	<i>Own account:</i> owner- drivers, fuel-vendors <i>Dependent 'self-employed'</i> drivers (leasing vehicles etc)
Non-motorised goods transport	Three-wheeler bicycle goods vehicles, animal-drawn carts, manual loaders	<i>Own account operators and casual wage labour:</i> drivers, head-loaders, porters, messengers
Rail & Air Transport		
Rail Stations / Airports		<i>Employers:</i> of small outsourced service enterprises <i>Employees:</i> cleaners, security in outsourced small businesses (briefcase businesses) <i>Own account:</i> food vendors, porters, touts, <i>Casual employees:</i> cleaners, porters, loaders

Size and Significance

There are no comprehensive statistics on the extent of informal transport work, and most of those that are available were compiled in the 1980s and 1990s, and not always based on the same criteria. Nevertheless, indications are that informal transport and related services are a significant source of employment, especially for male workers, and an important contributor to the GDP of many countries.

In **Sri Lanka** since privatisation, some 94% of the country's 16,000 buses now belong to owner operators running one bus.

In **Bangladesh**, whereas only 1500 buses and 27,000 trucks belong to the state run Bangladesh Road Transport Corporation, some 80,000 trucks are owned in the private sector. Here wages and working conditions are abysmally low for the over 500,000 workers, with no appointment letters or payment of regular and proper wages and 16-20 working hours per day. Worse still is

the condition of some 70,000 mini truck and mini bus drivers and employees; 120,000+ auto rickshaw drivers; 50,000 taxi drivers and over 250,000 cycle rickshaw (non-motorised) pullers. The bulk of these workers are employed in a highly fragmented and exploited industry².

In the **Philippines**, transport is a major source of new jobs. The number of transport workers grew from 1 million in 1988 to 2 million in 2002, with growth rates of between 4% to 6% up until 1997, slowing slightly to 5% per annum between 1998-2002. This is above the overall employment growth rate of 2-3% per annum.

In **Benin**, where the informal transport sector makes up 6.7% of the informal workforce, cars and motorcycles have created many driving jobs for owners and drivers. These now number 115,000, with an annual average growth rate of 9%. There is also a knock-on effect on other sectors of the economy, including: the sale of fuel and oil (women form the majority of workers at sales points), the sale of motorcycles and spare parts, engine repair, etc. And the informal sector accounts for an average of 245 million litres of oil per year, representing 74% of the market for oil³. There are approximately 50,000 informal passenger transport vehicles on the streets each day in Bangkok⁴ and 115,000 in Benin.⁵

One indicator of the scale of the informal transport industry is the proportion of journeys undertaken by 'formal' or informal means, where in most cases informal transport forms the majority:

Percentage of public transport journeys ⁶	'Formal' Transport	Informal Transport
Africa		
Abidjan (1998)	33%	67%
Algiers (2004)	6%	94%
Cairo	48%	52%
Cape Town	74%	26%
Dakar (2003)	5%	95%
Latin America		
Mexico City	27%	73%
Asia		
Jakarta	66%	34%
Manila	24%	76%
Tehran	44%	56%

Importance of informal transport operators to other urban poor workers

In many areas, informal transport services are the only bona fide means of mobility available to the poor. They allow car-less, disadvantaged individuals to reach jobs, buy and sell produce, and access medical care. Pedicabs, tri-wheelers, and micro-vans are also an integral part of the distribution networks of many third world cities, ferrying raw materials, furniture, equipment, and other goods in and out of neighbourhoods.⁷

Informal transport economy as a proportion of total employment

In many poor cities, informal transport comprises as much as 15% of total employment. In Dhaka, Bangladesh, the figure is closer to 30%, with more than 100,000 workers hauling customers and goods aboard pedicabs for a living.⁸

Informal workers as a proportion of all transport workers

India:	79% of transport and storage workers
Mexico:	63% of transport and communications workers ⁹
Philippines:	83% of all transport workers, and 96% of land transport workers ¹⁰

Informal transport workers as a proportion of all informal workers

South Africa:	7.1% ¹¹
Egypt:	11.0% ¹²
Russia:	12.0% ¹³
Benin:	6.7% ¹⁴

KEY FEATURES OF WORK¹⁵

“In a weakly regulated, competitive work environment, road transport workers struggle with low wages, long working hours, poor working conditions, occupational health hazards and lack of social protection”¹⁶

Earnings

Although variable, evidence suggests that informal transport workers live on very low and insecure wages or incomes. The following examples of average daily earnings, taken from a variety of sources, give a very approximate indication of levels of income.

Examples of average daily 'net' earnings – informal passenger transport workers¹⁷

	US\$	Sample Date
Lusaka minivan conductor	\$0.29	1987
Addis Ababa "big taxi" conductors	\$0.63	1987
Nairobi minibus (Matatu) conductor	\$0.68	1987
Lusaka minivan driver	\$0.74	1987
Nairobi minibus (Matatu) drivers	\$0.91	1987
Benin fuel-seller	\$0.99	2006
Bandung pedicab (Becak) operators	\$1.13	1987
Abidjan Minibus (Gbakas) conductor	\$1.28	1987
Jakarta motorcycle (Ojek) drivers (suburbs)	\$1.30	1999
Jakarta pedicab (Becak) operators (suburbs)	\$1.30	1999
Addis Ababa small taxi drivers	\$1.44	1987
Nairobi minibus (Matatu) owner	\$2.43	1987
Abidjan Minibus (Gbakas) driver	\$2.55	1987
Dakar "car rapide" conductor	\$2.55	1987
Jakarta pedicab (Becak) operators (city)	\$2.70	1999
Lake Victoria, Kenya, bicycle-taxi operators	\$3.00	1998
Addis Ababa "big taxi" drivers	\$3.17	1987
Jakarta motorcycle (Ojek) drivers (city)	\$3.35	1999
Kingston, Jamaica micro-bus conductors	\$3.50	1985
Dakar "car rapide" driver	\$3.83	1987
Dakar city taxi driver	\$3.83	1987
Dakar suburban taxi driver	\$3.83	1987
Benin waged driver	\$3.96	2006
Bangkok motorcycle taxi drivers	\$4.14	1992
Manila tricycle drivers	\$4.65	1997

It is evident that the lowest incomes are to be found among conductors and among drivers and operators who do not own their own vehicles. It should be noted that informal transport workers have to work exceptionally long hours to achieve this income (see below).

Income, especially for single vehicle driver-operators and for drivers renting or leasing vehicles can be highly irregular. They have no regular wage, and their income consists of what is left from "takings" after rent has been given to the vehicle-owners, and other expenses paid. These may include maintenance, spare parts, petrol, parking fees, fines and bribes. In addition, they have to pay government fees and taxes such as licences, vehicle registration, tests such as smoke emission, fines, and parking fees. Net income can also be significantly reduced through rising input costs, especially fuel prices, without compensatory rises in the price of fares.

An example of the overall effect of these costs is provided from Thailand:

Average Bangkok Motorcycle Taxi Driver Daily Earnings (1992)¹⁸		
	Thai Baht	% of total earnings
Total earnings	287	100
Less:		
▪ Fuel	50	17.4
▪ Loan Interest / Repayments	83	28.9
▪ Jacket rental	21	7.3
▪ 'Despatch depot' (<i>win</i>) fee	12	4.2
▪ Other costs including police fines	16	4.6
Total costs	182	63.4
Net income	105	36.6

Corruption, bribery & harassment

Many urban transport operators face daily harassment, bribery and corruption from police, border controls, authorities and politicians. Attacks - including murder and vehicle theft by criminals - are commonplace, particularly for long-distance road transport operators.

Working hours

Urban informal transport workers work exceptionally long hours:

Average informal transport working hours (per week)	
Bangkok motorcycle taxi driver ¹⁹	70 hours
Jamaica urban transport worker ²⁰	83 hours
Manila jeepney operator ²¹	78 hours
Jakarta pedicab (Becak) driver ²²	62 hours
Nigeria motorcycle taxi driver ²³	80 hours
Pakistan long-distance bus driver ²⁴	84 hours
<i>ILO Maximum Weekly driving time²⁵</i>	<i>48 hours</i>

Local Government Policy

Unilateral changes by local governments to routes, route bans and restrictions, leading to increased competition. These affect the owner and the driver by putting downward pressure on earnings and income, which can sometimes lead to violence.

Respect for Rights

The majority of informal economy transport workers are excluded from labour law provision and social protection schemes. They have no collective bargaining rights, and are also generally excluded from social dialogue forums (where normally only trade unions organising formal

workers are directly represented). Many of their associations and cooperatives are undemocratic and controlled by vehicle owners or other powerful interests (including criminal gangs), so they lack representation even within their own organisation.

Access to Social Protection

In most countries, informal transport workers, like others in informal employment, do not have access to adequate social security and protection. As social security provision such as pensions, health provision, disability grants, unemployment and maternity benefits and accident or life cover are commonly tied to formal employment, these workers falling outside labour law are also excluded from social protection provisions. Where state welfare provisions and social security nets are absent, totally inadequate or unaffordable, as in most developing countries, then those in informal employment live precariously: ill health or an accident can bring whole families to disaster. Even where theoretically workers in informal employment are eligible for voluntary membership of a government scheme, most do not take up membership, finding it unaffordable. In the Philippines, for example, only 42% of families had at least one member who had joined the social insurance programme, and the proportion of the poorest 30% of families was only 28%.²⁶

Health & Safety

Basic health and safety measures are absent from the working conditions in the informal transport sector. Long and irregular hours are worked under high stress and with no regular leave periods. The conditions of work are dangerous, and include unsafe and badly maintained vehicles, poor roads, lack of adherence to highway codes, leading to high accident rates; unhealthy working conditions such as inhalation of fumes, lack of protection against rain, sun, heat and lack of basic facilities; risk of contracting HIV/AIDS for long distance drivers. There is also a high incidence of drug addiction, especially among long-distance drivers who use drugs to fight off sleep and exhaustion²⁷.

Debt

Debt is a major problem for informal transport workers. *“The seemingly never-ending lease payments operators pay to ‘absentee landlords’ who own the vehicles, often half or more of their daily in-take, means few are able to break out of the shackles of urban poverty... Unable to obtain credit through formal channels, some operators turn to street lenders and loan sharks, becoming veritable indentured slaves. Because of prohibitively high interest rates, they end up turning over most of their daily earnings to creditors and are never able to get out of debt”*²⁸

Voice

Informal operators are often politically weak, poorly represented in the formal city democracy, and are more closely associated with traditional, as opposed to modern, society²⁹. Whilst they are thus effectively socially excluded and disenfranchised, informal transport workers continue to be highly visible on urban streets in developing countries.

WHAT THEY NEED

In light of the above, the priority issues and challenges for informal transport workers can be listed succinctly, as follows:

- Increased earnings

- More security of earnings
- Protection from harassment, bribery and corruption among police, authorities and politicians.
- Fewer and regulated working hours
- Access to health and safety, social and accident protection
- Effective pro-poor transport regulatory policy and implementation
- Reliable access to routes and passengers
- Regulation of competition with the formal transport sector
- Consultation/ inclusion in urban planning decision-making
- Stronger representative voice to authorities
- Stronger and more democratic organisation, both for collective bargaining with authorities, and for provision of services to members

“I am 25 years old and am married with two children. I live in Senama township, Zambia, where I rent two rooms at K30,000 per month. I am employed as a driver for Mr Mutale, who owns three buses. I often get up at 04:00. I knock off at about 20.00, reaching home around 21:00. My monthly salary is about K250,000, which is calculated on the commission of 15 per cent of the daily cash-ins. I hire the conductor or transport officer. I decide how much to pay the conductor. I suffer a lot of abuse from both unfriendly customers and the employers. Because my pay is very low I have no holiday and when I fall sick, it is my friends who assist me with medical care. I wish we had a strong association or union to fight for us so that we could enjoy better working conditions. Most of us suffer from stress because of working long hours on order to meet the so-called targets”³⁰.

RATIONALE FOR SUPPORT

- Informal transport workers are a significant proportion of the urban working poor.
- Informal transport workers play an essential role in supporting the livelihoods of other urban working poor, providing cheap and flexible transport to and from their workplace, markets, customers etc.
- Informal transport workers are essential allies to other urban informal economy sectors (street vendors, waste-pickers, home-based workers etc) in advocating and negotiating inclusive policies for urban development.
- Addressing the problems of informal transport workers is crucial in the wider context of reducing emissions in the fast-growing mega-cities of the global south, which is one of the key drivers of climate change.
- Informal transport workers are potentially key players in combating threats to road safety and the urban environment.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

Strong and sustainable organisations of informal transport workers are capable of making significant improvements to livelihoods and respect for rights.

Maintain or raise income

Informal transport workers’ unions and associations are primarily concerned with maintaining or raising levels of income for their members. For urban passenger transport operators, this can be achieved by reducing fuel prices, raising fares, persuading governments to subsidise or exempt from duty or tax vehicles and parts, lower penalties and fines for traffic violations, keeping illegal vehicles off the road, restricting entry to the market by controlling the number of passenger

vehicle licences, and curbing extortion and harassment by police (see below) and criminal gangs³¹.

In the Philippines in 2004, for example, there was a sustained increase in the price of fuel, which had a serious impact on *jeepney* (elongated jeep / minibus) drivers' income. Strong organisation, protest and solidarity between the major unions and associations were able to secure a 50% increase in the minimum fare, as set by the national government. Similarly, the unions campaigned for reductions in cost of the numerous permits, registrations and costs imposed by local and national governments³².

Prevent harassment and corruption by authorities

Through strong collective action, and in particular by building the credibility of membership cards, it becomes possible to challenge corruption and demands for bribes and kick-backs. The Pakistan Transport Workers' Federation, for example, successfully stopped the demand for *bhatta* (bribes) from police.

*“Our immediate concern was to tackle excesses suffered at the hands of regulatory bodies, particularly the collection of bhatta by various personnel. It took us several years to tackle the issue,... (but) ...not only have the law-enforcement personnel stopped harassing our members, they seek the Federation's partnership in their programmes” (Mohammed Rafiq Qureshi, President)*³³

The local association of jeepney drivers in Quezon City, Philippines, was able to secure the dismissal of corrupt police officers³⁴.

When unions and associations are sufficiently well organised and known by the authorities, membership cards can be a powerful tool. Typically they will contain the worker's picture, his/her name, the name of the union or association, its registration number (if it has one) and address. *“As soon as our member shows this card, the police refrain from excesses”*³⁵.

Ensure government recognition of unions and associations of informal transport workers, and establish bargaining and consultation structures

Government regulation is a key feature of the transport industry, both formal and informal. It affects virtually every aspect of workers' lives through licensing, fare-setting, route planning, the designation of terminals, bus stands, loading and unloading areas. This is why a crucial objective of transport workers' organisations is to win recognition and representation in state agencies that have jurisdiction over their members.

In Nepal, for example, following effective union organisation, the government amended the labour law to recognise and negotiate with both waged and own-account workers, including taxi drivers, rickshaw-pullers and trekker and mountain guides. In the Philippines, the local jeepney operators' association of Angeles City gained national accreditation in 2000, giving it formal negotiating rights. Elsewhere in the Philippines, representatives of informal transport workers' associations have successfully been elected to seats in local government.

In Phnom Penh, tri-motor taxis were barred by the municipality from entering the city. The union managed to hold negotiations with the municipal authorities, and convinced them to reverse the decision. In a similar negotiation, the city reversed a decision to ban motor-doups from carrying passengers at Phnom Penh airport³⁶.

Provide social protection

Unions and associations of transport workers frequently establish their own systems of basic social protection for their members, as well as campaign for inclusion in state-administered social protection programmes.

The Pakistan Transport Workers' Federation, for example, maintains a fund of between 500,000 and 700,000 rupees (USD 8,000 - 11,000) collected from union dues, to assist members in times of crisis, such as illness, injury, or death. The All-Sindh Private Bus Transport Workers' Union has a similar fund:

“Traffic Accidents, and at times illnesses, require long-term and costly treatment which transport workers cannot afford. In such cases the members are supported fully through the union fund. The union has friends... (in the hospital) ...who admit patients referred by us. The union does not pay cash to the affected member, but foots the bills, and pays a monthly stipend to the family for household expenses during the worker's hospitalisation, and resultant loss of wages. In case of fatal accidents, the union puts pressure on the owner of the vehicle to pay compensation of 200,000 rupees (USD 3,000) to the survivors of the affected family. The union itself cannot pay such a big amount.”
(Sher Nawab Khan, General Secretary)³⁷

Similarly, the Benin National Union of *Zemijan* (motorcycle-taxi drivers) holds a loan fund of 700,000 CFA (USD 1,500) for members. This might include, for example, repair or purchase of vehicles, or children's school expenses. It also supports a number of women setting up in agriculture and food production businesses.³⁸

Provide legal advice and support

Transport workers are frequently in areas where they are far from home and unfamiliar with local bureaucracies and procedures. Local offices or representatives can provide essential legal advice to drivers in trouble. In Benin, the union also acts as interpreter and witness for contracts between motorcycle-taxi owners and drivers, where many do not read or write in French. This also has the benefit of ensuring that the union has a thorough understanding of the terms of conditions of its members, and makes it more effective in defending members in times of conflict³⁹.

Facilitate links and alliances

Unions and associations can provide valuable access to politicians, the media, NGOs, development agencies and other organisations in civil society, unions and associations representing other workers (both informal and formal economy), and international labour federations and agencies. In particular, this enables workers to benefit from externally-funded education and development programmes.

Provide education and training

It is fairly common for informal transport unions and associations to provide education and training for their members. This may include not only education for representatives and members to strengthen the organisation itself, provide leadership skills, promote good democratic practice, represent members more effectively, but also vocational training to improve livelihoods. The

Pakistan Transport Workers' Federation, for example, provides regular membership training on traffic rules and regulations, in partnership with police and traffic management authorities⁴⁰

DATA CONSTRAINTS/GAPS

There are little reliable and up to date data on livelihoods of workers in the informal economy transport sector. The three available major sources are studies undertaken by the ILO in 1989, *Social and Labour Aspects of Urban Passenger Transport in Selected African Cities* (which drew heavily on an earlier Mazingira Institute study in Kenya in 1982); the Robert Cervero study for UN Habitat in 2000, *Informal Transport in the Developing World*; and reports commissioned by the ITF itself in 2006, *Organising Informal Transport Workers*, based on case studies undertaken in Benin, Philippines, and Zambia.

None of these studies focus on workers' livelihoods. The 1989 ILO research was a very broad survey of the sector, describing transport demand and supply, public transport users, cost structures and profitability, operational issues and policy options. It included some discussion of workers' livelihoods and working conditions, but was based on thin evidence and is now clearly out of date. The 2000 Cervero study for UN Habitat and subsequent work are more detailed, but their primary aim was to review the market, organisational and regulatory characteristics of informal transport. The livelihoods of the transport operators are simply treated as 'supply' characteristics of the market.

In both studies, the core issue of earnings is highly problematic, especially when trying to draw conclusions from data collected between different countries and between different periods. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the informal transport industry, particularly in passenger transport, has increased substantially in many countries over the last 20 years, due to urban population growth and privatisation or collapse of state-owned bus and rail services, so data collected in the 1980s and 1990s cannot be considered reliable.

It is also often not clear whether earnings stated are gross earnings, or whether they are net figures after deductions. The deductions themselves are very substantial, difficult to measure and complex – cost of fuel, lease of vehicle, cost of borrowings, boundary charges, bribes, taxes, terminal / bus station fees, payments to touts, and so on. These may often amount to very large proportions of gross earnings. The assumptions and methods underlying most available data on earnings make it difficult to assess real net income. Data on very large numbers of workers in the sector, notably those in casual wage labour, are unavailable.

The ILO and UN Habitat studies are also wholly concerned with passenger transport, and do not cover the many other urban informal transport sectors, for example transport of goods, loading at depots and stations, informal employment around rail termini, messenger services.

The ITF studies, while much more up to date and focused on informal workers in the transport sector, are primarily concerned with the documentation and analysis of workers' organising experiences, and strategies and methods of organising unions appropriate to their needs. The scope of the research also encompasses all informal transport workers, not just those in the urban environment (i.e. includes fishery workers, mountain porters, port workers, water transport etc). Nevertheless, the studies do contain some useful indicators of livelihoods and problems faced by informal transport workers.

Dave Spooner, January 2011.
Global Labour Institute (UK)

Main Sources:

Chris Bonner, *Organising Informal Transport Workers: Global Research Project Overview Report*, ITF, 2006.

Robert Cervero, *Informal Transport in the Developing World*, UN Habitat, Nairobi, 2000.

Robert Cervero and Aaron Golub, *Informal Transport: A Global Perspective*, Transport Policy 14, p.446, 2007.

Moussa Gibigaye, *Organising Informal Transport Workers: The Informal Economy and the Unionisation of Motorcycle Taxi Drivers in Benin*, ITF, 2006

Avishai Gil, *Social and Labour Aspects of Urban Passenger Transport in Selected African Cities*, ILO Sectoral Activities Programme, 1989.

Zeenat Hisam, *Collective Care Arrangements in the Informal Labour Market: Road Transport Workers in Pakistan*, Economic and Political Weekly, Mumbai, 2006

Sunita Kapila et al, *The Matatu Mode of Public Transport in Metropolitan Nairobi*, Mazingira Institute, Nairobi, 1982.

Clarence Pascual, *Organising Informal Transport Workers: A Case Study of the National Transport Workers' Union Philippines*, ITF, 2006

Workers' Education Association of Zambia (WEAZ), *Organising Informal Transport Workers: A Case Study of Zambia*, ITF 2006.

¹ Data drawn from variety of sources, notably Bonner (2006) and Gil (1989)

² ITF-FES, South Asia Seminar Report, 2005.

³ Bonner (2006).

⁴ Cervero and Golub (2007), p.450.

⁵ Gibigaye (2006)

⁶ Godard, X., *Coping with paratransit in developing cities*, Volvo Foundation for the Future of Urban Transport, 2006, quoted in Cervero and Golub, 2007.

⁷ Cervero and Golub, 2007, p.456.

⁸ Cervero (2000).

⁹ ILO, 2002

¹⁰ Pascual (2006)

¹¹ Devey, Richard, Caroline Skinner and Imraan Valodia, *The State of the Informal Economy*, in State of the Nation, School of Development Studies, University of KZN, South Africa

¹² El Mahdi, Alia and Mona Amer, *Formal versus Informal Labour Market Development in Egypt, 1990-2003*, Workforce Development Study Conference, Johannesburg, 2004.

¹³ Sinavskaya, Oksana and Daria Popova, 2004. *Russia's Workforce Development Study of the Global Policy Network*, Workforce Development Study Conference, Johannesburg, 2004.

¹⁴ Gibigaye (2006).

¹⁵ Unless indicated otherwise, evidence of working conditions is drawn from Bonner (2006). The report synthesises the findings of field research conducted in the Philippines, Zambia and Benin.

¹⁶ Hisam (2006), p.2099.

¹⁷ Data drawn from variety of sources, mostly ILO (1989) and Cervero (2000). Where possible, figures drawn from local data in local currency, shown in US dollars at the exchange rate in the year concerned. Although 'net' earnings, it is impossible to verify consistency of cost factors taken into account. Some survey samples very small in number.

¹⁸ Cervero (2000), p63

¹⁹ Cervero, (2000), p.63

²⁰ Cervero, (2000), p.126

²¹ Cervero, (2000), p.84

²² Cervero, (2000), p.107

²³ Cervero, (2000), p.151

²⁴ Zeenat, (2006), p.2102.

²⁵ ILO Convention 153: Hours of Work and Rest Periods (Road Transport) stipulates that every driver is entitled to a break after four hours continuous driving; the maximum daily total driving time should not exceed nine hours; the maximum weekly driving time should not exceed 48 hours, and the daily rest period must never be less than eight consecutive hours.

²⁶ Pascual (2006), p.9.

²⁷ Zeenat, (2006), p.2103.

²⁸ Cervero and Golub, (2007), p.449.

²⁹ Cervero and Golub, (2007), p.446.

³⁰ WEAZ (2006), p.19.

³¹ Pascual (2006), p.16.

³² Pascual, (2006), p.16

³³ Quoted in Zeenat, (2006), p.2104.

³⁴ Pascual (2006), p.22.

³⁵ Quoted in Zeenat (2006), p.2105.

³⁶ Bonner (2006), p.64.

³⁷ Quoted in Zeenat, (2006), p.2105.

³⁸ Gibigaye (2006), p.29.

³⁹ Gibigaye (2006), p.30.

⁴⁰ Zeenat (2006), p.2104