

# Kampala Bus Rapid Transit: Understanding Kampala's Paratransit Market Structure



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## Acknowledgements

This report would not have been possible without the assistance of a large team, including:

**Questionnaire survey team:** Phiona Kasweet, Shakira Namuga, Maria Nanziri, Rehema Nansubuga, Joseph Busulwa, Harriet Nassazi (KAMBE); Shanitah Birungi, Lilian Musimenta, Hussein Muwanika Kato, Shamin Nalubwama, Edith Namubiru, Julius Ssekito (KOTSA); David Musoke (ATGWU); **Field Researchers:** Ronald Kato (Usafi Taxi Park), Bernard Luggya (Old Taxi Park), Kiviri Livingstone Kanyike (Boda-Boda CBD stages); **Focus Group Discussion rapporteurs:** John Ssendagire, Lilian Najjita; and **Additional Desk Research:** Georgia Montague-Nelson and Jess Whelligan (GLI). Special thanks to Arnaud Desmarchelier, AFD.



Interviewing boda-boda riders in Kampala, January

Unless stated otherwise, all photos were taken by **Gilbert Yoti**, with the support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Kampala.

***This report, including its recommendations, represents the findings and opinions of GLI and do not represent the policies or position of AFD.***

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The research and subsequent report were undertaken through a contract with **Agence Française de Développement (AFD)** to support the Government of Uganda and the Kampala Capital City Authority in preparation of the planned introduction of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in Kampala



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## Summary

This report attempts to provide a detailed assessment of the market structure of the paratransit industry in Kampala, including both minibus (“taxi”) and motorcycle taxi (“boda-boda”) services. It is intended to contribute towards an understanding of how paratransit services can be incrementally improved and professionalised to minimize some of its negative effects on Kampala overall transport system, and how to integrate the existing informal service into the proposed new Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system.

The assessment is based on desk research, 790 street survey questionnaires completed with taxi and boda-boda workers, focus group discussions, in-depth interviews with workers, key informant interviews, field observations and interviews on proposed BRT routes, and additional field research.

### **Taxi industry**

There are large numbers of people who are dependent on the taxi industry for their livelihoods, including crew members (drivers and conductors), workers in the terminals and stages along the routes and those working to service the industry (mechanics, cleaners, vendors etc). Since the emergence of the informal taxis in the 1980s, there has been a history of conflict and violence in the industry between rival organisations fighting for control of the stages and between the workforce and the authorities.

The industry is characterised by a lack of regulation, the over-supply and congestion of vehicles, exceptionally long working hours, and the so-called “target system”, whereby informally employed crews have to pay owners a daily fee for the operation of the taxi. There are some owner-drivers or owners of small fleets, but there are also owners of large fleets whose identity is hidden behind layers of agents and proxies. The key issues faced by the workforce include police extortion and harassment, a lack of respect from the authorities and the general public, precarious livelihoods, poor working conditions and high levels of crime. The few women in the industry face gender discrimination and sexual harassment, both from passengers and male workmates. Women face discrimination and exploitation in trying to get work in the taxi industry in the first place.

### **Boda-boda industry**

There are perhaps 200,000 boda-boda riders in Greater Kampala, and the industry continues to expand as passengers turn to motorbikes to overcome the chronic congestion and long journey times. There are many similarities with the taxi industry. Boda-bodas have a history of politically generated conflict. Riders face police extortion and harassment, problems of over-supply and competition, a danger of serious accidents and injury and high levels of crime. There is little regulation. Most boda-boda riders also work on the target system, and there are owners of large motorbike fleets, but there is evidence that the pattern of ownership is shifting, as more riders are able to gain access to loans to purchase their own machines. There is also a growing number of riders working for ride-hailing platform companies.

Despite being a dominant feature of Kampala’s passenger transport system, the boda-boda industry is completely overlooked by many transport planners.

## **Bus Rapid Transit in Kampala**

Planners envisage that the planned introduction of BRT in Kampala will transform paratransit services into a regulated market. BRT vehicles would have the exclusive right to operate routes and, in particular, competition between taxis and BRT would be avoided. It is recognised that opposition from the paratransit industry could cause fundamental problems in the implementation of BRT projects, as has been the case in several other African cities.

Potential opposition is likely to be driven by the fear of large job losses. Without any action in mitigation, BRT will have a major impact on employment. Fear of the impact on employment is the main concern among the workers, especially in the taxi industry. More 17,000 taxi jobs and 20,000 boda-boda jobs could be at risk from the impact of BRT on the central business district alone. There is also a very high degree of cynicism about the competence and ability of the government to successfully deliver any major public transport improvement projects, based on the extent of corruption and the historical evidence of past failures.

Consultation and inclusion of taxi and boda-boda industry representatives in BRT planning processes are vital to the success of BRT. But they also offer opportunities for the incremental reform of the paratransit services towards formalisation.

### **Recommendations**

The highest priority must be to build trust, understanding and mutual respect, particularly between the taxi and boda-boda workforce and the public authorities responsible for transport. This should include a review the recognition and inclusion of informal workers in labour law and participation in tripartite structures and processes. Transport planners should engage representatives of the paratransit workforce, particularly in the boda-boda industry, in the planning of BRT, the integration of paratransit services in Kampala's passenger transport as a whole, and the development of policies and programmes to incrementally formalise the informal transport economy.

There is an urgent need to explore possible alternative business models in the boda-boda and taxi industries that may have the potential to improve livelihoods, reduce working hours (and therefore improve road safety) and address the problems of over-supply and greenhouse gas emissions. This could include the formalisation of stages, financing programmes that encourage owner-riders and owner-drivers as an alternative to the target system, development of the role of SACCOs or other cooperative models to encourage formal employment relationships with riders and taxi crews, and the regulation of ride-hailing companies.

Working conditions in the taxi parks, stages and service areas are extremely poor – for both workers and passengers. There is an urgent need to initiate dialogue, discussion and confidence-building towards an agreed plan for the refurbishment of CBD taxi parks, to include resurfacing of the park with adequate drainage, construction of shelter from sun and rain at each stage within the park and provision of hygienic working space for food vendors with affordable access to electricity and clean water.

Very few paratransit workers have adequate social protection. Every boda-boda and taxi stage should have a Savings and Credit Cooperative (SACCO) and/or welfare schemes for riders, and banks are legally obliged to match SACCO savings with loans. These should be strengthened to ensure due diligence in SACCO administration to ensure regular contributions by members, proper use of the funds and training for administrators to resist political and financial corruption.

The Kampala paratransit industry is dominated by men. Women in the taxi industry complain of harassment and discrimination from vehicle owners, stage workers and passengers. There is a particular problem in discrimination against women in access to the more skilled and highly paid occupations. Policies and programmes are needed to promote gender equality in paratransit, to include consideration of potential financing programmes to assist women to gain access to training and capital to operate taxis and boda-bodas, and public education programmes to assert women's economic rights in the industry and reduce discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace.

Police corruption and extortion is universally despised throughout the paratransit workforce. This is clearly a deep-rooted problem and requires long-term dialogue between police and paratransit workers, starting with the inclusion of worker representatives during police training.

There have been several attempts to include paratransit owners, workers and their associations in the ownership of companies and cooperatives that have tendered for BRT operations elsewhere in Africa, but with mixed and generally disappointing results. Owners and workers need independent advice and consultation on BRT financial operations and contracting arrangements at the earliest opportunity and their representatives should be included in negotiations and consultation on the appropriate design of BRT operating contracts, fares policy, and procurement and tendering procedures.

Both of the most significant paratransit representative organisations - Kampala Operational Taxi Stages Association (KOTSA) and Kampala Metropolitan Boda-Boda Entrepreneurs (KAMBE) have a large membership, but an under-developed capacity to provide the representation and services required by the members, and there is considerable confusion among paratransit workers about whether such organisations are there to defend and advance their interests through negotiation with the authorities, to implement and police the authorities' policies and regulations and impose discipline on the stages, or to do both.

Both KOTSA and KAMBE need capacity development to develop a deeper understanding about the roles, principles and values of democratic membership-based organisations; strengthen their representation and organisation at division and parish level, to bridge the gap between stages and the national leadership; and review and strengthen dues payments, financial accountability and procedures, and improved services to the membership.

## Glossary and acronyms

Awakula Ennume	Bus service launched by UTODA in 2013
ATGWU	Amalgamated Transport & General Workers Union. Affiliated to NOTU.
<i>Boda-boda</i>	Motorcycle taxis
Boda-Boda 2010	Association of boda-boda riders (2010-2017)
Boxer	Boxer motorcycles, manufactured by Bajaj Auto Limited in India
BRT	Bus Rapid Transit
CBT	Central Business District
COFTU	Central Organisation of Free Trade Unions
CPS	Central Police Station
DACA	(Taxi) Drivers and Conductors Association (2007-2014)
Defence	Elected stage leader responsible for security
DPC	District Police Commander
Drone	12-seater upmarket Toyota Hiace Drone taxis
GKMA	Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area
ISO	Internal Security Organisation
KAMBA	Kampala Metropolitan Boda-Boda Association (2013-2015) renamed KAMBE
KAMBE	Kampala Metropolitan Boda-Boda Entrepreneurs (2015 to present)
KCC	Kampala City Council (replaced by KCCA in 2011)
KCCA	Kampala Capital City Authority (2011-present)
<i>Kanabe</i>	Car washer
<i>Kasolo</i> group	Criminal gang
<i>Kibaruwa</i>	Relief / spare drivers
<i>Kiface</i>	Criminal gangs
<i>Kitukidogo</i>	Bribes demanded by police
<i>Kipapula</i>	Police express penalties.
KOTSA	Kampala Operational Taxi Stages Association (2015 to present)
KUBOCA	Kampala Union Boda Boda Cyclists Association (2006-2010)
NOTU	National Organisation of Trade Unions
NUDCAW	Nat. Union of Drivers, Cyclists & Allied Workers (2004-) Affiliated to COFTU.
<i>Okulya akata</i>	Lane indiscipline (“eating dust”)
<i>Panyas</i>	Short cuts / alternative routes (to avoid police)
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative
Stage Leaders	Elected (mostly) leaders of boda-boda stages
TAPSCOM	Taxi Parks/Stages Coordinating Committee (2012-2012)
Target	Daily or weekly rental fee for a vehicle paid by drivers or riders to owners
Taxi	14-seater
TVS	TVS motorcycles, manufactured by TVS Motor Company in India
Turnboy	Stage-based taxi worker fixing tyres, small mechanical jobs etc
UNRA	Ugandan National Roads Authority
UTODA	Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (1986-2015)
UTRADA	Uganda Transport Development Agency (2014-present)
<i>Zomugaga</i>	“For the boss” – see <i>target</i>

## Introduction

Kampala's passenger transport system is dominated by its large paratransit industry, primarily informally operated minibuses ("taxis") and motorcycle taxis ("boda-bodas"). In common with most major African cities, Kampala's streets are highly congested. At certain times of day, during bad weather or in response to any sort of disruption, traffic is practically at a standstill. The paratransit industry has also become notorious for inefficiency, violent criminality, pollution and corruption.

On the other hand, it offers cheap transport essential for the more than two million commuters and is highly flexible and responsive. It also informally employs hundreds of thousands of people in a city where earnings are poor and where employment is scarce.

The transformation of Kampala's informal public transport into a more efficient, less congested and more environmentally sustainable is a high priority for the Ugandan government and Kampala city authorities, particularly through the proposed introduction of a mass rapid transport programme, known as Bus Rapid Transit (BRT).

Although BRT will not replace all paratransit services, at least in the short term, it will require major changes to the taxi and boda-boda services, will require the constructive engagement of vehicle owners and the workforce, and offers an important opportunity to consider practical incremental steps towards the formalisation of the industry as a whole and its integration with the BRT initiative.

This report attempts to analyse the market structure of the paratransit industry in the Greater Kampala Metropolitan Area (GKMA), undertaken in support to the Government of Uganda through the Ministry of Works and Transport and KCCA towards ongoing public transport improvement and the development of BRT. It was conducted in parallel with a larger-scale study of the paratransit system and street usage in GKMA in view of the planned BRT system undertaken by a consortium of consultants led by Transitec Consulting Engineers.

The main objective is to support a public transport reform and streamlining of the highly fragmented paratransit sector. The findings, analyses and recommendations are meant to support the constructive engagement with stakeholders at the design and implementation stages for the successful development and operationalisation of BRT in GKMA.

The report is intended to provide an assessment of the market structure of the paratransit industry in Kampala towards an investigation on:

- How the para-transit service can be incrementally improved and professionalised to minimize some of its negative effects on Kampala overall transport system and street usage?
- How to integrate the existing informal service into the proposed new BRT system such as to build a complete and consistent transport system?

The approach and methodology draw extensively from two previous research projects which attempted to analyse the potential impact of BRT on the paratransit workforce in Nairobi (Spooner & Mwanika, 2019) and Dakar (Sakho, Spooner, Timera, & Diongue, 2020 (forthcoming)). These

studies developed an innovative method of participatory research, working closely with the relevant workers' associations and trade unions to build a 'bottom-up' understanding of the complexities of the organic micro-economy of paratransit in both cities. In both cases, the primary objective was to assist and encourage informal economy workers' representatives to constructively engage in the BRT planning process and identify policies and initiatives towards the formalisation of employment in the paratransit industry.

Why is this research necessary? In previous studies, we have discovered that one of the primary reasons for the failure of BRT projects in other African cities has been the opposition from, and lack of real consultation with, the paratransit industry (Spooner & Mwanika, 2019). Moreover, BRT would not replace most of paratransit. They will have to co-exist. This is an opportunity to consider the urban transport system as an integrated whole and find practical policies and programmes that contribute to the incremental formalisation of Kampala's paratransit. To achieve that, we have to understand it.

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**Sources.** Unless indicated to the contrary, all data is drawn from the questionnaire survey, focus group discussions, field research and in-depth interviews undertaken by GLI in January-February 2020.

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**Currency.** Unless stated to the contrary, all figures are in Ugandan Shillings (UGX). Exchange rates as of 30 March 2020 were 1 USD = 3,812 UGX, 1 EUR = 4,220 UGX

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## Survey methodology

### Study design

This study relied on the collection, analysis and integration of both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative data mainly consisted of street surveys with additional information obtained through desk research. Qualitative data was gathered through focus group discussion, in-depth interviews, key informant interviews and field observations. A mixed research approach was intended to help researchers gain in-depth understanding of issues under focus and ensure validity of data by corroboration through triangulation (i.e., the use of several means in terms of methods, data sources and researchers while examining the same phenomenon). This was the most appropriate approach given that the kind of information which the study needed to achieve its overall objective could not be gathered authoritatively by relying on a single data source. The entire research process was well-documented to ensure reliability.

Overall, key stakeholders (i.e. members of informal transport workers associations) participated in the conceptualisation of the study, preparation of the instruments, data collection and validation of the findings. As studies show, participatory approaches in research enhance learning and capacity building by providing opportunity to acquire new knowledge, skills, and experiences.

This approach provided the principal investigators a chance to blend their previous experience in Nairobi (Spooner & Mwanika, 2019) and Dakar (Sakho, Spooner, Timera, & Diongue, 2020 (forthcoming)) with practical experiences of informal transport workers and other stakeholders in Kampala leading to a robust conceptual and methodological grounding of the Kampala study.

### **Inception meetings**

Coordination meetings were held with members of the Transitec consortium in Kampala on 23-24 October 2019 and specifically with the ODA team on 16 October 2019 through Skype and subsequently on 23 October 2019 in Kampala. Inception meetings with clients, stakeholders and Transitec Consortium followed on 24 October 2019 at the Ministry of Works and Transport.

As the result of these discussions, it was agreed to expand the focus on the boda-boda sector as a critical yet under-researched component in understanding the Kampala paratransit industry.

GLI team planning meetings were held in Kampala on 25-29 October 2019 to agree conceptual and methodological issues, attended by Dave Spooner (Project Manager), John Mark Mwanika (Kampala Research Coordinator), Erick Manga (Research consultant/data analyst) and Shadrack Natamba (Data manager). These meetings agreed the project inception report, outlining tasks to be undertaken, data required (i.e. data necessary for analysis, data collection frame), methodology, calendar of field visits including meetings and workshops, key reports and appendices.

### **Identification of data needs, sources, research instruments and analysis**

During the October 2019 meetings, the research team

- identified the kind of information required to address specific issues under focus outlined in the terms of reference, possible sources, means of collecting them, and the appropriate types of analysis (see Annexe: Situational analysis/data needs table)
- prepared data collection tools in the form of street survey questionnaires, focus group discussion guidelines and key informant and in-depth interviews guides and templates (see Annexe: Data collection tools).

### Identification and recruitment of field researchers

During November and December 2019, meetings were held with leading representatives of Kampala Metropolitan Boda-Boda Entrepreneurs (KAMBE), and Kampala Operational Taxi Stages Association (KOTSA) to introduce and review the purpose and methodology of the project and confirm the active participation of both organisations. It also led to the identification and recruitment of a team of field researchers in consultation with the associations:

### Research assistants, gender and association

Name	Gender	Association
Phiona Kasweet	Female	KAMBE
Shakira Namuga	Female	KAMBE
Maria Nanziri	Female	KAMBE
Rehema Nansubuga	Female	KAMBE
Joseph Busulwa	Male	KAMBE
Harriet Nassazi	Female	KAMBE
Shanitah Birungi	Female	KOTSA
Lilian Musimenta	Female	KOTSA
Hussein Muwanika Kato	Male	KOTSA
Shamin Nalubwama	Female	KOTSA
Edith Namubiru	Female	KOTSA
Julius Ssekito	Male	KOTSA
David Musoke	Male	ATGWU

Additional meetings of the principal investigators were held on 21 January 2020 to agree logistics and commencement of the study.

### Training of research assistants and pre-testing of data collection tools

Street research team training and questionnaire testing was successfully completed on 22-23 January 2020. The training programme included

- introduction to the purpose and methodology of the project;
- introduction to BRT and planned BRT development in Kampala (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2014);
- detailed review of the draft questionnaire and interview methodology, and subsequent amendment;
- field testing of draft questionnaire with taxi drivers, conductors and boda-boda riders (18 questionnaires completed);
- pilot in-depth interviews with selected boda-boda riders and taxi drivers and conductors;
- subsequent review and amendment of data collection tools in the light of field pre-test;
- discussions and agreement of questionnaire sampling (detailed locations / occupations) and interview methodology;
- composition of survey teams and survey timetable.

### **Target population and sample size**

The study targeted informal transport workforce in Kampala along the three proposed BRT corridors covering taxi crews, boda-boda riders, stage workers and service providers. There is no authoritative data on the paratransit workforce, so the team were unable to rely on the census population to determine the sample size. Instead the principal investigators agreed a sample size of 740 workers distributed along each of the three designated BRT corridors, and by workplace/occupation, paying particular attention to the boda-boda industry: taxi crew (101), taxi stage workers (99), taxi service workers (99), boda-boda riders (207), boda-boda stage workers (84), boda-boda stage workers (141). (See Appendix: Taxi Worker Sampling Points)

## Data collection

### **Desk research**

Preliminary desk research was undertaken during November 2019 by Dave Spooner, Jess Whelligan (School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London) and Georgia Montague-Nelson (Global Labour Institute). They reviewed major literature and reports on the introduction of BRT in Kampala, the City's paratransit industry, and comparative literature on the relationship between BRT and paratransit services in other cities in Africa. This exercise provided additional insights on theoretical, conceptual and methodological issues important in grounding the study.

### **Administration of street survey questionnaires**

The questionnaire survey was conducted between 24 January and 1 February 2020 under the supervision of the Data Manager. Each research assistant was required to administer six (6) questionnaires per day. Completed questionnaires were scrutinised and data entry completed each day to ensure accuracy and consistency. There were debriefs at the end of each day with field assistants to share challenges and lessons learnt with the view of finding solutions to any emerging problem. Research/field assistants in turn collected questionnaires for the following day at the end of each debriefing session. The number of completed questionnaires exceeded the targets. In all, **790 questionnaires were completed.**

### **Focus Group Discussions**

After consultation with KAMBE and KOTSA, and taking time constraints into consideration, it was agreed that there should be ten focus group discussions, each with participants from all three proposed BRT corridors. The number of FGDs equally took into consideration an expanded number of in-depth interviews, particularly for boda-boda workers and owners. These exercises were meant to capture perceptions and experiences of participants in the paratransit sector in Kampala with the view of providing suggestions on how to improve it. The discussions focused on the following: analysis of the micro-economy of sector, patterns of ownership and license-holding, employment and gender relationships, profitability, gross and net incomes. Each session had between 8-12 participants and lasted between one to two hours.

Due to logistical constraints, nine were completed.

<b>Focus Group Discussions</b>				
<b>Workers categories</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Date</b>
Boda-boda riders	9	0	KAMBE offices	31-1-20
Boda-boda stage leaders	9	0	KAMBE offices	31-1-20
Boda-Boda stage senior cadres	9	0	ATGWU office	1-2-20
KAMBE leadership	9	1	KAMBE offices	4-2-20
Taxi crews	8	1	KOTSA offices	29-1-20
Taxi stage workers	13	0	KOTSA offices	29-1-20
Taxi service workers	2	7	New Taxi Park	5-2-20
Taxi women conductors	0	11	KOTSA offices	1-2-20
KOTSA leadership	14	2	KOTSA offices	4-2-20
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>22</b>		

### **In-depth Interviews**

Pilot in-depth interviews with workers and owners from both the taxi and boda-boda industries tested the methodology and templates, resulting in minor modifications to the templates. A total of ten in-depth interviews were conducted between 27 January and 9 February 2020. They sought to provide a detailed understanding of the paratransit micro-economy including patterns of ownership and license-holding, profitability, gross and net incomes and the background political economy.

<b>Summary of in-depth interviews</b>		
<b>No.</b>	<b>Interviewee</b>	<b>Date</b>
1	Driver, Entebbe Stage	24/1/2020
2	Conductor, New Taxi Park	24/1/2020
3	Driver, Old Taxi Park	24/1/2020
4	Rider, Channel Street Stage	24/1/2020
5	Boda-boda owner	27/1/2020
6	Boda- boda owner-rider	27/1/2020
7	KOTSA representative	27/1/2020
8	Owner-driver, Old Taxi Park	27/1/2020
9	Boda-boda owner-rider	10/2/2020
10	SafeBoda rider	10/2/2020

### **Key informant interviews**

There were also seven key informant interviews to gather data and specialist opinion on the paratransit industry, including numbers of vehicles and workers, the history of data collection, financing models in the boda-boda industry, and the impact of credit availability on ownership patterns.

<b>Key informant interviews</b>		
24/1/2020	Rolf Paasch	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Resident Director, Uganda
27/1/2020	Robert Kyukyu	Strategic Management, KCCA
27/1/2020	James*	KOTSA representative
28/1/2020	Peter Kisambira	Centenary Bank
5/2/2020	Ashish Satija	Yuvraj International
8/2/2020	Shaka*	SafeBoda Rider
13/2/20	Jean-Philippe Garçon	AFD Programme Officer

\*Pseudonym for reasons of confidentiality

### **Field observations/interviews on route**

The team undertook taxi field visits along two designated BRT corridors to observe taxi and boda-boda stages, proposed BRT station sites, roadside paratransit services, and major pinch-points of traffic congestion. This also provided an opportunity to informally interview taxi crews. These field observations were conducted along the Jinja Road Corridor (25/1/2020) and Bombo Corridor (28/1/2020).

### **Additional field research.**

Further field research was conducted to collect detailed data on the numbers of stages and taxi workers to be found in four of the major taxi parks in the CBD (Usafi Taxi Park, Old Taxi Park, Namayiba Taxi Park and New Taxi Park), and numbers of boda-boda riders to be found in major CBD boda-boda stages, streets which have major concentrations of boda-bodas, including the CBD sections of Entebbe Road, Jinja Road and Bombo Road.

This was achieved by physically counting workers, vehicles and stages or, where possible, gaining access to the detailed data held by taxi park and boda-boda stage managers. The research was undertaken by volunteers from KOTSA and KAMBE.

### **Data management and analysis**

#### **Data entry and processing**

Data entry entailed assessment of data from the field, preparation and testing of data entry template, recruitment and training of data entry clerks, recruited on the basis of their acquaintance with the data entry software (SPSS-Statistical Package for Social Sciences), processes and procedures of data entry. Data processing begun with serialisation of received templates with unique identification number followed by coding of the open-ended questions. The data manager was in charge of the process.

#### **Data verification and cleaning**

Data cleaning entailed checking of sample point details, dates, missing data, wild codes and linkages across related questions. The first step of checking involved going back and verifying data from the templates. Further checks were carried out by running frequencies for each variable and in some instances, like in the cases of linked questions, cross-tabulations among others.

## **Data analysis**

The research team relied on both quantitative and qualitative data analysis techniques. Analysis of quantitative data was done using SPSS. It mainly involved generation of descriptive statistics in the form of percentages, frequency tables and cross-tabulations using valid percentages.

This process involved the following steps: a) organising data b) developing or identifying categories or pattern matching, and c) explanation building from organised data. Each aspect of the analytical procedure had its own challenges or intrigues which had to be handled properly in order to realise a better output. The research team ensured attention to detail at each and every stage of the entire process so as to avoid any pitfalls.

### Organising data.

The immediate task after data collection involved organising the qualitative data in a more manageable (i.e. accessible and retrievable) form; going through field notes several times and very keenly in order to have a clear picture of the raw data, identifying gaps and taking note of observations such as quotations. This stage also involved identification of temporary constructs for instance taking note of interesting observations such as interesting quotations that have been used in report preparation. Data gathered was organised according to thematic areas and sources.

### Pattern matching and explanation building

The next stage involved going through the data with keenness in order to identify emerging patterns and themes. The objective was to group emerging patterns and themes into categories which correspond to key issues under investigation. The explanation approach to the qualitative data analysis was used to search for trends in the data to explain the issues under study. It mainly involved organising data, generation of categories, themes and patterns.

Organisation of data consisted of examining the data for what appears to be key items of information around which the entire data set was structured. Part of the exercise involved going through the patterns to see how they relate to one other in reference to the issues under investigation. The overall aim was to establish the extent to which available data provided binding explanations as far as central issues under investigation are concerned.

### Study limitations, field challenges and mitigations measures

These were some of the notable limitations and challenges experienced or foreseen.

- Instances of missing questionnaire responses on the first day of the research either due to negligence by the research assistants or refusal by respondents to volunteer information.
- Failure by some questionnaire respondents to give reliable information on operating expenses, which consequently cast doubt on net payments (take-home pay) either due to inadequate framing of questions or perceived sensitivity of the issue.
- Lack of authoritative data or information on some issues under investigation such as the exact number of vehicles plying routes along the designated BRT lanes or corridors
- Logistical challenges, including a riot and use of tear gas in Kalerwe which obliged many of the targeted respondents to flee, and delays caused by unseasonal rainfall.

The research team took the following measures to mitigate these limitations and challenges:

- Based on their previous experience from Nairobi and Dakar BRT studies, informal transport workers from Kampala were recruited as research assistants to improve the conceptualisation and methodology of the study. In particular the team paid close attention to improve the framing of questions, research instruments, data collection techniques and analysis.
- The research team addressed the problem of missing or contested information for example net and gross income by triangulation and weighting information from multiple sources, such as in-depth interviews. Terms were replaced with improved wording to ensure better understanding. Apart from further probing by research assistants, FGDs and key informant interviews addressed specific questions which could not be investigated solely through the questionnaire survey.

### Ethical issues

The study team paid attention to some key ethical issues during actual data collection.

#### **Informed consent**

Informed consent is meant to avoid or to identify or articulate potential risks to human subjects involved in a research project. Informed consent in this case means individuals getting involved in the survey out of their free will instead of securing their participation through deceit, duress, fraud or similar unfair inducement or manipulation. It was applied to all the respondents in the study.

The team undertook measures to secure consent of participants, including explanation of the objective of the survey, the kind of information required and subsequent use. The team also provided reasons for choosing them as respondents. We did not consider it appropriate to use written means to request and secure their consent; it was, instead, granted orally.

#### **Confidentiality and anonymity**

Time was taken to explain intentions of the study and build rapport with respondents. Besides conducting separate interviews, the team was keen not to act in a manner that would raise expectations of both the survey respondents and FGD participants. Moreover, there were neither financial inducements nor any promises or form of reward in exchange of information. The team always maintained a reasonable distance between themselves and respondents/FGD participants.

#### **Security**

The paratransit industry is highly politicised and involves complex relationships between workers, owners, politicians, authorities and law-enforcement agencies, and between taxi and boda-boda workers and their associations. Confrontations can be highly antagonistic and frequently violent. There are particularly difficult tensions between the paratransit workforce and the police and security services, frequently involving arbitrary arrests and detentions, as well as widespread corruption and demands for bribes.

In reporting comments and complaints by workers and other paratransit stakeholders, the research team has had to take exceptional care not to endanger correspondents by potentially identifying individuals, or reporting some of the language that could potentially precipitate collective retribution or violence by those with vested interests in the paratransit industries.

## Kampala Taxi industry

Kampala has a large fleet of 14-seater Toyota minibuses, known as “taxis”, which form the backbone of public transport. Precise numbers of taxis are unknown. In 2007, one study calculated that there were 20-25,000 taxis in Kampala, based on available membership figures from (the now disbanded) Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA), and national government statistics on the number of public transport vehicles (Kamuhanda & Schmidt, 2009). It can be assumed that the fleet has expanded considerably since then.

According to the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) there were 21,000 registered taxis in 2018, after which KCCA’s management of the system and maintenance of the records was suspended when President Museveni abandoned the taxation of the taxi industry (Kyukyu, 2020). This was certainly a considerable under-estimate, as it does not include unregistered taxis.

All the taxis are imported, mostly second-hand from Japan, and are typically eight years old before they reach Uganda.

Taxis are organised on **stages**. These are lines of vehicles sharing the same destination, waiting at departure points to load passengers, or stages on route where passengers are dropped and picked up.

In the CBD, stages are grouped together in five major **taxi parks**. The field research on four of the parks, supplemented by results of a survey (which included Kisenyi Taxi Park) undertaken by KCCA the previous year (KCCA, 2019), estimates that the five stages employ more than 23,000 crew members and stage workers on 100 stages, operating 8,000 taxis. A comparison between the KCCA survey and the 2020 field research reveals that results of the two surveys are remarkably consistent.

<b>Summary of stages, taxis and workforce in CBD taxi parks</b>			
<b>Taxi Park</b>	<b>Number of stages</b>	<b>Number of taxis</b>	<b>Number of workers</b>
Old Taxi Park	36	2,685	7,686
New Taxi Park	42	2,575	8,623
Usafi	17	1,185	3,065
Namayiba	6	515	1,387
Kisenyi Taxi Park*		1,147	2,505
<b>Total</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>8,107</b>	<b>23,266</b>

Taxi crews and stage officials only

\*Source: (KCCA, 2019)

There are also many unregistered, “ungazetted” stages in CBD, partly because many passengers complain about the difficulty of getting to the new parks from the city centre, and the taxis respond to demand by establishing unregistered stages on the roadside. There are stages along the routes.

## Driving a taxi

Although there are some owner-drivers, most taxi drivers are informally employed by vehicle owners on the so-called “target system”. This is where the driver pays the owner an agreed daily fee (typically around 80,000/=) for the use of the vehicle. The driver is then responsible for the operating costs, such as the conductor’s wages, fuel, minor maintenance, police bribes and fines, and numerous other small services. Whatever fare revenue is left over after paying all these costs forms the driver’s income for the day.



The driver is almost certainly a man. There are some rare women conductors, but very few women taxi drivers in Kampala.

The day starts very early. Most drivers live in one of Kampala’s suburbs, taking passengers in and out of the Central Business District (CBD).

A typical taxi driver leaves home at around 4:00 am to collect their vehicle from where they have parked overnight. This can be a piece of private land, perhaps a petrol station or somewhere nearby the vehicle’s owner. A night guard at the parking area may charge 2,000/= per day to keep watch over the vehicle, paid weekly or monthly by the driver. The parking areas are often also washing bays for vehicles, with the vehicle cleaned overnight, costing the driver perhaps 10,000/= every two or three days.

The driver then picks up passengers heading for the CBD, either from the street or from informal suburban stages. These stages are entirely informal, controlled by self-declared stage managers or organisers who simply identify a particular corner of a street or busy area where passengers gather each morning, and provide some order to loading of passengers, alert drivers (by mobile phone) of passengers waiting for transport, provide some order etc, for which they get paid a small fee by the drivers for each pick-up. These suburban stage workers may only provide this service during the

morning rush hours and go on to other jobs for the rest of the day. For some, this job can be an entry into the taxi industry, perhaps befriending a driver and beginning to get work as a conductor.

The driver then makes his way to the CBD. On this first trip in the morning, if the conductor does not live close by, the driver may collect the fares himself, or ask one of the passengers – perhaps a student – to collect the fares for him, for which he gives a discount on the fare.

### The taxi stage

After dropping of the first load of passengers, the driver reports to his registered stage in the CBD and meets up with the conductor. The stage is the most important structure in the organisation of the taxi industry. Each stage serves a common route, grouped together in one of the major city centre taxi parks.



On arrival, drivers and other stage workers will normally catch up on the latest news and any other useful information. Some stages even buy a local newspaper to be read aloud for the rest to listen. The driver and his taxi may also both be inspected by one of the ‘callers’ (see below) to check their cleanliness. If the vehicle is in particularly poor condition (with wet seat upholstery for example) or if the driver’s or conductor’s clothes are dirty, they can be prevented from operating from the stage until improved.

On each stage, depending on its size, you will find drivers, conductors and a range of other occupations. These may include **callers** (sometimes referred to as ‘touts’) who are responsible for filling the taxi with passengers as soon as possible, paid by the driver or conductor; **loaders**, who assist passengers by loading bulky items into or on the roof of the taxi; **guides**, knowledgeable and frequently multilingual people who provide assistance and information to passengers; and **“turnboys”** who fix tyres and minor mechanical problems. There are also large numbers of **hawkers** selling a wide variety of goods to passengers as they wait to depart, **food vendors** preparing and selling meals and snacks to both workers and passengers, **mobile phone agents** selling airtime,

**porters** carrying passenger goods to and from the stages, and other people providing a wide variety of services.

All of these workers are loosely attached to the stage, many of them see their job on the stage as their entry point into the taxi industry, hoping to gain the necessary experience and trust to climb the career ladder towards a job as a conductor or driver.

Every stage has a leadership, mostly drivers, elected from all the workers. These include a Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson, providing overall management of the stage, a Secretary responsible for documenting stage meetings and maintaining records, a Treasurer responsible for stage finances, “Defence”, in charge of security, law and order and protection of workers’ and passengers’ property, “Welfare” responsible for the general well-being of stage workers and passengers and, in larger stages, a “Mobilizer” – an organiser responsible for keeping in contact with stage workers, calling meetings etc.



The stage leaders are responsible for implementing the agreed “loading chart”, a numbered list of drivers that forms the order in which they queue to fill their vehicles with passengers. The loading chart is determined the previous evening in a lottery. If there are for example forty taxis on a stage, each driver draws one of forty numbered tickets from a bucket which tells them which place they have in the queue the following morning.

Each stage has a Savings and Credit Co-operative (SACCO) welfare fund for drivers. SACCOs were first introduced in Uganda in the 1950’s and are now one of the fastest growing sectors in the co-operative movement. In effect, they are democratically (in theory at least) controlled microfinance organisations based in local communities or in the workplace.

The stage leaders are responsible for the collection of mandatory contributions to the SACCO welfare fund, normally the equivalent per trip of the fare of one or two passengers. The driver is

given a receipt which the driver (or conductor) shows at the exit to the park to prove that it has been paid.

The stage leadership also set the fares, enrol vehicles, maintain discipline, resolve disputes between stage members and liaise with the taxi park administration, the taxi association executive and relevant authorities. Whereas there is free registration at the stage for vehicles, drivers, conductors and other stage workers have to undergo strict and thorough tests and background checks and in most cases are required to pay a substantial fee (500,000/= or more) before they join. Joining a stage as a driver or conductor is not always easy. Successful applicants are often family members of others already working, or perhaps friends with stage leaders. Some of the very few women working on the stages complain of demands for sex from some stage chairmen in return for work (see p.40).

**Vehicle owners** need a driver, a route and a stage to operate, so will approach the stage leadership to enrol their taxi. If agreed, the leadership will enrol the vehicle at no cost and allocate a suitably experienced driver. The system is mutually beneficial to the owner and the stage. The stage management invests in building a pool of reliable and experienced drivers to attract owners, which provides employment for the stage workers.

### Operating the route



Taxis operate on a “fill and run” basis, which normally means that the taxi does not leave the stage until it is fully loaded with passengers. If the driver has a low number on the loading chart, he will be near the front of the queue, in which case he may not have long to wait before he can leave. There are clear advantages of working from the stage, especially if you have a low number. The fare is pre-determined, is not negotiable with passengers and therefore higher than fares from passengers picked up from the street.

If he gets a high number, rather than wait the driver may leave the stage to pick up passengers on the streets or take on other jobs, until called back to the stage by the callers when their turn is approaching.

When the taxi is full, the driver pays the welfare contribution, the caller and the loader. The welfare contribution is generally the equivalent of one passenger's fare, amounting to perhaps 15-20,000/= per day, depending on the number of trips. He also pays the callers and loaders around 2-3,000/= per trip. In some cases, loaders and callers can be the same person. The taxi sets off from the stage and leaves the park, showing their welfare fund receipt at the exit to prove that they have paid.

The streets are highly congested, particularly in the centre of Kampala, and taxis can easily get caught in traffic jams – particularly during heavy rain or during other disruptions. These delays cost the taxi crew money, reducing the number of round trips, losing passengers who take the faster (and more expensive) option of a boda-boda, or simply preferring to walk.

The crew may also have to cope with harassment and extortion from police and traffic officers, who will threaten arrest and heavy fines for minor infringements of traffic regulations or demand a bribe. This happens frequently, especially when driving taxis that are old or in bad condition.

They may make two or three round trips per day, depending on the length of the route. Passenger numbers drop significantly in the middle of the day. In these off-peak hours, the crew may rest and eat, cruise around the streets picking up passengers where they can, or they may hand the vehicle to a relief driver while they undertake other work – perhaps working as a vendor or in another business.

By 5:00 or 6:00pm the evening rush hour starts, and the crews will again queue in the allotted order at the CBD stage to pick up passengers, perhaps for the last trip of the day, although operations continue throughout 24 hours if there is sufficient demand. Most crews work more than thirteen hours a day.

If it has been a bad day, perhaps when the streets have been unusually congested or there has been heavy rain, the crew may have only been able to complete one or two trips and fare revenue will be lower than needed. It may not even be enough to pay the target to the owner. In these circumstances, the stage leaders may agree to increase fares for the evening trip.

After the last trip, the driver will then return the taxi to the parking area in the suburb close to where he lives, where the vehicle will be washed and cleaned for the following day.

Finally, at the end of the day or, in some cases, the end of the week, the driver has to pay the target fee to the owner or the owner's agent. This is normally in cash, although some are now beginning to pay using Mobile Money. Any money left over forms the driver's wages.

## Taxi organisation

### Historical background

With the collapse of the old Uganda Transport Company bus services in the 1980s and the growth of the taxi industry, taxi owners, drivers and conductors were organised under the Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA) in 1986. As the legal constraints of contracting public transport services were lifted, UTODA grew fast. In 1993, it took on the role of the main regulator of public transport, through owning taxi parks, operating stages, determining fares and – most importantly – being part and parcel of the licensing system, after being contracted to collect taxes for Kampala City Council (KCC) (Schmidt, 2007).



Kampala municipal bus station in the 1980s.  
(Photo: Carl Fleischhauer)

UTODA members included drivers (70%), owners (20%) and conductors (10%). It operated 125 stages around Kampala, with 650 UTODA staff nationally. It collected user fees from every taxi, and only registered and paid-up taxis were allowed to board passengers in the taxi-parks. UTODA also supported the police in regulating city traffic through a force of about 100 traffic wardens (Baker). By 2002, it had approximately 60,000 members out of which 30,000 were in Kampala.

There was, however, widespread unrest in the industry, leading to the formation of the Drivers and Conductors Association (DACA) to independently represent the interests of the workforce, in opposition to UTODA which was believed to have excluded drivers and conductors from its leadership. In July 2011, DACA organised a strike against UTODA's exploitation of workers and collusion with police corruption.

In 2011, KCC was disbanded and replaced by the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), which formed an interim committee in an attempt to reduce tensions in the industry, bring together the key stakeholders, including UTODA, DACA and the major stages from each of Kampala's divisions, and to oversee the development of the taxi industry. But UTODA boycotted the committee. In response, KCCA called for a 'general election' of all those in the taxi industry, to establish the Taxi Parks/Stages Coordinating Committee (TAPSCOM). This did not satisfy DACA, and TAPSCOM was subsequently dissolved, leading to the formation of the Kampala Operational Taxi Stages Association (KOTSA) in 2011.

In January 2015, the government removed UTODA and other rival taxi organisations from managing the taxi transport business and gave KCCA a full mandate of running the passenger transport business in the city.

According to KOTSA, KCCA could not cope with drivers' expectations and all the stages that had been united by UTODA disintegrated, and it was very difficult for each individual stage to stand on its own. This created a communication gap amongst drivers and conductors, a lack of security in the operations, and a breakdown in communications between taxi drivers and government authorities.

“On realizing the above said gaps in the industry, a number of “so-called” taxi organizations cropped up in a bid to win a tender for the collection of revenues” from taxis in Kampala previously undertaken by UTODA. and to manage the same business in the city, which had been relieved of UTODA by the KCCA that had come in place replacing KCC. This trend prompted the government to issue a directive restricting all taxi organizations to operate their business in their offices and not in taxi parks as a way to stop wrangles by them while struggling for the control of the business operations. “It was then that the authentic operational taxi drivers and conductors came together based on their taxi stages of origin, formed and established an association of their own without anyone not in the business operationally and co-named it “Kampala Operational Taxi Stages’ Association – KOTSA” (KOTSA, 2020).

In 2015, KOTSA affiliated to the Amalgamated Transport & General Workers Union (ATGWU). At the same time the remnants of TAPSCOM and UTODA merged with other smaller organisations to form the Uganda Transport Development Agency (UTRADA).

In October 2018, President Museveni donated 500 million shillings to the KOTSA SACCO at the Old Taxi Park, causing violent protest and friction with UTRADA, who claimed that the President had been duped. In September 2019, UTRADA attempted to swear in a new leadership, strongly resisted by KOTSA. Police became involved in running battles with Entebbe stage drivers after chaos ensued between the two factions over management of the stage, with claims that the fighting had been fuelled by police and ISO agents (Outa, 2019).

### Current organisation

Today, there are two major associations with members in the Kampala taxi industry: KOTSA and UTRADA. KOTSA claims more than 30,0000 members (KOTSA, 2020) (Mwanika & Spooner, 2017). During the period of field research, it proved difficult to engage with UTRADA's leadership, and therefore its membership and operations are not known and not explored further in this report. However, it is evident from interviews with stage workers and crews that individuals are frequently members of both organisations (and possibly other smaller organisations or self-help groups). Workers may join or leave associations, depending on what are perceived to be services or benefits on offer on a day-to-day basis. Membership figures fluctuate and precise numbers are difficult to determine.

Although KOTSA is the *Kampala* Operational Taxi Stages Association, it in reality covers the whole country, as the Kampala taxi parks are the termini for most national destinations as well as those within Greater Kampala.

In addition, there are taxi associations in all major long-distance destinations, such as the Entebbe Stages Conductors and Drivers Association (ESCADA) and the Jinja Taxi Operators Association (JTOA)

which organises workers at each end of their respective routes. Their membership overlaps with KOTSA. ESCADA played a major role in introducing the idea of ATGWU membership to KOTSA (Mwanika & Spooner, 2017).

KOTSA's constitution enables it to "carry on and undertake transport business of all sort and act as transporters of passengers and their cargo to their destinations; purchase, import and stock cars, buses, taxis, special cars for hire for the general transportation services of passengers and their cargo to their destinations, dealers in cars for hire and, taxi operators; (and) carry on the business of running and managing a driving school".

This suggests that KOTSA is a commercial public transport operator. Yet at the same time, the constitution enables KOTSA to "act as an arbitrator in stage related matters i.e. wrangles between drivers and their leaders, misunderstandings between drivers/conductors and passengers; prepare and conduct taxi stages' general elections; liaise with government agencies and NGOs to ensure smooth running of the association; conduct awareness campaigns on topical issues such as road safety; advocate for passenger rights on board, including vulnerable groups such as girl children, pregnant women, the elderly and people with disabilities" (KOTSA, 2011).

In 2016, KOTSA formed a transport cooperative society embracing all the taxi stages co-operative societies, the *Undugu Na Bidii* Taxi Drivers and Conductors Transport Cooperative Society Ltd. The SACCO is fully registered with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies and aims to transform the current 14-seater commuters into large carrier buses in line with the National Transport Master Plan.

There appears to be some confusion about the nature of the organisation: whether it is a transport operator, a welfare organisation, or an association to organise and represent the workforce in negotiation with transport authorities and informal employers (i.e. vehicle owners). This is explored further in key findings and recommendations (below).

The members of the KOTSA Executive Committee have immense experience in the taxi industry. On average, the participants in their focus group discussion had been working for more than 27 years as callers, conductors, drivers and stage workers. Committee members have previously been leaders or active members of nearly all the previous taxi industry organisations, including UTODA, Freeline, the original interim committee, DACCA and UTRADA.

KOTSA leaders and members recognise that the organisation has internal divisions, limited administrative capacity and a low understanding of the principles and values that should underpin democratic representative organisations. At the same time, the leadership expresses frustration at their lack of authority in implementing regulations and policies.

"The people we lead fail to respect the job we are doing which leads us to appear as if we are not doing right thing. We put in place measures that make our business a real business but people we lead don't respect it" (KOTSA, 2020).

In a sign of progress however, there was a change in leadership by KOTSA in 2019 which brought in a new leadership thought to be more representative of the rank and file of the membership.

## Taxi workforce: Survey Findings

There are numerous occupations within the taxi industry, which can be broadly categorised as crew members, stage workers and service workers. The questionnaire survey, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and field observations identified a wide range of jobs. Estimating the size and structure of the workforce is complicated by the multiple jobs that one person can do within one day in the taxi parks. A driver or conductor, for example, can also be a caller, relief driver, guide etc, especially when waiting in line on the stage.

### Taxi Crews



Taxi crew members include drivers, relief drivers, conductors and relief conductors. A total of 100 drivers and conductors participated in the questionnaire survey, including fifty-eight drivers, thirty conductors and two relief drivers. Ten were unspecified, implying that they undertake several roles.

#### Gender

Taxi crews are almost all men. Of the 100 drivers and conductors surveyed, only four were women.

#### Age of taxi crews

There is a wide age range among taxi drivers and conductors, although the large majority (82%) are 25 years old or older.



#### Education

The majority (68%) of taxi crew members had completed secondary education or more.

#### Additional Training

Most (90%) drivers and conductors had received no additional training since leaving school or college. Only 6% have received formal training as drivers or in road safety.

Additional Training		
	Frequency	Percent
<b>No any other training</b>	90	90.0
Driving	5	5.0
Trade union	1	1.0
Computer applications	1	1.0
Electricity course	1	1.0
Mechanic	1	1.0
Road safety	1	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

### Other occupations

63% of taxi crews reported that the taxi industry was their sole occupation. 17% stated that they also work on farms, and 7% were “businessmen”. The remainder also worked in construction, poultry-rearing, shop-keeping, catering, spare-parts dealing, street trading and welding.

### Duration of employment

The taxi industry is a source of long-term employment for many working as a crew member. Of the 100 people surveyed, 64 have worked in the taxi industry for ten years or more.

### Formal employment



Only nine of the 100 taxi crew members surveyed have written agreements with the person who pays them to do their job.

### Working Time

Reported working hours are extremely high, with more than 36% of respondents claiming to work more than 15 hours per day. Ten crew members claimed to be working nineteen hours a day.

Nearly all taxi crews work six or seven days per week, with 40% working seven days. 27% of crews explained, however, that their working time was irregular and/or unpredictable.

It is also difficult to assess the number of hours actually worked, as distinct from time spent waiting at the stages to collect passengers, taking breaks during off-peak travel time in the middle of the day etc.



## Livelihoods and employment relationships

The majority of drivers are informally employed by vehicle owners on the target system. There is widespread belief among taxi workers and transport professionals that large fleets of taxis are owned by people with powerful political and commercial interests in Kampala. Many taxi crews and stage workers do not know who owns the taxis they operate. Most target payments are made to owners' agents or proxies, rather than the owners themselves, and true ownership is shrouded in secrecy. This presents a major problem in understanding the market structure of the taxi industry from a fleet ownership perspective and identifying owners' representatives.

Nevertheless, there are some indications that taxi ownership is slowly shifting, in a similar way to the ownership patterns of boda-bodas (see below). Fundamentally, there is an over-supply of vehicles, making it difficult or impossible to make a profit. Discussions with taxi workers suggest that investment by large fleet owners is declining as they fail to make good returns on their capital, while at the same time more small operators and drivers are entering the market, many of whom are assisted by drivers' SACCOs.

Owner-drivers and small operators buy vehicles and are able to make a modest income, but many are unable to cover the true cost of maintenance or depreciation, so (in effect) drive the vehicles into the ground.

### Informally employed drivers

From the passengers' fares received, drivers informally employed on the target system have to pay the daily target to the boss (owners and their agents), the callers and themselves, along with the stage committee, the stage guide, the KCCA and the police.

In 2017, one journalist estimated that on average "a taxi makes between 100,000/= and 150,000/= a day. On this amount the owner of the vehicle gets between 60,000/= and 90,000/= depending on the condition of the vehicle and the route on which it is. The driver saves an average of 50,000/= which he has to share with his conductor" (Kikobera, 2017).

The research results suggest that this is broadly accurate, although in-depth interviews with drivers employed under the target system suggest that earnings can fluctuate considerably, largely depending on the route and the age of the vehicle. An older vehicle requires more frequent servicing, is off-road more frequently for repairs (hence reduced working days) and attracts greater attention from the police – costing more in fines and bribes.

The following table attempts to provide a very approximate picture of the livelihoods of two drivers based on interviews, each with different circumstances and resulting incomes. It is important to bear in mind that the claimed age of the vehicle is not necessarily accurate – many drivers are unaware of the true age of a vehicle which was almost certainly imported second-hand, may have had several subsequent owners, and may simply be unknown – even by the owners.

<b>DRIVING A TAXI (TARGET SYSTEM)</b>				
Route	Entebbe Route		Entebbe Route	
Stage	Entebbe Stage		Old Taxi Park/ Conrad Stage	
	Driver A		Driver B	
<b>Number of Seats</b>	14 Seats		14 Seats	
<b>Age of Vehicle</b>	10 Years		14 Years	
<b>Working days per year</b>	353 Days		300 Days	
<b>Km travelled per day</b>	280 Km		210 Km	
<b>Fuel cost per Km</b>	353.57 Per Km		471.43 Per Km	
<b>Annual Costs</b>				
Target (per day/year)	85,000	30,005,000	85,000	25,500,000
Fuel (per day/year)	99,000	34,947,000	99,000	29,700,000
Conductor (per day/year)	40,000	14,120,000	30,000	9,000,000
Relief Conductor (per day/year)	0		0	
Relief Driver (per day/year)	0		0	
Breakdown repairs (per month)	0		0	
Routine Service (per week/year)	0		100,000	5,200,000
Carwash (every two days/year)	10,000	1,765,000	10,000	1,765,000
Police bribes (per month/year)	40,000	480,000	120,000	1,440,000
Fines (per year/year)	200,000	200,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
Callers (per day/year)	8,000	2,824,000	6,000	1,800,000
Night Guard (per day/year)	2,000	706,000	2,000	600,000
Stage guides (per day/year)	0	0	25,000	7,500,000
<i>Abakuma Ekondo</i> (per day/per year)	1,000	353,000	1,000	300,000
Stage guide bribes (per/day)	8,000	2,824,000	4,000	1,200,000
<b>Total Annual Costs</b>		<b>88,224,000</b>		<b>85,005,000</b>
<b>Annual Income</b>				
Passenger Fares (per day/year)	300,000	105,900,000	300,000	90,000,000
<b>Annual Income less Expenditure</b>		<b>17,676,000</b>		<b>4,995,000</b>
<b>Daily net income</b>		<b>50,074</b>		<b>14,150</b>

<b>Explanatory notes</b>	
<b>Route</b>	Each taxi is allocated a route by the stage. Some are more lucrative than others.
<b>Stage</b>	Each driver is based on a stage, normally a terminal at the beginning or end of each route, or one of the major taxi parks in CBD.
<b>Number of seats</b>	The typical Toyota minibus taxi has fourteen seats, although some some conductors will illegally add makeshift additional seats
<b>Age of vehicle</b>	The age of the vehicle is an important factor in determining livelihoods, affecting fuel consumption, attractiveness to passengers, unwanted attention by traffic police, cost of maintenance etc.
<b>Purchase price per taxi</b>	Cost of purchase (owner-drivers)
<b>Loan</b>	Outstanding loan still to repay
<b>Loan period</b>	Remaining period left to repay the loan
<b>Working days per year</b>	Estimated number of days per year that the driver is on the road earning money
<b>Km travelled per day</b>	Estimated distance covered per day
<b>Fuel cost per Km</b>	Daily cost of fuel divided by Km travelled per day
<b>Annual Costs</b>	
Fuel	Daily cost of fuel consumption
Target	Daily fee demanded by vehicle owner (or owner's agent)
Conductor	Approximate or typical daily wage paid by the driver to the conductor, normally negotiated at the end of each day, dependent on the net earnings left after all expenses taken into account. Conductors may also be members of the driver's family
Payments to the stage	Payments made at the stage, including mandatory welfare fund contributions
Routine Service	Regular maintenance of vehicle (changing oil filters, checking tyres etc), normally weekly or fortnightly
Police bribes	Estimated monthly cost of police bribery, normally to escape a fine for infringement of traffic regulations. Older vehicles with more defects (poor tyres, lights not working etc) are likely to attract more attention and thus have to pay more bribes
Relief Driver	Temporary driver paid for a short time to cover for the regular conductor when taking a break or undertaking other duties on the stage.
Callers	Small sums of money paid to the callers on the stages (both termini and along the route) during each trip to fill the taxi with passengers in the shortest time possible
Carwash	Daily cost of cleaning the vehicle
Loan repayment	Loan repayments, generally paid weekly or monthly
Breakdown repairs	Cost of major repairs not covered in the routine service. Normally the financial responsibility of the vehicle owner.
Night Guard	Fees paid for guarding the vehicle when parked overnight
Fines	Officially imposed receipted fines for infringement of traffic regulations
<i>Abakuma Ekondo</i>	"Clamp-keepers" – stage workers on taxi routes who check drivers' receipts that they have paid at their stage for the right to work the route. The vehicles are clamped to prevent the driver escaping without payment.
PSV	Annual Public Service Vehicle (PSV) licence, paid by the vehicle owner.
3rd party Insurance	Minimum legal insurance cover required to operate a taxi
<b>Income</b>	
Passenger fares	Typical amount of money collected each day from passengers

**Driver A** has a relatively new vehicle working on the Kampala-Entebbe route, based in Entebbe. He has to pay 85,000/= daily target fee to the owner six days each week, but not on Sundays (“salary day”) when he is free to earn as much as possible from passenger fares. The vehicle is serviced each Saturday, paid for out of Friday’s target – which means in effect that the owner pays for the routine service. He normally charges passengers 3,000/= for Entebbe-Kampala and 3,500/= for Kampala-Entebbe, plus negotiated fares for passengers travelling part of the route. He estimates that he would collect 75,000/= per return trip and is normally able to complete four round trips per day, generating approximately 300,000/= gross income each day.

The low age of the vehicle could explain the low cost of fuel per Km, the lack of need for regular servicing, and the relatively low police bribery demands and fines. Being based at a stage in Entebbe results in the lower cost of stage guides and possibly less aggressive extortion from the police. All of which contributes to a comparatively high daily net income.

**Driver B** works on the same route, but based in Kampala, and in a considerably older vehicle. His cost of fuel per Km is higher, he has to pay for regular servicing, and he pays three times as much in police bribes and five times as much in fines as Driver A. He has to pay more to the stage guide in the Old Taxi Park and, unlike Driver A, he is normally only able to complete three return trips per day rather than four – perhaps due to the congestion in Kampala CBD. Assuming his passengers pay the same as Driver A for the same trip, one would expect that he would only be collecting 225,000/= per day, yet his daily gross earnings are the same as Driver A (300,000/=), which could lead to the conclusion that he might be overloading passengers to make up the difference. (He reported that he only worked 300 days per year, considerably less than Driver A, although it is possible that he did not include Sunday “salary days” in his calculation, in which case they both work the same number of days). All of these factors combine to leave Driver B with a far lower daily net income.

## Owner-drivers

It might be assumed that an owner-driver should normally be able to earn considerably more than an informally employed driver. But often the owner-driver earns little more than a driver working on the target system and is under pressure to work similarly long hours in bad conditions.

Assuming that a would-be owner does not have the capital to buy a vehicle outright, the taxi will be bought with a loan. In a few cases, this will be achieved with a loan from a bank, repaid over a two-year period, or from the dealer, repaid over six months. In the majority of cases however, the loan will be obtained from large fleet owners acting as middlemen – often people with influence and power in the transport industry, who may borrow from the banks and re-lend the money on interest, rather than owning the vehicle directly and operating on the target system. Typically, such a loan would be repaid over six to twenty-four months at anything between 10-40% interest.

Many of these owners have little or no real business experience but are attracted by the low cost of entry into the industry. But given the very slim profit margins, they find it difficult to meet the repayments. This places pressure on the driver to work long hours, and to avoid the cost of routine maintenance, which inevitably reduces the life-expectancy of the vehicle – typically five to eight

years. Major repairs or maintenance, such as the replacement of tyres, will be undertaken on credit, thereby increasing the financial pressure.

If the driver fails to meet the loan repayments but the taxi is still roadworthy, the middleman lender may approach the stage where the driver is based and identify another driver who would be prepared to take on the remaining debt and continue to operate the vehicle – perhaps not realising that they may be trapped by a high cost of repayments.

The following illustrative example attempts to indicate the profitability of a typical owner-driver's operation, based on a fourteen-year old vehicle with an operational life expectancy of a further six year, and assumes that the driver has available capital of 10,000,000 /=. Interest rates are highly variable, but for illustrative purposes, we assume 22%. We assume that the taxi is capable of generating a daily average income from passenger fares of 160,000 but declining by 5% each year as the taxi suffers wear and tear and therefore becomes less attractive to passengers over its lifetime. It is assumed that the taxi can operate 340 days per year, considering days lost through maintenance or external circumstances.

Fuel consumption is inefficient, so fuel costs are high. The vehicle is in poor condition, so less attractive to passengers and attracts frequent fines and demands for bribes from police. It breaks down frequently, costing a lot in refurbishment and repairs.

In this example, the owner driver has a meagre but positive operational profit over the life of its investment. However, these profits should cover the remuneration of both the owner-driver's labour and his capital investment. If one were to assign all the operational profit to capital remuneration (i.e. saving all this profit without any money left to pay for his own labour), the internal rate of return on equity (EIRR) would be an apparently high 66.22% per year. However, the owner-driver cannot afford not to use a significant part of his net income for his and his family's survival. The financial analysis demonstrates that when the owner-driver spends more than a meagre 4,674/= per calendar day, the rate of return decreases to zero or less, and the owner's initial capital is eaten away (even without taking inflation into consideration).

Actually, the operational losses occur in the last year of operation, when declining fare revenues become insufficient to cover operational expenses and the reimbursement of the outstanding loan. Saddled with this expensive loan, the owner-driver has no alternative but to maintain operation. He has no alternative other than finding additional sources of revenue (or another loan) to provide a livelihood and cover his losses.

This demonstrates that the industry is extremely precarious, and it does not take much for a driver or owner-driver to lose money. The profitability can vary wildly from one day to another. All it needs is a thunderstorm, a crackdown by police or a mechanical breakdown to push a driver into debt. On the other hand, on a good day he can make good money. Most owner drivers have no idea whether their business is profitable or not. They simply survive from day to day and hope that the next day will be a good one. Many will have some other potential source of income. If they have a particularly bad day, an owner-driver might get some money as a caller, manage to sell some phone cards, or

withdraw savings from their stage-based SACCO, for example. At worst, they will be forced to borrow more money from a moneylender, and risk falling into a spiral of debt.

<b>TAXI OWNER-DRIVER</b>				
<b>Age of taxi at time of purchase (years)</b>		14		
<b>Purchase price</b>		20 000 000		
<b>Loan</b>		10 000 000		
<b>Loan period (years)</b>		6		
<b>Interest</b>		22,00%		
<b>Operational life expectancy (years)</b>		6		
<b>Passenger fares per day</b>		160 000		
<b>Operating days per year</b>		340		
<b>Costs</b>			<b>Total</b>	
Principal (purchase price)			-20 000 000	
Interest			-8 945 866	
Fuel (per day)	50 000		-102 000 000	
Loading fees / guides (per day)	18 000		-36 720 000	
Police bribes and fines (per week)	80 000		-24 960 000	
Conductor (per day)	12 000		-24 480 000	
Breakdown repairs (per year)	2 400 000		-18 517 464	
Routine Service (per month)	200 000		-14 400 000	
Car wash (per week)	30 000		-9 360 000	
Callers (per day)	5 000		-10 200 000	
Parking / Guard (per day)	2 000		-4 080 000	
PSV licence (per year)	600 000		-3 600 000	
3rd party Insurance (per year)	120 000		-720 000	
<b>Total Costs</b>			<b>-277 983 330</b>	
<b>Passenger fares per day</b>	<b>160 000</b>		<b>288 220 023</b>	
<b>EBITDA</b>			<b>39 182 559</b>	
<b>Net Income</b>			<b>10 236 693</b>	
<b>Investment</b>	<b>FIRR</b>	<b>38.80%</b>	<b>ROI</b>	<b>1.96</b>
<b>Equity</b>	<b>EIRR</b>	<b>66.20%</b>	<b>ROE</b>	<b>2.02</b>

Explanatory notes	
<b>Investment</b>	The total capital expenditure (or CAPEX) at the beginning of the cycle, i.e. the cost of the vehicle plus initial upgrades and customisation as required.
<b>Equity</b>	The share of the Investment that is paid with the owner money (i.e. not borrowed)
<b>EBITDA</b>	"earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization" all money left from the revenues after paid all expenditures but payment to the lender, i.e. the principal and interest.
<b>Net Income</b>	All earnings (i.e. passenger fares) minus all costs, including financial costs and taxes.
<b>Internal rate of return (IRR)</b>	Represents the yearly financial gain from the capital invested at the beginning in %. If calculated on the Investment, we speak of the Financial IRR (FIRR). If calculated on the Equity, we speak of the Equity IRR (EIRR).
<b>Return on Investment (ROI)</b>	The ratio of the EBITDA earned during the whole cycle to the Investment
<b>Return on Equity (ROE)</b>	The ratio of the EBITDA earned during the whole cycle to the Equity

## Taxi Owners

Unlike owner drivers, taxi owners informally employ drivers and conductors through the target system, which removes their responsibility for most costs, other than servicing and repairs and removes the risks of bad weather, police extortion and other daily occurrences.

In the illustration below, the owner makes a significant profit since return on equity (ROE) is more than 4.5! It assumes the same age, price, operating capacity and borrowing arrangements as the owner driver shown above, with a yearly 5% decrease in target income as the vehicle ages. It assumes a daily target of 80,000.

Nevertheless, the owner of one or a few vehicles faces the same daily uncertainties as the owner-driver, is no more likely to be financially literate, and is dependent on the informally employed driver to earn sufficient fare income to meet the target. As demonstrated above, this is very challenging. If the driver is unable to meet the daily target, the owner or his agent may approach the driver's stage leadership to identify a replacement driver believed to be more capable of earning sufficient income from passenger fares – perhaps by working longer hours, having a better relationship with the stage leadership, the passengers (or the police), or driving more skilfully or aggressively.

<b>TAXI OWNER</b>				
Age of vehicle at time of purchase	14			
Purchase price	20 000 000			
Loan	10 000 000			
Loan period (years)	6			
Interest	22,00%			
Operational life expectancy (years)	6			
Daily target	80 000			
Target decrease per year	5%			
Operating days per year	340			
<b>Costs</b>		<b>Total over operational life expectancy</b>		
Principal (purchase price)		-20 000 000		
Interest		-8 945 866		
Routine service (per week)	150 000	-60 181 758		
Major repairs		-14 894 880		
PSV licence (per year)	600 000	-3 600 000		
3rd party Insurance (per year)	120 000	-720 000		
<b>Total Costs</b>		<b>-108 342 504</b>		
<b>Target income per day</b>	<b>80 000</b>	<b>144 110 012</b>		
<b>EBITDA</b>		<b>64 713 374</b>		
<b>Net Income</b>		<b>35 767 508</b>		
<b>Investment</b>	<b>FIRR</b>	<b>67.70%</b>	<b>ROI</b>	<b>3.24</b>
<b>Equity</b>	<b>EIRR</b>	<b>119.60%</b>	<b>ROE</b>	<b>4.58</b>

## Taxi Fleet Owners

As explained above, it is not possible to estimate the livelihoods or profitability of owners of large fleets, although it is understood that many are withdrawing from ownership because of the meagre returns on capital. It would be possible to provide an illustration by simply scaling up from the example of a single vehicle owner, as above, but this would not take into consideration the likely access to alternative sources of capital borrowing, lucrative relationships with those in power and influence, and the possibilities of avoiding (or benefitting from) extortion and corruption.

## Drone Taxis

Toyota Hiace Drones are up-market 12-seater minibuses used as taxis, mostly serving long-distance routes. There are currently a few hundred of these, but numbers are growing.

New laws introduced in 2018 banned the import of vehicles more than eight years old, which increased the demand for the newer drone taxis.

Drone taxi crews can earn considerably more than their counterparts in the traditional Toyota minivans. Passenger fares are higher. A new vehicle is more fuel-efficient, less likely to break down and in good condition, therefore attracts lower police extortion and fines.

A typical drone taxi imported when it is relatively new (less than eight years) and works on the long-distance routes. A conductor can earn 30,000/= or more per day (depending on the relationship with the driver), and the driver can earn 75,000/=.

<b>CONDUCTOR IN A DRONE TAXI</b>			
<b>Number of Seats</b>	12 Seats		
<b>Age of Vehicle</b>	8 Years		
<b>Working days per year</b>	320 Days		
<b>Km travelled per day</b>	450 km		
<b>Fuel cost per Km</b>	489 per km		
<b>Annual Costs</b>			
Fuel (per day/year)	220,000	70,400,000	
Target (per day/year)	100,000	32,000,000	
Driver (per day/year)	75,000	24,000,000	
Callers/stage leaders - Mutukula (per day/year)	50,000	16,000,000	
Callers/stage leaders - Kampala (per day/year)	30,000	9,600,000	
Lunch (per day/year) Conductor & Driver	20,000	6,400,000	
Stage assistants (per day/year)	10,000	3,200,000	
Carwash (per day/year)	10,000	3,200,000	
Routine Service (per week/year)	50,000	2,600,000	
Police bribes (per week/year)	40,000	2,080,000	
Breakdown repairs (per month)	0		
Fines (per month/year)	0		
Night Guard (per day/year)	0		
<b>Total Annual Costs</b>		<b>169,480,000</b>	
<b>Income</b>			
<b>Passenger Fares (per day/year)</b>	<b>560,000</b>	<b>179,200,000</b>	
<b>Annual Income less Expenditure</b>		<b>9,720,000</b>	
<b>Daily net income</b>		<b>30,375</b>	

This example is taken from a conductor, rather than a driver, but the basic figures are the same. It is interesting to note the relatively low cost of police bribes, fines, and breakdown repairs, due the good condition of the new vehicle and the proportionately shorter periods of time spent in Kampala

where the threat of police extortion is higher. Given the long distance of the route, the costs also include lunch for both driver and conductor.

## Drone Taxi Owners

The following illustrative example is based on an owner of an eight-year old vehicle with a further operational life expectancy of eight years and assumes that the driver has available capital of 30,000,000 /=-.

As with the 'traditional' taxi, interest rates are variable, but for illustrative purposes, we assume 18% to be paid over two years. We assume that the taxi is capable of generating an average daily target income of 100,000 but declining by 5% each year, and can operate 320 days per year, considering days lost through maintenance or external circumstances. This results in a reasonable rate of return for the owner's investment since it factors in some of the technical risks.

<b>DRONE TAXI OWNER</b>				
<b>Age of vehicle (years)</b>	8			
<b>Purchase price</b>	70 000 000			
<b>Loan</b>	40 000 000			
<b>Loan period (years)</b>	2			
<b>Interest</b>	18,00%			
<b>Operational life expectancy</b>	8			
<b>Daily target</b>	100 000			
<b>Operating days per year</b>	320			
		Year		
<b>Costs</b>		0	<b>Total</b>	
Principal (purchase price)		-30 000 000	-70 000 000	
Interest			-11 097 248	
Major repairs		-5 000 000	-27 500 000	
Routine service (per week)	-100 000		-41 600 000	
PSV licence (per year)	-600 000		-4 800 000	
3rd party Insurance (per year)	-120 000		-960 000	
<b>Total Costs</b>		<b>-35 000 000</b>	<b>-155 957 248</b>	
<b>Target income</b>			<b>182 250 493</b>	
<b>EBITDA</b>			<b>112 390 493</b>	
<b>Net Income</b>		<b>-35 000 000</b>	<b>26 293 245</b>	
<b>Investment</b>	<b>FIRR</b>	<b>16.00%</b>	<b>ROI</b>	<b>1.50</b>
<b>Equity</b>	<b>EIRR</b>	<b>15.10%</b>	<b>ROE</b>	<b>1.75</b>

## Stage Workers

Stage workers include the leadership (normally a chairperson, vice-chairperson, secretary, treasurer, *defence* (responsible for security), welfare and *mobilizer* (responsible for organising meetings among workers)).

Taxi stage leadership structure	
Position	Roles
Chairperson	Overall administration of the stage and coordination.
Vice Chairperson	Deputises for the chairperson and performs other roles
Secretary	Documents minutes of meetings and files all stage documents.
Treasurer	Responsible for finances of the stage
Defence	In-charge of security, law and order, and safety of items and property
Welfare	Responsible for the general wellbeing of crew members, passengers and stage administrators.
Mobilizer	An organiser, calling together meetings etc.

Source: (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020)


There are also guides, callers (touts), owners' agents, loaders, porters, security guards, vendors, hawkers, caterers, and mobile phone agents. Along some major routes, you can also find *Abakuma Ekondo* ("Clamp Keepers"), who prevent taxis from picking up and dropping off passengers at stages without being registered at a city centre terminal stage. If they are discovered, their vehicle has a wheel clamp fitted, to be removed on payment of a fine.

### Gender

The taxi stage workforce is dominated by men. Out of the 132 respondents, there were only eight (6%) women.

### Age of stage workers

There is a wide age range among taxi stage workers, although the large majority (92%) are 25 years old or older




### Education

The majority (69%) of taxi crew members had completed secondary education or more.

### Additional Training

Only 19 (14%) of the respondents have received any additional training. Of these, six had been trained as mechanics. The remainder had training in driving (from the Uganda Driving Standards Agency), road safety, accounting, building, first aid and trade union organisation.



### Occupations


Nearly all stage worker respondents in the survey were stage chairs, callers, guides or other “supervisors”. 48 respondents had other occupations. 24 were involved in farming. The remainder had a variety of jobs, including builder, “businessman”, driver, hairdresser, car-washer (*kanabe*), restaurant owner, trader and public toilet supervisor.

### Stage occupations

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Stage chairman	54	40.9%
Caller	46	34.8%
Stage guide	29	22.0%
Stage supervisor	2	1.5%
Loader / porter	1	0.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>100%</b>

### Duration of employment

Stage workers have been working in the taxi industry for an average of 11 years (median 12 years), but there is wide variation, from those just entering the stage to those who have been working for up to 25 years.




### Formal employment

Only eight of the 132 taxi stage workers surveyed have written agreements with the person who pays them to do their job.

### Working time on the stages

Similar to the hours reported by the crews, the reported working hours for stage workers are extremely high, with more than 35% of respondents claiming to work more than 16 hours per day. Seven stage workers claimed to be working more than eighteen hours a day.



Nearly all stage workers are at work six or seven days per week, with 47% working six days and 40% working seven days

Of 130 stage worker respondents, 30 declared that their working time was unpredictable or irregular.

### Livelihoods

With the exception of workers who are paid or hired directly by passengers (porters, vendors, hawkers etc), stage workers are dependent on taxi crews for their income. Average net earnings among those interviewed was 24,750/= and median 30,000/=, but there is a wide spread of income, ranging from the senior stage leaders to callers.

### Stage workers net daily earnings

	Frequency	Percent
Less than 10,000	17	12.9
10-15,000	21	15.9
16-20,000	17	12.9
21-25,000	7	5.3
26-30,000	35	26.5
31-35,000	6	4.5
36-40,000	9	6.8
More than 40,000	20	15.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>100</b>

## Service workers

### Occupations

215 Service Workers responded to questionnaires, including mechanics, tyre-fitters, panel beaters, street vendors, food vendors, cleaners, and spare parts dealers, as well as stage workers operating in service areas.

Fifty respondents had additional occupations. Eleven also worked as drivers, and nine were involved in farming. The remainder had a variety of jobs, including barbers, three estate agents/'house brokers', builders, "businesswoman/man", butchers, caterers, chapati-sellers, snack-makers, food vendors, hairdressers, solar power salesmen, mechanics, painters, shopkeepers, spare parts dealers, tailors and traders.

### Gender

The taxi services workforce employs greater numbers of women than crews and stage workers. Out of the 215 respondents, 87 were women, more than 40%.

Unsurprisingly, nearly all women in taxi services are employed as food vendors, whereas all but one of the relatively high-earning mechanics are men.

### Age of service workers

There is a wide age range among service workers, although a large majority (78%) are 25 years old or older



### Education

The majority (66%) of taxi crew members had completed secondary education or more.

### Additional training


Thirty-two of service worker respondents have undergone some sort of additional training, of which fifteen had trained as mechanics and six in hairdressing. The remainder had attended training in subjects including driving (5), catering (2), computer skills and electronics, first aid, and security.

Service worker respondents' occupations		
Men	Frequency	Percent
Mechanic	62	48.4
Cleaner	18	14.1
Food Vendor	16	12.5
Stage manager/chairperson	7	5.5
Spare parts	6	4.7
Stage guide	5	3.9
Caller	4	3.1
Tyre fitter/repairer	4	3.1
Street vendor	3	2.3
Unofficial stage supervisor	2	1.6
Panel Beater	1	0.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Women		
Stage manager/chairperson	1	1.1
Panel Beater	0	0.0
Unofficial stage supervisor	1	1.1
Caller	2	2.3
Mechanic	1	1.1
Street vendor	1	1.1
Cleaner	0	0.0
Tyre fitter/repairer	0	0.0
Spare parts	2	2.3
Stage guide	0	0.0
Food Vendor	79	90.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>100.0</b>



### Duration of employment

Service workers have been working in the taxi industry for a considerably shorter time than crews and stage workers, an average of just 6.6 years, and a median of just 3 years



### Formal employment

Only seventeen of the 215 taxi stage workers surveyed have written agreements with the person who pays them to do their job.


### Working time in service areas

Working hours are considerably less than those of crew members and stage workers, averaging 9.7 hours per day, although they also work six or seven days per week.

Of 215 service worker respondents, 56 declared that their working time was unpredictable or irregular.

### Service worker livelihoods

Of the 201 service workers responding to the question on their sources of income, 52% simply declared “customers” which, without further interrogation, is not helpful in our understanding of the micro-economy. Of the remainder, it is clear that the economy of the service workers is dependent on taxi crews and boda-boda riders.



Just over 40% of those responding in the questionnaire survey gave examples of others that they have to pay in conducting their business. Of these, 35% pay other business owners, and 30% simply stated that they had to pay “the boss”. These could mean a wide variety of employment relationships, including (for example) payment to the owner of a vehicle, a leader of the stage, a wholesaler or others. 18% are informal employers, including those who pay “casual labourers”.

	Frequency	Percent
Customers	106	52.7%
Drivers	42	20.9%
Boda Boda riders	19	9.5%
Conductors	16	8.0%
Vehicle owners	9	4.5%
Workers	8	4.0%
Shopkeepers	1	0.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

	Frequency	Percent
Owner of Business	31	34.8%
Boss	27	30.3%
Casual Labourers	9	10.1%
Rent	9	10.1%
Employees	7	7.9%
Landlord	6	6.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

When asked to provide an indication of net daily earnings (“What is the average amount of money for yourself, after making all these payments”), there were very wide differences, ranging between 10,000/= and 200,000/= with a mean average of 37,000/= and the median between 26-30,000/=.

Even considering the likely inaccuracies or misunderstandings of the question or response from the responder or surveyor, it demonstrates that within the public transport service economy there is a sizeable minority of people making a considerable income, with 10% earning more than 65,000/= per day.

<b>Service workers net daily earnings</b>		
	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
10,000 or less	32	14.9
11-15,000	21	9.8
16-20,000	30	14.0
21-25,000	11	5.1
26-30,000	37	17.2
31-35,000	10	4.7
36-40,000	18	8.4
41-45,000	3	1.4
46-50,000	13	6.0
51-55,000	2	0.9
56-60,000	14	6.5
61-65,000	1	0.5
More than 65,000	23	10.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>100</b>



Photo: GLI

## Key issues in the taxi industry

The questionnaire survey included an open-ended question, simply asking workers “What are the problems you face at your work”, and focus group participants were asked “What are the major problems you face in your job?”. The questionnaires among taxi workers provided 352 responses, including 113 from crew members, 24 from stage workers and 215 from service workers (including some who service the boda-boda industry).

Most responses fell into clear thematic categories

**Police corruption and harassment** including demands for bribes, arrest, harassment and brutality by both police and KCCA officers. This is a major problem, experienced on a day-to-day basis by all workers in the industry. Drivers and conductors are routinely stopped for minor or non-existent infringements and threatened with arrest, heavy fines and/or impounding of the vehicle or removal of the number plates. The alternative is to simply pay the bribe, as inevitably demanded.

One driver, based on the Kawempe stage, explained “We make an average of 13,000 shillings per day, but each of us get stopped by the police once or twice a week, each time demanding a 10,000-shilling bribe” (Thomas, 2020).

Service workers face similar harassment, arrests and confiscation of goods in raids by KCCA enforcement teams, frequently prompting accusations of brutality.

When asked in the focus groups whether there was any prospect of dialogue with the police and/or KCCA enforcement officers, the main response was one of scepticism: “There are certain things you can’t say in a dialogue that will land us in problems. If we accuse the traffic police of always asking and forcefully getting bribes from us drivers, they will instead tighten how they handle us” (taxi crew member). One stage worker described how when the trade union raised stage workers’ concerns over police harassment and corruption, the police “retaliated and made roadblocks impounding our taxis while accusing us that we reported them so we had to face it rough” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

**Problems caused by passengers and customers** including abuse, refusal to pay, and disrespect. Many workers raised the problem of abusive or arrogant passengers and customers. Some passengers refuse to pay the fare or pretend they do not have the right money. Service workers, including mechanics, spare part dealers and food vendors, complain that customers frequently refuse to pay or delay payment.

This is symptomatic of a broader **lack of respect, self-respect and discrimination** between workers within the workforce, the broader disrespect for taxi workers among the public and people outside

“The issue is corruption because once the traffic officer identifies something small with your taxi; he or she just turns off the engine and stands aside just waiting to hear the ‘Luganda’ (bribe you give to the traffic office when caught in wrong)” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

“Traffic police are a big problem because instead of guiding our driving and cautioning them over the traffic rules and regulations, they instead hide in corners of the road where our drivers don’t expect them purposely to fault find and arrest or penalize our drivers. This makes our drivers operate in fear and suspense as their hearts are always worried of traffic police and the bribes they have to give them” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

“We are unsecure in the places where we work in especially the park. The police and KCCA officers always chase us here and there and when they arrest us, they not only take us to prison but also take our items that we have been selling. Generally, there is no serious business here” (Taxi Service Workers, 2020).

“The major problem we face is that the passengers have a way they complicate our job in a way that they pay less money than what we had agreed on for a particular journey when they reach their destination and sometimes they don’t pay at all. They undermine us knowing that we can’t fight and force them to pay. In this situation drivers should come in and intervene to help us with such passengers” (Women Taxi Conductors, 2020).

the industry, and discriminatory tribalism. Workers frequently complain of the lack of recognition and respect for their job, including abusive behaviour between the workers themselves.

The few women in the industry face **gender discrimination and sexual harassment**, both from passengers and male workmates.

“We are harassed by male passengers; they abuse us and call us all sorts of names, they say that it seems we have failed in our marriages, that we are mannerless, we should just go back home and look after our children and other passengers just touch our bodies as they please (bad touches). The male passengers are so biased, they don't want us to do this kind of job” (Women Taxi Conductors, 2020).

Women face discrimination and exploitation in trying to get work in the taxi industry in the first place. Stage guides (callers) can refuse to call passengers if they see that it is a woman on the door working as a conductor. Passengers (including other women) sometimes prefer to wait until another taxi to become available rather than ride with a woman conductor. Others simply find it funny: “Some passengers laugh at us. They can board and laugh at you for the whole journey until they board off. They find it so funny for a woman to work as a conductor” (Women Taxi Conductors, 2020).

Women seeking work in the taxi industry, like anyone else, have to first get a place on a taxi stage, normally requiring a payment to the stage chairman. If they do not have sufficient money, the chairman can demand sex.

“Some of the conductors confirm that if you don't have money to pay the stage chairman to get a job, you use your body to pay. This normally happens at the stages near Pioneer Mall, where there is a gentleman who takes advantage of the females who want to work” (Women Taxi Conductors, 2020).

The poor employment opportunities and discrimination against women in the taxi industry is recognised by the KOTSA Executive Committee. They suggest that “each stage should have a woman representative to cater for women on the road” (KOTSA, 2020).

**Congestion**, especially during bad weather, causing long working hours, fewer trips and reductions in income. There were specific mention of congestion caused by boda-bodas. **Congestion and lack of space in the taxi parks**, including traffic, passengers and hawkers, and over-crowded individual stages; and **lack of parking space** and congestion on the stage, especially due to numbers of hawkers.

**Poor conditions of employment**, including lack of contracts, insecurity, long hours and low pay. low earnings, exceptionally long working hours and job insecurity.

**Poor working environment**, with high day-time temperatures and lack of shade and shelter from rain and sun, dust and an unhygienic working environment. Service workers, such as food vendors and mechanics complain of expensive or unavailable water and electricity and lack of sufficient secure working space.

**Poor leadership** and confusion among taxi organisations, including lack of a strong united voice for the industry, failure to represent the interests of workers, and the uncontrolled entry of members. There is also confusion between the roles, rights and responsibilities of associations and government agencies.

**High levels of crime**, particularly theft, and a general lack of personal security.

There were further issues identified which were specific to crews, stage workers and service workers. The crews complain about the high price of fuel, taxes on fuel and unpredictable price rises, the high price of driving permits, competition between taxis for passengers and breakdowns, mechanical problems and the failure of owners to maintain vehicles. Stage workers face harassment by drivers and conductors, and the risk of injury from accidents. Service workers are concerned with the high prices of spare parts and other goods, too few customers and expensive or unaffordable tools and machinery. There is particular frustration at the influx of fake goods and spare parts and the inability of the authorities to clamp down on the trade.



## Kampala Boda-boda industry

No-one has a reliable estimate of the numbers of boda-boda operating on the streets of Kampala. In 2014, there were thought to be 63,000 *registered* boda-bodas, but of course did not include the large numbers of unregistered motorbikes. KCCA and boda-boda workers both believe that there are certainly many more than 200,000 operating today (Kyukyu, 2020) (KAMBE Executive Committee, 2020).

Other indicators suggest that the number is still growing. There are two major brands of motorcycle popular among boda-boda riders, Boxer and TVS, both imported from India. The dealer for TVS bikes in Uganda estimates that a total of 8,000 bikes are sold each month, of which 7,000 are Boxer and 1,000 are TVS, with an overall growth in the market of 10-15% per year (Satija, 2020).

Detailed field research counted the number of riders to be found in some of the major boda-boda stages in the CBD.

This is illustrative only. There are many more stages in the Central Business District, and hundreds more in Greater Kampala.

There are also many riders to be found on certain streets within the CBD, each with 1,200 to 1,600 riders.

Along the proposed BRT corridors and parts of the city directly affected by BRT development, we estimate that there are more than 50,000 riders likely to be affected.

<b>Major Boda-Boda Stages in Kampala CBD</b>	
<b>Stage</b>	<b>Riders</b>
Blue Room	271
Kamalimali	215
Good Shed	198
Mini Price	185
Shoprite	176
City Square	167
Clock Tower	124
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,336</b>

Source: field research January 2020

<b>Major Kampala CBD streets with boda-boda riders</b>	
<b>Street</b>	<b>Riders</b>
Namirembe Road	1,661
Ben Kiwanuka Street	1,542
Lumu Street	1,301
Entebbe Road	1,292
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,796</b>

Source: field research January 2020

<b>Estimated number of boda-boda riders on BRT Corridors</b>			
<b>BRT Corridor</b>	<b>Stages</b>	<b>Riders</b>	<b>Average per stage</b>
Entebbe Road	62	3,870	62
Jinja Road	85	5,120	60
Bombo Road	69	4,250	62
CBD	658	38,450	58
<b>Total</b>	<b>874</b>	<b>51,690</b>	

Source: field research January 2020

## Riding a boda-boda

A typical boda-boda rider will start working early in the morning to pick up commuters from the suburbs and head for the CBD. There are no fixed routes. A major reason for the popularity of boda-boda among passengers is the flexibility to move from point to point to the exact destination, as well as the ability to navigate quickly through congested streets and traffic jams.

The rider may have regular passengers, who have come to rely on his boda-boda to promptly reach their workplace in the morning, and have come to trust the rider's reliability, safe riding skills and experience. The rider may also go to the local suburban stage to pick up passengers or, in particular, take local children to and from school.

Just like the taxi industry, boda-boda grassroots organisation is based on stages. He (and it is almost certainly a 'he') is most likely based at one of Kampala's hundreds of boda-boda stages in the CBD or in the suburbs or may be registered in two or three stages.

### **Boda-boda stages**

There is nothing to prevent the rider simply roaming the streets to pick up passengers without being a member of a stage, but there are advantages. Being registered at a stage gives the rider some protection, security, a basic level of social protection, and a more general sense of belonging to a group that offers social and economic solidarity. They provide a form of organic policing of the boda-boda system, preventing outsiders from attempting to operate in the locality who, if caught, will be chased away or physically punished. To avoid stage membership can be dangerous.



Photo: GLI

To join or belong to a stage, the rider has to present a recommendation letter from the local administration (Local Council 1), names of two referees, and pay the required fees. These can be quite high. Stages within the CBD will typically charge a one-off fee of 500,000/= to 1,000,000/= to register.

Stage leadership is theoretically democratic, but normally these positions are just reflecting their level of local influence and power, at least when the stage is being established. It can be a strong individual with strong connections with the police, Local Council 1 leadership, the KCCA and proprietors in the areas where the stage is located. He can take it upon himself to claim control over the boda-boda services on a particular street corner or popular spot on the road where would-be passengers gather, perhaps assisted by a small group of riders willing to enforce their control over the stage and collect (and profit from) the lucrative registration fees. Over time, this becomes more structured, with a stage Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary, Treasurer, Mobilizer (organiser) and a 'Defence Secretary' responsible for maintaining discipline on the stage and chasing away non-members.

The stages are very important sources of street-level intelligence and gossip, and many have close connections with police, politicians and/or security service agents. Stage leaders and members can be paid for this information, can be regular informants or informal agents. They can even be paid to conduct surveillance over people in the local community. This can evolve into strong alliances between security services and political parties leading to, for example, the emergence of the 'Boda-Boda 2010' organisation (see below).

Stage leaders are also constantly looking for other opportunities to find additional sources of income. In addition to carrying passengers, they may build relationships with schools, local businesses, restaurants and others to provide delivery services, act as couriers, run errands etc.

In addition to the registration fee, the rider has to pay a contribution to the stage organisation, typically 2-33,000/= per day. This money is used to maintain the stage (some rudimentary shelter, cleaning etc), small-scale informal loans, welfare payments and payment of fines for members. In effect, the stage funds are an unregistered small version of a SACCO (see key findings and recommendations, below).

The stages are nearly deserted from around 6:30 to 10:00 when riders are busy with passengers in the morning rush hour. After this, on arrival at the CBD stage, the riders will join an informal queuing system and wait for passengers and catch up with news and gossip with their fellow riders.

Some riders may have recognised regular customers, in which case they can jump the queue, otherwise they have to wait their turn. The stage leaders will attempt to ensure that all the members have the opportunity to earn some money and resolve the inevitable petty conflicts.

At the most popular stages – and therefore those stages which demand the highest registration fees and daily contributions to stage funds – there is a fairly constant demand throughout the day. In others, riders may be encouraged to leave the stage during the middle of the day to cruise streets in search of passengers.

Business picks up again during the evening rush hour, and the rider will eventually return to their home area. In most cases, he will park the bike at a secure night parking area, for which he will pay a small fee (perhaps 500/=), or park at the bike owner's premises.

## Targets and loans

Similar to a taxi driver, most boda-boda riders do not own their motorbike, and have to pay a weekly *Zomugaga* (“bosses money”) target fee to an owner, or owner’s agent, of 60-80,000/=, although Sundays are ‘free days’ when the rider can keep all the money collected in fares without paying the target.

According to the KAMBE boda-boda association (see below), 60% of their members work for bike owners under the target system, the remainder being owner-riders, with only 1,000 (3% of membership) owning more than one bike (KAMBE, 2020).

Some target system employees work for large scale fleet-owners with up to 2,000 bikes (Kisambira, 2020). A large fleet owner will generally expect that a rider will work with them for 12-18 months, before moving on (Robert, 2020) perhaps when the bike becomes less roadworthy. Other owners may be small scale – perhaps two or three. Small-scale boda-boda owners can also continue to be riding. Andrew for example owns two three-year old bikes (therefore old by industry standards) based at Samala Road stage, of which he rides one and employs someone else to ride the other. After all expenses are taken into consideration, he can earn 8-9,000/= a day as a rider and about the same again as an owner (Andrew, 2020).

At the end of each week, the rider has to call the owner’s agent and arrange to pay the money or go to the owner’s business premises to pay directly. If he hasn’t paid, the agent or owner will be out searching for him on the stages or streets to ensure that he hasn’t absconded with the motorbike. Some riders may pay by Mobile Money, but owners generally prefer face-to-face cash payments so that they can examine the state of the motorbike.

Others may own their motorbike through a bank loan or leasing arrangement and have to earn sufficient money to cover their payments, or perhaps they are one of a growing number of riders that work for ride-hailing companies, such as Taxify or SafeBoda.

Whatever the arrangements, it is a struggle for these riders to earn a livelihood, and requires long hours of riding, waiting and searching for passengers. There is little time to rest. Other riders may be more fortunate and have sufficient capital to buy their own bikes or even small fleets of bikes, with which he can informally employ other riders. A considerable number of boda-boda riders sell off valuable property to purchase motorbikes in pursuit of improving their income.

## Boda-boda organisation

### Historical Background

In 2006, the police commissioned hundreds of traffic wardens under a newly formed *Kampala Union Boda-Boda Cyclists Association (KUBOCA)* to provide order and regulation in the boda-boda industry. These wardens were unpaid and, according to media reports, turned to soliciting bribes and making illegal arrests to earn a living, provoking major protests among boda-boda riders. This culminated in a blockade of President Museveni’s convoy on Bombo Road, demanding his intervention to stop KUBOCA’s harassment, and the alleged connivance between the police and the then Kampala City Council to collect illegal fines that the officers of the two institutions would then share.

KUBOCA was very close to the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, and its members were very visible in their NRM yellow t-shirts, while extorting money from the boda-boda riders. This became a major embarrassment to the NRM leadership, and by 2010, KUBOCA had been shut down. In May 2010 all former boda-boda leaders were arrested and Kampala City Council organised elections of a new leadership, allied to the police and supportive of NRM, to form the *Boda-Boda 2010* association. Boda-Boda 2010 took over the management of all stages in the city centre. Riders who showed support for opposition party leaders were expelled from the stages.

After the 2011 General Election, the opposition leaders organised 'Walk to Work' protests that paralysed the city. Boda-boda riders escorted opposition leaders to the city centre, attracting huge crowds. Boda-Boda 2010 allied with the police to crack down on the protests.

Boda-Boda 2010 began to register riders for a fee and impounded motorbikes of those who did not have a membership card. In September 2013, KCCA attempted to register riders, but the leadership of Boda-Boda 2010 blocked the process, beat up registration officials and burnt the materials. The process was halted by police. This was a period of heightened political tension, crime and a wave of killings in the city centre, causing a major problem of security for boda-boda riders. In an attempt to provide protection, several new associations of riders were established, including the Kampala Metropolitan Boda-Boda Association (KAMBA) in August 2013, later to be renamed Kampala Metropolitan Boda-Boda Entrepreneurs (KAMBE).

#### Current organisation

Although others still operate, KAMBE is now the only association that has built a level of structural power and operates in all five divisions in Kampala. Its membership has grown from 38,200 members in 2014 to 48,000 today. Members pay a one-off fee of 20,000/=, giving them life membership.

It has an elaborate leadership structure from the stages, to parishes, the divisions and the national level. Each stage elects (or self-selects) its own leadership, with a stage Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, Defence Secretary and Mobilizer (organiser). The Chairperson, Secretary and Mobilizer then represent the stage in a Parish Council which, in turn, elects five members to represent the Parish in a Divisional Council. Each Divisional Council elects three representatives to form the KAMBE Executive Committee. Riders are also members of a wide variety of local organisations, including SACCOs, local boda-boda associations (in Zana, Bwaise etc) and various self-help groups, microfinance schemes, and community-based organisations.

KAMBE aims at improving and transforming the boda-boda business in Uganda and creating employment for youth. The association changed its name on 23rd December 2015 to Kampala Metropolitan Boda-Boda Entrepreneurs (KAMBE) and registered as a SACCO.

Among its objectives, KAMBE seeks to offer a decent, reliable and efficient transportation service in Uganda, reduce accidents and injuries, encourage savings among the boda-boda workers through the SACCO, provide training in environment management, preservation and protection, and encourage property ownership among the riders.

It seeks to work with KCCA in streamlining the boda-boda industry by gazetting stages, registering riders and providing regular updates on transport regulation. It works closely with the Centenary Bank to provide young people with loans to enable youth to purchase motorcycles and gain access to housing. It has partnerships with companies to provide affordable third-party and life insurance, assembly and distribution of motorbikes, provision of tracking devices for motorbikes and training in road safety. It is also attempting to provide ambulance services for riders injured in accidents.

In 2015, KAMBE affiliated with the Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (ATGWU), which was a major help in consolidating KAMBE's position. ATGWU provided important support in promoting and representing boda-boda workers with the authorities, training for the leadership, and links with motorcycle taxi unions, associations and other informal transport worker organisations in other countries through membership of the International Transportworkers' Federation (ITF).

On a day-to-day basis, KAMBE provides access to small loans to members through its SACCO, helps processing of driving permits, recommends members and acts as a guarantor to the Centenary Bank and others to access loans for motorbikes and housing, tracks members' lost or stolen motorbikes on GPS devices, provides support on school fees, and helps disabled members get vocational training in carpentry, painting, construction etc.

### Boda-boda workforce: survey findings

The boda-boda workforce includes riders, stage workers and service workers.

Riders fall into one of four categories:

- informally employed on the *Zomugaga* (target) system
- own their own bikes or small fleets of bikes
- in the process of buying their own bike through loans or leasing agreements
- informally employed by ride-hailing companies (SafeBoda, Taxify etc)

There are also Stage workers, including stage leaders who are responsible for the management of the stage, and stage "cadres" who play a more political role as powerbrokers in the boda-boda industry.

The industry is supported by service workers, including mechanics, motorcycle dealers and workers in small motorcycle assembly plants, lending and leasing company workers, and ride-hailing company staff.


The questionnaire survey covered a total of 277 workers directly employed in the boda-boda industry, including 262 riders and 15 stage leaders.

### Gender

The boda-boda industry is overwhelmingly dominated by men. Of the workers interviewed, only two were women, and that is despite the survey teams being specifically asked to identify any women in the workforce.


### Age

The large majority of boda-boda riders are between twenty-five and thirty-nine years old. The survey revealed that a surprising number of riders were over forty years old (22%). Overall, it suggests that the popular youthful image of boda-boda riders is misleading. Only 12% were under 25 years old.



### Education

The majority (64%) of boda-boda riders had completed secondary education or more.



### Further training

Most boda-boda riders have received no further training since leaving school or college. Out of the 277 respondents, 13 had received training as mechanics, and only five had specifically received training in riding a boda-boda, and two in road safety.

22 respondents had received vocational training in a wide range of other skills unrelated to the boda-boda industry, such as carpentry, baking, construction, electronics, graphic design, catering, tailoring etc.

### Age of boda-boda motorbikes

Most boda-boda motorbikes are between one and five years old, with only 5% lasting more than 10 years.

Age of motorbike		
Age	Frequency	Percent
Less than one year	16	7.6
1-2 years	75	35.5
3-5 years	78	37.0
6-10 years	31	14.7
More than 10 years	11	5.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>100</b>

### Other jobs


106 of the 277 riders interviewed had other jobs beside that of the boda-boda industry. 37 also work on farms, 15 are involved in “trading” and 13 as “businessmen”. Other occupations include shop-keeping, construction, mechanics, estate agency, butchery, carpentry, spare-parts dealership, fishing, furniture-making, mobile money agent, taxi driving, and stage welfare.

### Years in the boda-boda industry

Most riders have considerable experience working in the boda-boda industry, averaging 7.7 years, with the large majority (more than 80%) having been riding for more than 4 years, and with 20% having worked for more than ten years.

### Formal employment

Forty-one (15%) of riders have written agreements with the person who pays them to do their job, although this might include formal financial agreements covering loans to purchase a bike, or formal contracts with ride-hailing companies, such as SafeBoda or Taxify.



### Boda-boda working hours

Hours	Frequency	Percent
7	3	1.1
8	23	8.3
9	2	0.7
10	9	3.2
11	9	3.2
12	72	26.0
13	51	18.4
14	39	14.1
15	21	7.6
16	42	15.2
17	6	2.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>100</b>

### Working time

Riders work for an average of 12.9 hours per day and 6.4 days per week. More than 83% of riders work 12 hours per day or more, and 17.4% claim to work more than 16 hours. Nearly all riders work six or seven days a week, and nearly half work a seven-day week.

It is difficult to assess the ‘actual’ working time, i.e. when riders are carrying passengers, running errands or making deliveries, and time spent on the stages waiting for work, but as described above, stage leaders will attempt to ensure that all the members have the opportunity to earn some money, and at popular stages there is a fairly constant demand throughout the day and riders are encouraged to leave the stage during the middle of the day to cruise streets in search of passengers.

### Boda-boda working days

Days	Frequency	Percent
4	3	1.1
5	15	5.4
6	125	45.1
7	134	48.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Of all the riders interviewed, only 3% describe their working hours as irregular or unpredictable.

## Livelihoods and employment relationships

From in-depth interviews and field observation, it is estimated that riders typically have to pay the bike owners a daily 10-15,000/= target (*Zomugaga* - “boss’s money”) but both taxi drivers and riders are given a ‘free day’ each Sunday, when they may keep all the fares collected. According to KAMBE, 60% of their members work for bike owners under the target system, the remainder being owner-riders, with only 1,000 (3% of membership) owning more than one bike (KAMBE, 2020).

Some target system employees work for large scale fleet-owners with up to 2,000 bikes (Kisambira, 2020). A large fleet owner will generally expect that a rider will work with them for 12-18 months, before moving on (Robert, 2020) perhaps when the bike becomes less road-worthy. Other owners may be small scale – perhaps two or three. Small-scale boda-boda owners can also continue to be riding. Andrew for example owns two three-year old bikes (therefore old by industry standards) based at Samala Road stage, of which he rides one and employs someone else to ride the other. After all expenses are taken into consideration, he can earn 8-9,000/= a day as a rider and about the same again as an owner (Andrew, 2020)

### **Source of income**



Of the 277 riders interviewed, 258 receive their income in cash directly from passengers. Nineteen work for ride-hailing companies, thirteen for SafeBoda and six for Bolt (Taxify).

### **Major expenses**

147 riders from the sample provided some details of their major expenses incurred in their work. Of those, 102 explained that their main costs are payments to the “boss”. In other words, the bike owners, fleet owners or their agents. Other costs include bank loans, fuel, third-party insurance, boda-boda washers, repairs, parking, SACCOs or other savings groups.

### **Gross and net income**

Making a realistic estimate of earnings by boda-boda riders is difficult. The results of the questionnaire survey suggest an average gross income of just under 45,000/= and average net income of 21,000/=. Yet this is within a very wide range of reported gross and net incomes, based on the questions “How much money do you receive in total, before paying other people or other expenses?” and “What is the average amount of remaining money for yourself, after making all these other payments?”.



There are several reasons for doubting the accuracy of these results. Most riders have a constant flow of cash received and paid, and none of them keep a detailed track of what they are earning and spending through the day. Expenses involved in work (fuel, bribes etc) are not separate from personal expenses (food, school fees etc). Income can fluctuate from day to day, or week to week, depending on the weather, traffic congestion and luck. Nearly 40% of riders have other jobs besides boda-boda riding (see above) and it is not clear from the survey results whether the income from these has been taken into account. Some may be owner-riders, and some may own several bikes.

Certainly, the high number of riders who claim to earn (net) more than 30,000/= per day does not correspond with other evidence. According to KAMBE, for example, riders working under the target system earn an approximate average of 60,000/= per week (KAMBE, 2020).

There are also large variations in income and expenditure depending on the age of the bike, the distances travelled (therefore the amount of fuel consumed), the area worked, and the relative success in attracting passengers. It is also noticeable that net income is greatly affected by whether the rider owns their own bike or has to pay a target or leasing fee to an owner.

Many riders are also paying monthly repayments and interest for loans to buy one or more bikes. In the time available, it did not prove possible to conduct full in-depth interviews with bike-owners still paying loans, but field interviews indicate that owner-riders with outstanding large and expensive loans feel trapped by the debt and frequently have to abandon their bike and return to the target

system of renting bikes from larger fleet owners. Many more are unable to raise the deposit demanded or turn to low-deposit schemes that charge a much higher rate of interest.

In-depth interviews showed that owner-riders, having paid off their loans, earn something between 8,000/= and 20,000/= per day after all expenses are taken into consideration. A SafeBoda rider, on the other hand, has to pay the company a target (under a leasing agreement) can earn around 12,000/=.

### **Livelihoods of riders under the target system**

The in-depth interviews attempted to build a picture of the detailed micro-economy of the boda-boda industry by comparing the income and expenditure items of twelve different riders, all of which work on the target system (in other words paying a daily (or weekly) fee to the bike owners (see below).

This reveals a considerable variation in net daily income. At most, riders are earning up to 12,000/= to 13,000/=, but according to the figures given by two of the interviewees, some can make a loss.

The daily targets are identical, set at 10,000/=: and the costs of fuel and some of the other items seem to be similar. The big differences appear to be the variation in daily gross income, ranging between 25,000/= and 40,000/=: the varying cost of police bribes (two riders claimed to be able to avoid these completely), and the level of contributions to stage welfare funds and KAMBE's life insurance scheme.

<b>BODA-BODA RIDERS ON THE TARGET SYSTEM</b>												
	<b>A</b>		<b>B</b>		<b>C</b>		<b>D</b>		<b>E</b>		<b>F</b>	
<b>Stage</b>	Kibuye Market		Hardware City		Clock Tower		Salaama Road		Gombo Road		Gombolora	
<b>Age of Motorbike</b>	0.7 Years		2 Years		3 Years		4 Years		3 Years		1.5 Years	
<b>Working days per year</b>	300 Days		360 Days		300 Days		300 Days		300 Days		360 Days	
<b>Annual Costs</b>												
Target (per day/year)	10,000	3,000,000	10,000	3,600,000	10,000	3,000,000	10,000	3,000,000	10,000	3,000,000	10,000	3,600,000
Fuel (per day/year)	8,000	2,400,000	9,000	3,240,000	12,000	3,600,000	10,000	3,000,000	12,000	3,600,000	12,000	4,320,000
Stage Welfare (per month/year)	4,000	48,000	30,000	360,000	5,000	60,000	30,000	360,000	0	0	20,000	240,000
Airtime (per day/year)	2,000	600,000	1,000	360,000	1,000	300,000	1,000	300,000	1,000	300,000	1,000	360,000
Routine Service (per month/year)	45,000	540,000	60,000	720,000	80,000	960,000	16,000	192,000	60,000	720,000	58,000	696,000
Police bribes and fines (per month)	100,000	1,200,000	100,000	1,200,000	100,000	1,200,000	120,000	1,440,000	100,000	1,200,000	100,000	1,200,000
KAMBE Life Insurance (per month/year)	0	0	0	0	5,000	60,000	5,000	60,000	0	0	5,000	60,000
KAMBE welfare (per week/year)	1,000	52,000	1,000	52,000	2,000	104,000	1,000	52,000	1,000	52,000	1,000	52,000
3rd party insurance (per year)	48,000	48,000	48,000	48,000	50,000	50,000	48,000	48,000	50,000	50,000	47,000	47,000
Driving Permit (bribe) per three years	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000
<b>Total Annual Costs</b>		<b>8,038,000</b>		<b>9,730,000</b>		<b>9,484,000</b>		<b>8,602,000</b>		<b>9,072,000</b>		<b>10,725,000</b>
<b>Annual Income</b>												
Passenger Fares (per day/year)	40,000	12,000,000	35,000	12,600,000	35,000	10,500,000	30,000	9,000,000	30,000	9,000,000	40,000	14,400,000
<b>Annual Income less Expenditure</b>		<b>3,962,000</b>		<b>2,870,000</b>		<b>1,016,000</b>		<b>398,000</b>		<b>-72,000</b>		<b>3,675,000</b>
<b>Daily net income</b>		<b>13,207</b>		<b>7,972</b>		<b>3,387</b>		<b>1,327</b>		<b>-240</b>		<b>12,250</b>
	<b>G</b>		<b>H</b>		<b>I</b>		<b>J</b>		<b>K</b>		<b>L</b>	
<b>Stage</b>	Kibuye Roundabout		Makindye-Salaama		Katuba-Mukwano		Shoprite		Shoprite		Kibuye Roundabout	
<b>Age of Motorbike</b>	4 Years		3 Years		3 Years		5 Years		3 Years		4 Years	
<b>Working days per year</b>	312 Days		310 Days		312 Days		301 Days		287 Days		309 Days	
<b>Annual Costs</b>												
Target (per day/year)	10,000	3,120,000	10,000	3,100,000	10,000	3,120,000	10,000	3,010,000	10,000	2,870,000	10,000	3,090,000
Fuel (per day/year)	10,000	3,120,000	12,000	3,720,000	10,000	3,120,000	8,000	2,408,000	10,000	2,870,000	10,000	3,090,000
Stage Welfare (per month/year)	0	0	3,000	36,000	5,000	60,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
Airtime (per day/year)	1,000	312,000	2,000	620,000	500	156,000	500	150,500	1,000	287,000	1,000	309,000
Routine Service (per month/year)	120,000	1,440,000	80,000	960,000	6,000	72,000	8,000	96,000	12,000	144,000	120,000	1,440,000
Police bribes and fines (per month)	100,000	1,200,000	150,000	1,800,000	0	0	0	0	120,000	1,440,000	0	0
KAMBE Life Insurance (per month/year)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KAMBE welfare (per week/year)	5,000	260,000	5,000	260,000	5,000	260,000	5,000	260,000	5,000	260,000	5,000	260,000
3rd party insurance (per year)	48,000	48,000	150,000	150,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000	48,000	48,000	50,000	50,000
Driving Permit (bribe) per three years	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000	450,000	150,000
<b>Total Annual Costs</b>		<b>9,650,000</b>		<b>10,796,000</b>		<b>6,988,000</b>		<b>6,124,500</b>		<b>8,069,000</b>		<b>8,389,000</b>
<b>Annual Income</b>												
Passenger Fares (per day/year)	30,000	9,360,000	35,000	10,850,000	25,000	7,800,000	27,000	8,127,000	30,000	8,610,000	30,000	9,270,000
<b>Annual Income less Expenditure</b>		<b>-290,000</b>		<b>54,000</b>		<b>812,000</b>		<b>2,002,500</b>		<b>541,000</b>		<b>881,000</b>
<b>Daily net income</b>		<b>-967</b>		<b>180</b>		<b>2,707</b>		<b>6,675</b>		<b>1,803</b>		<b>2,937</b>

<b>Explanatory Notes</b>	
<b>Stage</b>	Most boda-boda riders are based at one of hundreds of 'stages', informally organised pick-up areas for passengers, normally at busy intersections or popular venues (markets, public buildings etc)
<b>Age of motorbike</b>	The age (and therefore roadworthiness) is an important factor in attracting passengers
<b>Annual Costs</b>	
Target	Daily fee demanded by motorbike owner (or owner's agent)
Fuel	Daily cost of fuel consumption
Stage Welfare	Mandatory contributions to the stage welfare fund
Airtime	Cost of mobile phone usage
Routine service	Cost of regular maintenance (cleaning filters, checking tyre pressure etc)
Police bribes and fines	Payment of routine bribes to avoid penalties or impounding of bikes, or payment of fines
KAMBE life insurance	Voluntary contributions to KAMBE's life insurance scheme
KAMBE welfare	Mandatory contributions to KAMBE welfare fund
3 <sup>rd</sup> party insurance	Mandatory minimum insurance cover
Driving permit	Mandatory government driving permit, normally obtained through a bribe
<b>Annual income</b>	
Passenger fares	Fares negotiated with the passenger

## Boda-Boda Ownership

In a similar ownership pattern to the taxi industry, there are three distinct groups of boda-boda owners – owner-riders, owners who have one or more motorcycles ridden by others and owners of substantial fleets of motorcycles.

### Shifting patterns of ownership

According to KCCA strategy management (Kyukyu, 2020), there has been a major shift in the pattern of employment and ownership in the boda-boda industry. Some years ago, people with access to capital could purchase large fleets of motorbikes, perhaps 200-300, but today there are many more owner-drivers and small fleet owners of 5-20. Previously, bank loans were relatively difficult to obtain and had to be secured with assets. Today all that is required is a bank account with a 1,000,000/= deposit and the bike itself is the security.

This was verified by the interview with the motorcycle dealer, who estimated that out of the total monthly sales of 8,000 Boxer and TVS bikes, 5,500 were sold through one of the many finance schemes available, and that the proportion of the boda-boda market owned by large fleet owners has declined as a result, benefitting owner-riders and owners of 1-3 bikes.

In 2014, at the initiative of ATGWU, Centenary Bank introduced a loan scheme for the purchase of motorcycles in a partnership with KAMBE and motorcycle dealers, who would identify and recommend members who would benefit from owning their own motorbike with low interest and deposit and potentially be lifted out of the extremes of poverty.

KAMBE's current arrangement with Centenary Bank provides its members with access to loans for the purchase of motorcycles, with KAMBE acting as guarantor. This enables members to become owner-drivers, but also enables a minority of members to become owners of small fleets and employers of other KAMBE members, making relatively substantial profits. Borrowers have to open an account with the bank and deposit a minimum of 1,000,000/=. The maximum loan amount is the purchase price of the motorcycle, with monthly repayments.

The scheme started with 200 motorcycles per month, but by 2019 it was regarded as the bank's "key microfinance initiative" and a major strategy to grow its microfinance business (Kisambira, 2020). In 2019 the bank required all branches to disburse a minimum of ten motorcycle loans per month (Centenary Bank, 2019). By 2020, it was providing 670 such loans each month through the scheme.

Once an owner-rider has successfully managed repayments, he/she can apply for further loans to purchase one or more further motorcycles, in effect becoming a small fleet owner, without further reference to KAMBE, and employing other KAMBE members.

By 2020, the scheme had been expanded beyond KAMBE to other boda-boda associations and SACCOs, with 10 participating by January 2020 (Kisambira, 2020), selected on the basis of a due diligence process following detailed criteria, including:

- Should be located within the bank operational area with clear mission and objectives
- Must have existed for at least two years with good governance
- Recommendation from a 'reputable organisation'
- A minimum of 30 members in the boda-boda industry
- Registration with local authorities as an association, SACCO or company
- Evidence of financial performance: bank account, turnover, audited accounts (where available)
- Other business opportunities for the bank, including cross-selling other bank products or promotional activities

Following the commercial success of the Centenary Bank scheme, other banks and finance companies have entered the market.

KAMBE Executive Committee members voiced particular concern about *Tugende* ("let's go"), a company established in 2009 by an American entrepreneur to provide lease-own finance to boda-boda riders to purchase their own bikes. The company was created to "invest in giving a chance to customers generally unable to access traditional credit providers, including most micro-finance institutions—often due to a lack of existing collateral". A standard lease is for 24 months, after which the rider owns the bike. The financing package also includes training, life and health insurance, driving permits, and support (Tugende, 2020).

KAMBE members believe that behind the attractive-sounding low initial deposit of 500,000/= (compared with 1,000,000/= at Centenary Bank), the leasing costs are very high, meaning that a bike with a purchase price of 4,500,000/= can actually cost around 8,000,000/=. In other words, "cheap entry but high interest". They estimate that Tugende has some 10-12,000 leaseholders (KAMBE, 2020).

"Our primary product is a lease to own motorcycle financing package which includes training, life and health insurance, driving permits, and active support. Successful customers own the bike within 24 months or less. Ownership allows drivers to save money they would normally spend renting and provides accumulated savings in the value of a paid-off motorcycle" (Tugende, 2020).

Many owner-drivers and owners of small fleets are trapped by Tugende and other finance companies, and forced to sell their bikes and return to the target system (KAMBE, 2020). According to riders interviewed, most of them continue to pay targets, rather than own their own bikes. The loan costs are very high, and most are unable to find the deposit of 1,000,000/=, which means they are "trapped in the boss's pocket" (Stephen, 2020). Some riders borrow the 1,000,000/= from other banks or finance companies at high interest to pay the deposit on a bike, ending

up having to manage two loans. If the deposit threshold could be lowered, it would help pull the 60% of KAMBE members trapped in the target system out of poverty (KAMBE, 2020).

This does not however include the cost of depreciation. It is estimated that the value of a boda-boda drops dramatically within a few years. A motorcycle with a purchase price of 4,500,000/= can be worth a fraction of that by the time that a typical 18-month loan has been repaid. It is widely reported that police stations are full of old boda-bodas that have effectively been abandoned, and many boda-bodas are sold off after a few years, often to riders working in the outer reaches of greater Kampala or rural areas. The owner with a three-year-old single boda-boda can barely make an income.

Despite the shifting pattern of ownership, there are still owners of large fleets. One fleet owner for example, has 2,000 bikes (Kisambira, 2020). It is commonly believed that these are often policemen, military, high-ranking civil servants etc, but their identity can be hidden behind layers of proxies and middlemen (Robert, 2020) (Stephen, 2020) (Satija, 2020).

It is also commonly believed that there are many parliamentarians seeking election, using land title deeds as collateral for large numbers of loans provided to youths seeking to be boda-boda owner-riders in return for support in the election campaign. Those who fail to be elected can subsequently be saddled with large debts, with consequences of further corruption.

According to riders, most of them pay targets to “bosses” (owners or middlemen), rather than own their own bikes. The loan costs are very high, and most are unable to find the deposit of 1,000,000/=, which means they are “trapped in the boss’s pocket” (Stephen, 2020).

## Boda-Boda Owner-Riders

The table below attempts to illustrate the livelihood and profitability of a typical boda-boda owner-rider, based on examples of owner-riders who have taken advantage of the KAMBE-Centenary Bank loan scheme with motorcycle dealers. It suggests that an owner-rider can make a modest income over the operational lifetime of the motorcycle, although – in common with their taxi owner-driver counterparts – livelihoods are extremely precarious and vulnerable on a day-to-day basis to bad weather, police harassment, accidents, fuel price increases and mechanical breakdowns.

Under the KAMBE-Centenary Bank loan scheme, the price of the bike (5,000,000/=) is significantly more than the normal cash price (4,450,000/=) but this includes the (undisclosed) interest and other charges, so the interest costs are included (hidden) in purchase costs. The owner has to have a minimum cash deposit of 1,000,000/=, and the loan is normally repayable over eighteen months.

The cost of fuel accounts for more than half of the total operational costs of a boda-boda, which makes all riders (including owner-riders) highly vulnerable to major increases in fuel costs.

Other major costs include a weekly service, along with refurbishment and major repairs. Refurbishment costs include the initial costs of strengthening the motorcycle for use in the boda-boda industry immediately after the collection of the motorcycle from the dealer. It is assumed to cost approximately 600,000/= to reinforce the frame, add a

luggage rack, replace the seat cover with more durable material etc. The cost of repairs is assumed to increase by 10% per year as the motorcycle ages with wear and tear.

There are also the costs involved in the use of a mobile phone ('airtime') which is practically essential for boda-boda riders, daily payments of 'stage welfare' contributions to the stage funds, police bribes and fines, and voluntary contributions to the KAMBE welfare scheme.

The sole source of income in the illustration are passenger fares, estimated to be 40,000/= per day although there are some other potential sources of income, such as running errands, delivering goods etc. There are also opportunities for income from criminal activities on behalf of gangs and cartels.

<b>BODA-BODA OWNER RIDER</b>				
<b>Age of Motorbike (years)</b>	New			
<b>Purchase price (inc. interest and bank charges)</b>	5 000 000			
<b>Loan</b>	4 000 000			
<b>Loan period (years)</b>	1,5			
<b>Interest</b>	0,0%			
<b>Operational life expectancy (years)</b>	5			
<b>Operating days per year</b>	340			
<b>Costs</b>		<b>Total over operational life expectancy</b>		
Principal (purchase price)		-5 000 000		
Interest		0		
Fuel (per day)	-20 000	-34 000 000		
Refurbishment and major repairs		-1 064 100		
Routine Service (per week)	-20 000	-5 200 000		
Airtime (per day)	-1 500	-2 550 000		
Stage Welfare (per day)	-1 000	-1 700 000		
Police bribes (per year)	-300 000	-1 500 000		
KAMBE Life Insurance (per week)	-5 000	-1 300 000		
Driving Permit (bribe) per three years	-450 000	-750 000		
Fines (per year)	-100 000	-500 000		
KAMBE welfare (per month)	-5 000	-300 000		
3rd party Insurance(per year)	-57 000	-285 000		
<b>Total Costs</b>		<b>-54 149 100</b>		
<b>Passenger Fares (per day)</b>	<b>40 000</b>	<b>68 000 000</b>		
<b>EBITDA</b>		<b>19 450 900</b>		
<b>Net Income</b>		<b>13 850 900</b>		
<b>Investment</b>	<b>FIRR</b>	<b>83.00%</b>	<b>ROI</b>	<b>7.66</b>
<b>Equity</b>	<b>EIRR</b>	<b>133.90%</b>	<b>ROE</b>	<b>18.31</b>

As with the taxi owner-driver, the internal rate of return on equity is impressive at first sight: up to 134% per year. Yet this assumes that all the EBITDA is used for the sole remuneration of the capital. Once one takes into account the necessary living expenditures of the owner-driver, the results are much less impressive – if he spends more than

8,148/= per calendar day, the internal rate of return on equity becomes negative. This leaves him with very little leeway to cope with unforeseen events.

## Boda-Boda Owners

In a similar pattern to the taxi industry, owners of one motorcycle or a small fleet employ riders through the target system, which removes their responsibility for most costs, other than servicing and repairs and removes the risks of bad weather, police extortion and other daily occurrences.

In the illustration below, the owner makes a modest profit. It assumes that they have capital of 1,000,000/= as a deposit against a purchase price of 4,450,000/=, with a loan repayable over two years with an interest rate of 18%. In reality, interest rates are highly variable and complex. There are different categories of loan with interest rates varying between 10% and 42%, depending on whether the owner is operating in the KCCA area, the GKMA, or outside Kampala, and whether the owner comes under the youth livelihood scheme promoted by the government. The model shown in the table simply assumes a rough approximation of 18%.

<b>BODA-BODA OWNER</b>			
<b>Number of motorcycles</b>	1		
<b>Purchase price</b>	4 450 000		
<b>Loan</b>	1 000 000		
<b>Loan period (years)</b>	2		
<b>Interest</b>	18%		
<b>Daily target</b>	15 000		
<b>Operational life expectancy</b>	5		
<b>Operating days per year</b>	291		
<b>Costs over operational life expectancy</b>			
	Total		
Principal (purchase price)	-4 450 000		
Interest	-277 431		
Refurbishments and major repairs	-1 064 100		
<b>Total Costs</b>	<b>-5 791 531</b>		
<b>Target income</b>	<b>21 857 143</b>		
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>21 393 043</b>		
<b>Net Income</b>	<b>16 065 612</b>		
<b>Investment</b>	<b>FIRR 81.00%</b>	<b>ROI</b>	<b>4.24</b>
<b>Equity</b>	<b>EIRR 90.90%</b>	<b>ROE</b>	<b>4.97</b>

The owner demands a target payment of 15,000/= per day, which appears to be fairly standard across the boda-boda industry. In line with common practice, the rider is given each Sunday as a 'free day', where all fare income is kept by the rider without having to pay the target, so the owner only collects the target for 291 days per year.

The financial result is rather impressive with an internal rate of return of 91%. As with the taxi owners, it demonstrates that the boda-boda owner captures the lion's share of the total revenues from the boda-boda industry. Nevertheless, the investment into a single motorcycle is risky. If it were to disappear or become unusable, the investor is left with no recourse and a potential complete loss.

## Boda-Boda Fleet Owners

As discussed above, there are boda-boda owners with large fleets of motorcycles. It is difficult to assess the profitability of these operations, although the shift in ownership patterns towards owner-riders and small fleets suggests that return on capital is not particularly lucrative.

The table below tentatively attempts to provide an example of an owner who invests in 100 motorcycles. The purchase price and interest rate remain the same as an individual buyer and does not take into consideration the possibility of discounts for bulk orders or of close relationships with dealers, although the loan repayment period is four years, rather than the eighteen month or two years for individual purchases. The target per boda-boda per day is also kept constant. The calculation does however assume that 10% of the motorcycles will be lost each year through accidents, theft or impounding by police – reducing both target income and major repair costs. By the end of the five-year operational life expectancy, only sixty-six motorcycles are still in operation. Overall, the business is marginally profitable with an EIRR of 5.5%, after taking the high risks into consideration. Under these circumstances, it is imperative for the fleet owner to minimize risks to the largest possible extent to ensure some returns on its initial investment.

<b>BODA-BODA FLEET OWNER</b>				
<b>Number of motorcycles</b>				100
<b>Purchase price per motorcycle</b>				4 450 000
<b>Total purchase price</b>				445 000 000
<b>Loan</b>				400 000 000
<b>Loan period (years)</b>				4
<b>Interest</b>				18%
<b>Daily target (per motorcycle)</b>				15 000
<b>Daily target (fleet total)</b>				1 500 000
<b>Operational life expectancy</b>				5
<b>Operating days per year</b>				291
<b>Costs over operational life expectancy</b>				
Principal (purchase price)				-1 245 000 000
Interest				-194 781 873
Refurbishment and major repairs				35 610 000
<b>Total Costs</b>				-1 404 171 873
<b>Target income</b>				1 503 334 286
<b>EBITDA</b>				<b>1 478 944 286</b>
<b>Net Income</b>				<b>99 162 412</b>
<b>Investment</b>	<b>FIRR</b>	<b>33.60%</b>	<b>ROI</b>	<b>3.32</b>
<b>Equity</b>	<b>EIRR</b>	<b>5.50%</b>	<b>ROE</b>	<b>1.13</b>

## Ride-hailing boda-boda apps

There are now a number of ride-hailing companies operating in Kampala providing boda-boda mobile apps, including SafeBoda, Dial Jack, Uber Boda and Taxify Boda which some claim improve safety and provide structure to the industry. Of these, the most prominent is *SafeBoda*.

### **SafeBoda**

SafeBoda's stated aim is to modernise informal transportation and ensure safe access to mobility. It is a "community of entrepreneurs and boda drivers working together to improve professional standards across the urban transportation industry in Africa. Our aim is to improve the industry for both drivers and passengers by increasing the number of safe trips taken per day and by making travel around cities convenient and stress-free".

SafeBoda is a private company that started operations in 2015, but would spend almost two years developing the software and raising capital before the service was fully launched in Kampala in 2017, having raised over USD 1m from Shell Foundation, Global Innovation Fund, USAID, and a private tech company (Siegel, 2017). It has subsequently gained further investment from venture capital companies and others, including the Jakarta-based Go-Jek ride-hailing motorcycle taxi service. [<https://pitchbook.com/profiles/company/113216-86>]

According to SafeBoda, all riders receive extensive training in road safety, first aid, bike maintenance and customer care; they are equipped with hairnets and a spare helmet, and are identifiable and trackable through their system (SafeBoda, 2020). Road safety training includes traffic and road safety rules by the Global Road Safety Partnership and by the Uganda Police. First aid training also includes certification by the Uganda Red Cross and the Ministry of Health. After training, drivers sign up to the SafeBoda Code of Conduct to "hold themselves accountable to a higher standard of safety and service". Drivers are trackable and can also be identified by their name and ID number that is both on their orange jackets and in the app.

Passengers download the SafeBoda app for free, type in the destination and request a boda. They are then connected to a SafeBoda who picks you up at their location. When they input their destination into the app, it gives a price estimate based on distance. After the trip, the app calculates a final price based on distance and time. They can rate the driver and can pay via mobile money, although most pay in cash. SafeBoda allows passengers to take cashless trips by loading credit into a wallet using MTN or Airtel Money. When the trip is complete, the credit is automatically deducted from the account. Fares paid on credit is given to riders at the end of each week.

SafeBoda claims that drivers usually earn 30 per cent more than regular boda bodas, even though the prices are fixed, because it is faster for them to get new customers through the app. Drivers need to have been in the industry for three years, and have a valid national ID. According to the company, background checks are performed on potential drivers. "We go to your stage and ask; 'who is this person?' Ideally, we go to the stage chairman" (Rasmussen, 2019).

From the riders' perspective, SafeBoda can be more attractive than being an independent operator. For those who worry about job security or being "chased away" in the face of potentially new government regulation, they feel somewhat more secure within a company like SafeBoda. It also frees riders from the stage structures and the obligations and politics that accompany them, and riders suggest that it provides greater protection from police harassment.

On enrolment, riders are asked to pay an initial fee of 20,000/= and are then obliged to borrow 510,000/= to cover the cost of the mobile phone, two helmets, two jackets and other equipment (other than the phone, the rest of the equipment remains SafeBoda property). The company then takes automatic deductions from the rider of 23,000/= per week over two years, totalling 2.4 million shillings.

<b>SAFEBODA RIDER</b>		
Stage	<i>No stage</i>	
Age of Motorbike	5 Years	
Working days per year	354 Days	
<b>Annual Costs</b>		
Target (per day/year)	10,000	3,540,000
Airtime (per day/year)	3,000	1,062,000
Fuel (per day/year)	7,000	2,478,000
Routine Service (per week/year)	20,000	1,040,000
Police bribes (per year)	0	0
Fines (per year)	60,000	60,000
Stage Welfare (per day/year)	0	0
3rd party Insurance(per year)	45,000	45,000
KAMBE Life Insurance (per week/year)	0	0
KAMBE welfare (per month/year)	5,000	60,000
Driving Permit (bribe) per three years	450,000	150,000
Total Annual Costs		<b>8,435,000</b>
<b>Annual Income</b>		
Passenger Fares (per day/year)	35,000	12,390,000
Annual Income less Expenditure		<b>3,955,000</b>
<b>Daily net income</b>		<b>11,632</b>

SafeBoda riders also have the option of leasing a bike on a 300,000/= deposit, and then payments of 74,000/= per week over two years, making a total cost of 8 million shillings, compared with a typical cash purchase price of 5 million shillings.

They can potentially earn more than their independent counterparts. According to some SafeBoda riders, they can earn anything between 500,000/= and 2 million shillings per month, although this may be exaggerated (see in-depth interview example above, which suggests monthly earnings of around 360,000/=). These earnings include a bonus scheme, which for example pays an additional 5,000/= per ten trips, or 20,000/= per twenty trips, which may not have been taken into consideration when estimating daily income from passengers.

SafeBoda faces tough competition from other ride-hailing companies, particularly Taxify and Uber. It is estimated that SafeBoda has 9-10,000 riders on-line every day, compared to 5,000 Taxify and 2,000 Uber, although Taxify is decreasing and Uber remains static. Riders are reportedly leaving Taxify to join SafeBoda, encouraged by being offered bonuses of 25,000/= per 80 trips per month,

Nevertheless, the competition is problematic for SafeBoda riders, as the company feels compelled to reduce prices in response to Taxify's and Uber's aggressive pricing policies. In 2018, it was reported that SafeBoda was discounting all rides taken at 50% for cash payments and 70% for credit, implying that a ride worth 10,000/= would only cost 5,000/= with cash and 3,000/= with credit. This made it as affordable as Taxify and almost matches the cost of taking the regular taxis, but perhaps at significant cost and a need to increase capital investment (digestafrica, 2018).

There is also an in-built conflict of interest in the SafeBoda business model between cash and cashless payments. Typically, a rider will receive 60% of earnings in cash and 40% cashless. Generally, it is in the rider's interest to maximise cash payments and in SafeBoda's commercial interests to maximise cashless, but there are complexities. While many riders and passengers would perhaps prefer to have the negotiating flexibility of cash, others may

believe that they would be safer on the streets without carrying cash. There are also likely to be many passengers for whom cashless payments would be technically difficult.

This leads to a problem of riders asking passengers at the pick-up point whether they intend to pay cash or cashless and, if the latter, may then abandon the job in favour of finding a cash-paying passenger. Many also switch off their apps outside rush-hours to find cash customers on the street when the SafeBoda prices drop. SafeBoda riders report that they typically earn 20% of their income from street pick-ups with the app switched off. In response, SafeBoda offers drivers a further 5% commission on each cashless trip.

Although SafeBoda riders may suffer less from police harassment, they can face resentment and harassment from other non-SafeBoda riders, particularly if they encroach on their stages (Shaka, 2020).

“Those organisations like SafeBoda and Taxify should have a system of knowing the background of the people they recruit and which stage they belong to before they are given the app to work in town. App organisations are a problem. They recruit those who have no experience in the boda-boda industry; they only mind about money without getting more details of where they come from. They should recruit those who have stages so that they don't destruct our activities” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

“Organisations like SafeBoda or Taxify give people apps who are not familiar with riding in the city, which causes accidents. They don't first investigate the person to see where he comes from. As long as he has a motorcycle and has paid their fee, they enrol him into the system” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

SafeBoda's continual growth or survival remains to be seen, with reports of further needs for investment, the demands of venture capital investors and continuing competition from other ride-hailing companies. It is also dependent on the cashless system, which could be under threat if the government imposes taxes on data bundles, as planned.

### **KAMBE to launch its own worker-owned app?**

By early 2018, KAMBE's leadership concluded that it needed to develop a KAMBE ride hailing and courier services platform to compete with the new entrants. They had noted that some of the association's members had begun to join the new market entrants' digital platforms and that there was a growing interest amongst boda-boda riders to use such technology. (A survey undertaken by the International Transport Workers Federation in 2019 showed that four out of ten respondents had joined Uber, SafeBoda or Bolt at some point). This led to the emergence of a collective interest in the development of a KAMBE platform application.

KAMBE used its partnership with the Centenary Bank to secure backing to develop the app which would include a banking functionality.

A technical consultant developed the back-office requirements that managed the financial records, member data, and related reports. Centenary Bank was approached to provide the hardware in the form of computers for KAMBE's branch offices which had until then lacked adequate facilities. Training was arranged and provided by both the Bank and an IT consultant on how to operate the back-office systems. The back-office is operational and is used on a daily basis by KAMBE.

The app also has been developed. The boda version enables the member to download the app onto their phones (android only). Within the app environment they can pay membership fees, save and withdraw funds, track transactions and performance, manage passenger and courier requests, and use the chat room. The passenger version enables passengers to push out requests and track their payments in real time. The app has been tested. However, it cannot be activated at present.

There are a range of other factors which either was not identified or whose impact was underestimated during the concept and planning phases with financial and budgetary impediments an overarching factor. Boda-boda rider access to smartphones is an essential component to the strategy's success. Yet only 40% of respondents own a smartphone. KAMBE is therefore assessing options to increase access to smartphones for the membership. The leadership are in negotiations with a provider to purchase smartphones and applying influence in the negotiation talks through their SACCO status. Other key components for success are also lacking, including knowledge of how to use the platform applications, Wi-Fi connectivity and lack of equipment such as high visibility vests and passenger helmets. Branded equipment again requires a huge financial commitment which demands a rethink around the app's launch and marketing (Hamilton & Kisingu, 2020)

## Key issues for boda-boda riders

Responses to the question “What are the problems you face at work?” in the survey elicited 339 responses from 277 riders. There was a wide range of issues raised, but police bribery and corruption, theft and assault, the over-supply of bikes and competition between riders, and accidents were the most common, representing nearly 50% of the responses. There was also a common thread of complaint about the general disrespect and lack of recognition from the general public and the authorities, and particularly from passengers who can be abusive and attempt to evade payment.

This is reflected in the view of the KAMBE Executive Committee, who believe the key challenges faced by the boda-boda industry include congestion, and police harassment, bribery and corruption. Toxic emissions are also a problem, but mostly from old bikes brought into the city from outlying or rural areas. (KAMBE, 2020)

<b>Boda-boda problems at work</b>		
	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Police bribery and corruption	54	15.93%
Theft and assault	37	10.91%
Over-supply and competition	37	10.91%
Accidents	34	10.03%
Disrespect, discrimination and lack of recognition	29	8.55%
Customer abuse / non-payment	29	8.55%
Congestion	24	7.08%
Poor state of the roads	20	5.90%
Fuel tax / high prices	19	5.60%
Leadership problems	14	4.13%
Insecure work / low pay	9	2.65%
Poor working conditions	7	2.06%
Bad drivers	6	1.77%
Lack of parking space	4	1.18%
Poor government	4	1.18%
Unskilled and undisciplined riders	3	0.88%
Ride-hailing companies	3	0.88%
High stage fees	3	0.88%
Poor stages	2	0.59%
High loan interest	1	0.29%
<b>Total responses</b>	<b>339</b>	<b>100%</b>

Committee members criticise the failure of the authorities to include boda-bodas in transport planning. The limited “consultations” with the boda-boda workforce by authorities, when building new roads or introducing new bus routes for example, are instructions, not real consultations with opportunities to provide input into the planning process. (KAMBE, 2020).

“KCCA plans for taxis, cars and pedestrians, but never plan for boda-bodas” (KAMBE, 2020).

Key issues mentioned during in-depth interviews with riders include high targets demanded by owners, injuries sustained in accidents, and poor medical treatment. In 2010, an investigation by Kampala’s Mulago hospital found that 40% of its trauma cases involved a motorcycle taxi (Nguku, Naddumba, & Kigera, 2010). One interviewee complained that riders are “hated” by the medical staff in hospitals and can be severely mistreated – performing unnecessary amputations, for example (Stephen, 2020). Real helmets are expensive, so many riders use ‘fake’ helmets which are worse than wearing nothing (Stephen, 2020). Bad street behaviour and rule-breaking are blamed on the police.

“You can obey all the rules and still face bribery or arrest, so why bother?” (Stephen, 2020).

The major issues identified by boda-boda fleet owners include congestion, over-supply of bikes, the cost of retrieving bikes from police after riders have been arrested and the lack of good signposting on the streets, especially to

indicate one-way systems (Robert, 2020). Theft from boda-boda passengers is a major problem. Bags are frequently snatched. (Andrew, 2020).

### **Police harassment and extortion**

Hostile relationships between boda-boda riders and the police, including KCCA traffic officers and security agencies, are one of the most serious problems affecting riders on a day-to-day basis. Police demands for bribes or unreceipted fines from riders is a daily occurrence.

“The traffic officers take us as a source of income, they find all means to extort money from us even when you have all the requirements you need to ride in town like the drive permit, helmet, third party insurance they still create a fake reason and arrest you” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

“The traffic officers are very hard to us, even when you have all the requirements needed for you to be on the road they still arrest you and demand for money before you are released... Traffic officers do not respect us as boda-boda riders... Some people in government offices have no time to listen to us unless we pay them. They ask for a lot of money. There is a big number of people who are not traffic officers but connive with them to extort money from us”. (Boda-Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

There is particular anger at the attitude of the police towards the riders in the case of an accident, who assume that they must be in the wrong. In response, riders quickly gather at the scene of an accident to support their accused workmate.

“When there is an accident, the police don't treat us equally with the car drivers. They arrest the boda-boda riders instead of the car driver who is in the wrong. In that case, when an accident occurs, many boda-boda riders gather to rescue their fellow rider; being in a big number on the scene is our survival mechanism” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

### **Political corruption**

The boda-boda industry is highly politicised. Riders complain about large amounts of money spent by politicians, political candidates and government officials to attract support and votes from riders, disrupt and interfere in riders' own democratic representation and the undermine attempts to properly regulate the industry.

“There is a lot of politics in our job, and in most government organisations like KCCA. We wanted to elect our leaders and pushed the election programme up to General Tumukunde's<sup>1</sup> office but since people politicise everything they failed to agree, and the programme was terminated. Nothing good came out of it... Sometimes people get driving permits before they are fully trained since they have connections to those who issue them out in Kyambogo... People shouldn't board a boda-boda which is not on a stage, but big people in government disorganise the system by supporting those who don't have stages. The government should restrict its officials from interfering in the business” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“There are taxi stages alongside the roads that are not under the law, yet they are owned by big people in the government like in Bwaise. There is a lot of politics in it. All taxis should be allocated space in the taxi park to avoid those who park on the roadside because they are the ones that have a lot of issues” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

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<sup>1</sup> Minister of National Security (2016-2018)

**Stage Registration.** Since the abolition of the old Kampala City Council, there has been no attempt to register (“gazette”) or formalise boda-boda stages. This means that street developments are planned without consideration of boda-boda stages.

“When they are planning for the city, they don’t gazette stages for us and we end up parking on roadsides, which is not safe for us... We have 100,000 boda-bodas and more in the town if you are to count those that have stages, but there are those that don’t have stages. People just gather and make stages as they wish and in case there is a person who wants to join that stage, that person has to go through someone” (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020)

“We have a problem of those who have no specific stages (“lubyanza”). They disorganise us and sometimes they misbehave with the customers and give a bad picture of our job... There is lack of gazetted stages. They used to be there but there are no more because of politics in the city” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

The lack of properly registered stages also increases tensions with the police: “since we are not gazetted, they harass us” (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020).

### **Accidents and road safety.**

The number of accidents and injuries caused to boda-boda riders is of great concern. Riders recognise that they are “at a very high risk of getting accidents since the rider is the body and the balance can easily be lost. Every slight mistake made by another driver on the road an accident can happen” (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020).

The accident and injury rate for boda-boda riders is very high. The KAMBE executive committee estimates that their members suffer twenty serious accidents, including two fatalities, every month. This high incidence of accidents is thought to be the result of several factors – firstly, bad driving by car owners and taxi drivers.

“Car drivers are careless; they drive while on the phone, they drive when drunk. They get driving permits from the “window”, not the right way, and drive when they don't know the road signs, overtake where they are not supposed to, speed up to 120 Km/hr even when the car starts warning, but they don't care and end up making mistakes on the road.... Even the taxi drivers that are not trained, so drive carelessly. They overspeed and don't mind about other drivers and people on the road so all of us riders have to be trained to avoid accidents” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

There was particular concern at the increasing use of bull-bars on private cars and taxis, which are believed to be fitted specifically to intimidate and injure boda-boda riders.

Secondly, accidents are believed to be caused by new, inexperienced and young riders, particularly those coming into town from rural areas, and more likely to operate without being based at a stage.

“The young generation that has just started riding cause so many accidents since they don't know exactly what they are into, they forget about their lives and drive carelessly and impatiently on the road. They still have a lot of excitement working and they don't listen to our advice thinking that we are old and outdated” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“There is also bad driving in town brought about by those who have just come from the village and not experienced with driving in town... Those who don't have formal stages are more than those that have stages and are careless, impatient and arrogant while riding in town since they don't have a person they report to. They cause more accidents” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

Particularly worrying is the widespread belief that injured boda-boda riders are deliberately subject to **persecution and ill-treatment by medical authorities**. These allegations were repeatedly made in all boda-boda focus groups and in many questionnaire responses.

“In case of accidents, when a boda-boda rider is taken to the hospital the doctors just cut off the injured leg without taking any other precautions to save it. We should get someone to cater for us so that we are respected” (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020).

“When we have an accident, the doctors in government hospitals, especially in Mulago, don't care about our proper recovery. They are so biased when they get to know that you are a boda-boda rider, thinking that we are bad drivers. If it's the leg that is injured, they just cut it off because they don't want us to ride again” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“The doctors in government hospital especially Mulago hospital don't take precautions to save our injured body parts like the legs or the hands but they just cut them off by malice the moment they get to know that you are a boda-boda rider” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

In addition, many accidents are caused by the **poor state of the roads**, particularly during rainstorms when potholes and other hazards are hidden by flooding, and the **excessive working hours** leading to tiredness, lack of concentration and encouraging drug or alcohol abuse.

## **Congestion**

Extreme congestion is recognised by boda-boda riders to be a major problem. There are numerous factors believed to be the major causes of traffic jams and congestion, including narrow and bad roads, street vendors encroaching on roads, and accidents (particularly the slow response of traffic police).

The most commonly cited cause of congestion, however, are **private cars**, including the use of cars to take children to and from schools, and the creation of roadside parking spaces in the city centre.

“KCCA should remove the parking spaces that were created in the middle and beside the roads for example on Kampala Road, Buganda Road, Wilson Street to reduce congestion in town. If you notice, almost all taxi drivers work on Sunday because it is a day given by their bosses to make their own money but you find no jam in town simply because those who own private cars don't work on Sunday and have not parked besides and in the middle of the road so cars can move freely. They should also remove those flowers they planted in the middle of the road to widen the roads” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

But riders recognise that congestion is also the major reason for the growth in the boda-boda industry.

“Traffic jam doesn't affect us so much. Instead it is a blessing in disguise because if there is jam we work the most; the person who would have boarded a taxi ends up riding on a boda-boda so that they reach their destination in time” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

## **Crime**

There are major concerns about criminality – the use of boda-bodas by violent criminals (including assassins), the vulnerability of riders to violent crime, and passengers who evade paying fares.

“We get customers who don't want to pay after their ride. They run away without paying and some of them are robbers who kill our colleagues and steal their motorcycles... There are also those who pretend to be boda-boda riders, yet they are thieves. They even create fake stages and the police don't do anything to arrest them. Instead, if you complain about them and try to interfere with their activities, the police ends up arresting you” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

“Sometimes when you take a passenger and reach their destination, they just run away without paying. Some even hit our riders' heads and kill them to take their motorcycles” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

## **Pollution.**

Air pollution is largely blamed on the use of old and badly maintained taxis and motorbikes, exacerbated by high interest rates that deter owners from buying new and less-polluting vehicles.

“There is a lot of pollution from old taxis and boda-boda. Such vehicles should be in the village doing farm work, not in town, but this is also brought by the high interest on loans. The loans should be put on a smaller interest so that people can easily acquire new ones to avoid pollution” (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020).

## **Consultation and inclusion in planning processes**

Many comments by focus group participants and questionnaire respondents pointed to the general lack of consideration of the boda-boda industry when planning Kampala's transport system and, more specifically, the lack of real consultation with the boda-boda riders themselves. When planning road improvements, for example, the authorities do not take the opportunity to build in properly planned boda-boda stages.

“Many of our stages are affected or removed by road building or development, so we had preparations with KCCA to see how we can organise our jobs and ensure that the stages are gazetted. We brought our ideas and they recorded them, but they started working on the site before they showed us places where we are going to stage. Our stages were disorganised when KCCA was making roads and did not gazette stages for us on those roads, yet they registered us. If you look at the areas with shops where people need to transport their goods on a boda-boda for example, the KCCA did not take the opportunity to consider how the 40 stages from Luwun Street up to Namirembe (could be consolidated to) 20 stages there after construction” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

The lack of consultation and communication also causes confusion. “They change programmes in the city without informing us. They made one-way roads before they told us and we end up making mistakes on the road and, in

addition, there are no sign posts on those roads that indicate the changes made to them” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

The authorities are also criticised for excluding boda-boda rider representatives in consultations on urban planning, preferring to employ external consultants.

“The minister for Kampala doesn't know what to do and she doesn't consult us when she is thinking of transforming the city. Instead she brings in experts from abroad who don't even have experience in riding boda-bodas in Uganda, rather than us who have been doing this job for so long” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

### **Access to finance**

As described above, lack of access to affordable loans is a major obstacle to riders who wish to purchase their own vehicles and escape poverty caused by the target system.

“The organisations that give us boda bodas on loan charge us a very high interest. A boda boda bought on cash costs 4,500,000/= yet for them they give it to us at 8,500,000/= payable in one year” (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020); “We lack the capital to own our own motorcycles, most of the people ride motorcycles for their bosses which reduces on their income” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

According to the KAMBE Executive Committee, there are particular problems caused by schemes that offer low deposits but high interest, particularly organisations such as *Tugende*. “10,000 of our members are riding boda bodas on loan from Centenary bank and have completed payment, 5,000 are riding boda bodas that they are still paying for. 12,000 riders are given boda-bodas from Tugende on loan, but they are being cheated. A boda-boda that costs 4,500,000/= is leased to a rider at 8,000,000/= which is to be paid on instalments per week. This is because the initial deposit of Tugende is 500,000/=, yet for Centenary Bank is 1,000,000/=, so riders end up going for Tugende not knowing that they are being cheated” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

To raise a substantial deposit is an impossibility for many riders, and some will borrow the money from elsewhere and then have to service two loans at once.

“Most of the people are riding for bosses because they have so many responsibilities like rent, school fees, food so it becomes so hard for them to save and get their own boda-boda. There are some who get chance to get another loan from a bank to raise the 1,000,000/= of centenary bank as the initial deposit and get a boda-boda on loan, but they then have to pay back the two loans at the same time” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

### **Exploitation by boda-boda fleet owners**

Most boda-boda riders do not ride their own bikes but pay daily targets to owners – typically 10,000/= per day. These are sometimes owners of large and very profitable fleets. But riders complain that many of them avoid their responsibilities.

“The boda-boda owners who are our bosses don't mind about the problems we encounter on the road. They only mind about money and, in case of an accident or police arrest, they always rescue their bikes and give

them to other riders to make money for them... We shouldn't get boda-bodas from their owners instead we should cooperate in our own associations to get our own boda-bodas for the betterment of our being” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

### **Driving permits**

Many boda-boda riders operate without permits. Some argue that these are too expensive and unfairly charged at the same rate as a car.

“Since boda-boda driving permits are at the same price as car driving permits which is 400,000/= people end up getting car permits instead of boda-boda permits, which is not good. If they are made cheaper to like 200,000/= it would encourage us to train and get our own permits” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

### **Challenges for KAMBE**

According to riders, including KAMBE members and leaders, the organisation faces some major challenges: a lack of consistency and stability in the leadership; and the need for improved communications and democratic accountability between KAMBE organisation on the stages, the divisions, and the national Executive Committee; the identification and visibility (marketing) of KAMBE membership among the riders; the need for membership training and education; and the development of its own ride-hailing digital service.

### **Leadership**

Many riders, both in the questionnaire survey and in focus groups, were concerned at the inconsistent, divided and unstable leadership, unable to provide strong and democratic representation, or ensure compliance with regulations designed to provide order to the boda-boda industry.

“There are power pockets within the boda-boda industry. People form groups and create small leaders at any time they want, so you end up not knowing who is right and who is wrong” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020). “Boda-boda riders have no proper leadership which makes our job undermined and not respected” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

“There are no specific rules that govern our job as boda-boda riders since we don't have proper leadership. Rules and regulations should be put in place to regulate our job... We are disturbed by those who intrude into our job because of our ignorance to the law. There are those that don't even have stages and we as organised ones don't have the authority to fight them” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“There are those people masquerading as boda-boda leaders, but they are hypocrites, they don't have a side that they agree with and are against each other which further disorganises our profession... Other people and organisations think that we are mannerless, yet we are good people. If we get a leadership that we have created for ourselves it would be better” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

### **Communications and organisational capacity**

KAMBE's leadership recognise that they face challenges in building the capacity of the organisation:

“We take long to accomplish what we have started on. Some programmes are not effective. We have so many members, but we don't have the capacity to accomplish our programmes... We don't have the capacity to sustain offices in different parts of the country like Mukono or Lugazi. If we had the capability, we would be able to keep more members on board.” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

KAMBE is still very young, yet it has built a very significant membership to become by far the most representative organisation in the boda-boda industry. Nevertheless, its democratic structures, procedures and administrative capacity has yet to meet the needs of such a large number of members. In particular, there is a notable disconnect between the individual stages, the Kampala-wide leadership and the intermediate structures at Divisional level, which can lead to complaints from the stage workers and leaders that their issues are not being addressed.

“Leadership should be brought down to stage level. The stage leaders should be sensitised so that they also teach others on their stages to improve efficiency” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“As stage leaders we don't have a leader at the division level to help us act as a uniform voice for all of us to air out our issues to higher authorities. Those that say that they are our leaders in big offices are just money minded and think of only themselves not minding about the riders and their problems” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

In common with the taxi workforce, there is confusion among boda-boda riders about the relationship between their democratically elected representative workplace organisation and the authorities (government, KCCA, police) with whom they negotiate, calling for the government to intervene and assert authority.

“We don't have leaders with authority to speak for us, each stage has a chairman who is not elected; Leadership should start from above at division level and the hierarchy goes down to stages level. It is the government that should intervene and initiate the elections of the boda-boda leaders. KCCA and police should help in that; it should be involved by government officials to eliminate those who want to take advantage of us” (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020).

## **Identification and visibility**

Many comments expressed the need to find ways to establish a clear identification and visibility of KAMBE membership among the riders, similar to that of SafeBoda, Taxify, Uber and other boda-boda “platform companies”. This would have a major impact on some of the key issues, including the reduction of police harassment and bribery, attractiveness to potential passengers, and improved solidarity and identification among the riders. KAMBE branding could be achieved in a variety of ways, including Hi-Viz vests, protective motorbike jackets, helmets or the bikes themselves. The TVS dealer, for example, will provide bespoke fuel tank branding for approximately 150,000/= per bike on top of the purchase price.

“We have a problem with identification. If you go to another place like Lubaga or Mukono you can't be identified as someone from KAMBE. If we can get nice big jackets with some words on them, it would be better for easy identification. We need jackets that we use daily and are long-lasting, unlike the reflector vests that get spoilt so fast. We lack identification as KAMBE boda riders compared to SafeBoda riders, so people opt for SafeBoda rather than us. It makes us less trusted. We should get uniforms as per divisions of Kampala for easy identification” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

## **Training and education**

Questionnaire responses and focus group discussions (including that with the KAMBE Executive Committee) included numerous references to the need for KAMBE to provide training and education for members. Many of these were for vocational training, such as road safety and traffic regulation, or training in legal rights, how to deal with the police etc. But there is also demand for training on personal financial management, savings and social protection.

“We have members coming from very far in the village and we have to educate them on how to use the road and also to save their money as they work. We need more training on that since for us we don't have NSSF as other formal workers” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

## **Ride-hailing.**

KAMBE is attempting to develop and market its own ride-hailing platform, in response to the popularity of SafeBoda and other companies but is struggling to find the capacity necessary to successfully launch it as a service for members.

“We talk about the app but failed to put it into practice and other organisations took on our plan. Since we don't have the capacity to pay our executive members some of them are leaving us for other organizations that have apps. SafeBoda took away some of our big leaders offering them better pay. We used to have workshops on the idea, but even the things we talked about were not put in action. We need to be trained. Some of our members don't know the app, if we could call our members and sensitise them on how it works it will be better... We have a problem of technology. Some apps are coming in day-by-day, taking our members. We have the app but we are failing to go down into the market because we don't have the capacity to get the phones and to train our people how to use those phones” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

## Bus Rapid Transit in Kampala

BRT is a public transport system designed to improve capacity and reliability in congested cities. It is based on dedicated road lanes that cannot be used by vehicles other than large buses operated by BRT companies. BRT involves building new roads, interchanges, terminals and modern stations along the routes.

In many parts of the world, city authorities have introduced BRT, and others such as Kampala are exploring the feasibility of BRT as a means of relieving congestion, increasing efficiency, and reducing air pollution. There are some complex factors involved in determining what constitutes a recognisable BRT system, including service planning, infrastructure, station design, communications and integration with pedestrians and other transport systems.

The most basic criteria are

- Dedicated right-of-way
- Busway alignment (minimising conflict with other traffic)
- Off-board fare collection
- Intersection treatments (reducing delays at intersections)
- Platform-level boarding

### BRT design


The most recent available plans for BRT in Kampala are included in the 2014 report prepared for the Ministry of Works & Transport by a consortium of transport engineering consultancies, financed by the World Bank (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2014).

This proposed a pilot 25km project, linking Kampala's Central Business District (CBD) with Bwaise, Zana and Kireka through three BRT corridors along the routes of Bombo Road, Entebbe Road and Jinja Road. To minimise the need for transfer from one route to another, the plan proposes three BRT trunk lines that would pass through the centre and run from one suburban terminal to another. The pilot would be operated by a fleet of 165 articulated buses, 18m long, with a capacity of 150 passengers each.

Five non-BRT feeder bus lines are proposed to link the terminals with outlying districts:

1. Zana to Kajjansi (and possibly to Entebbe)
2. Kireka to Mukono
3. Bwaise to Watugga (via Bombo Road)
4. Bwaise to Kasangati – Gayaza (via Gayaza Road)
5. Bwaise to Wakiso (via Northern Bypass and Hoima Road)

These feeder lines would be operated with 6-12m buses and would “offer an opportunity for existing operators” (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2014).



Source: (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2014)

Proposed BRT Stations		
Bombo Corridor	Entebbe Corridor	Jinja Corridor
City Square Station	Shoprite Station	Railway Station
Watoto-Bat Valley Station	Queens Way Station	Centenary Park Station
YMCA-Wandegeya Station	Katwe Station	Jinja Road Police Station
Mulago Hospital Station	Kibuye Station	Lugogo Game Station
Kubbiri Station	Najjanankumbi Station	Nakawa Market Station
Kalerwe Market Station	Stella Station	Spear Motors Station
<b>Bwaise Terminal</b>	Freedom City Station	Kyambogo University Station
	Bata Bata Station	Banda Main Station
	Zana	Banda Market Station
	<b>Zana Terminal</b>	Namugongo Station
		Kireka
		<b>Kireka Terminal</b>

Source: (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2014)

The bus lanes and stations would be located in the centre of the road, and the lanes would exclude all other traffic. Each station would be staffed with one person, but station maintenance “might” be outsourced to an advertising company.

## Business Model

The proposed underlying business model is that the BRT infrastructure (roads, stations etc) would be owned by the government, but that the bus operations would be put out to tender on the basis of a ten-year contract, on the assumption that this would be the economic lifetime of the vehicles. It is suggested that the financing could be provided by the bus manufacturer.

Similar to nearly all BRT projects in Africa, one of the key priorities is to operate BRT without public subsidy, and preferably at a profit that could generate tax revenue for the government yet experience in other cities indicates that BRT operations are frequently loss-making. The 2014 report hints that it will be difficult to avoid subsidy:

“BRT is to be operated with a minimum of subsidy while keeping the fare at an affordable level. For urban public transport this is a tough challenge and in most cities in the world the public transport is subsidised” (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2014).

The report estimates that the total investment needed would be USD 429 million, including:

- Construction of BRT infrastructure (lanes, stations, terminals, signalling, ticketing etc), potentially eligible for a World Bank loan (approx. USD 400 million)
- Land acquisition and resettlement, to be borne by the Ugandan government (approx. US 29 million)

## Transformation of paratransit

“One quick win is to strengthen the regulation of the current minibus taxi system - Before Kampala is ready to make new public transport investments, such as Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) or rapid rail systems, the current transport system and regulatory environment needs to be further strengthened. A complete and sudden phasing out of taxis will not be feasible in the short run. As KCCA has taken over more control of the taxi industry’s regulation since 2015, this provides an opportunity to better regulate and coordinating taxi routes and stops, hopefully leading to less congestion and better traffic management”.

“A large unregulated informal sector focused in low productivity sectors presents a significant barrier to Kampala’s structural transformation. However, policies aimed at reducing the informal sector’s dominance needs to be informed by an understanding of the kind of firms and people working in it” (Kathage & Hobson, 2018).

The 2014 report proposes that, in the short term, the Ministry of Works and Transport establishes a BRT Agency, responsible for the procurement and management of the BRT system and the *management of taxi transformation*. In the longer term, it is proposed to establish a Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (MATA), which will require new legislation.

The report states that the paratransit market “will be transformed into a regulated market, based on transport concessions. Regulations are necessary to ensure the exclusive right to operate routes that are awarded to an operator under a concession. In particular, competition between the existing taxis and the BRT should be avoided. *A large public investment in the BRT should not be undermined by competing private operators*”. It argues that the taxi and boda-boda industry needs to be transformed, “focusing on up-scaling of the fleet, improving the quality of service and regulating the transport market by means of concessions... Implementation will require a step-by-step approach, including *consultation with the current operators*” (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2014).

(The term “operator”, widely used when describing the transport industry, is not helpful when attempting to analyse the paratransit industry, as it does not distinguish between vehicle owners and the workforce – drivers, conductors, riders and so on. The two groups, while maybe sharing some common concerns for the industry as a whole, have very different economic interests on a day-to-day basis through a variety of informal employment relationships).

A Consultation and Communication Plan was included in a 2013 report on the Feasibility, Preliminary Design and Operations (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2013). Stakeholders consulted during the preparation of the plan included – among many others - the (now defunct) Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA), Drivers and Conductors Association (DACA), (the forerunner of KOTSA) and the Pioneer Easy Bus company. The overall public administration of the project was be handled by the Ministry of Works and Transport, mainly through a Technical Committee which was to include UTODA along with government ministries, national and local authorities and the police.

## Awareness and attitudes towards BRT

According to the questionnaire results, 82% of stage workers, 63% of taxi crews, 52% of service workers and 69% of boda-boda riders were aware of plans to introduce BRT in Kampala. Of these, most had heard of BRT through the media or by word of mouth. Very few had been informed directly from the authorities or their association.

Source of knowledge on BRT										
	Service workers		Taxi Crews		Taxi Stage Workers		Boda-boda riders		Total	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Radio	35	26.7	27	27.8	33	27.7	19	28.4	114.0	27.5
TVs	32	24.4	15	15.5	24	20.2	6	9.0	77.0	18.6
General Public	24	18.3	8	8.2	32	26.9	8	11.9	72.0	17.4
Newspapers	18	13.7	16	16.5	12	10.1	17	25.4	63.0	15.2
Workmates	11	8.4	16	16.5	11	9.2	11	16.4	49.0	11.8
Customers	6	4.6	9	9.3	3	2.5	1	1.5	19.0	4.6
Social media	3	2.3		0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	3.0	0.7
KOTSA or ATGWU			5	5.2	3	2.5	4	6.0	12.0	2.9
KCCA	2	1.5	1	1.0	1	0.8	1	1.5	5.0	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>414</b>	<b>100</b>

The workers who were aware of plans for BRT were split between those who thought it was a good idea (39.5%) and those who opposed it (49.4%) with 11.1% undecided.

Is BRT a good idea?										
	Service workers		Taxi Crews		Taxi Stage Workers		Boda-boda riders		Total	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Yes	50	40.3	29	43.3	41	36.0	76	39.8	196	39.5
No	54	43.5	32	47.8	64	56.1	95	49.7	245	49.4
Don't Know	20	16.1	6	9.0	9	7.9	20	10.5	55	11.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>496</b>	<b>100</b>

The questionnaire survey and focus groups revealed that taxi crews and stage workers who are **positive** about the arrival of BRT believe it will be good for the development of the country, will improve the transport system and reduce congestion, and will bring more good quality employment. The largest number of reasons given by service workers to support to BRT were concerned with the prospect of more efficient, cheaper and faster transport in Kampala and reduction in congestion, along with the more general view that it would be good for Uganda's economic development. Other reasons included the possibility of new jobs and more customers, and improved safety and the environment.

“We appreciate that at times such developments come for the better development of the city for instance when Park Yard market was demolished and later Ham Shopping Grounds built, this led to improved working standards and beauty of the city” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

But there were frequent caveats, such as concern that the new BRT jobs will not be available to taxi industry workers, that the taxi industry is insufficiently prepared or reformed in advance of BRT implementation, or more general cynicism about whether the government is capable of delivering BRT.

By far the largest number of reasons given for **opposition** to BRT concerned the potential loss of jobs, customers and livelihoods. Other reasons included the narrowness and poor state of Kampala's roads, the previous failures to introduce buses, that BRT would not favour “the common people”, especially the uneducated or illiterate, that it would only benefit the bosses and a general distrust of the government to implement any large project.

Other reasons included the inability of BRT to take people to their final destinations (unlike taxis and boda-bodas), a belief that BRT will discriminate against the poor, a fear that it will cause further divisions in the transport industry, the inability of BRT as a means to transport goods from the market, and a general distrust in the government and its inability to manage efficient and successful transport operations.

Some are neither for, or against, but are concerned that they are not being consulted, that the government should do more preparation before BRT is introduced, that it is good “if it does not push people out of the system”, or simply think that they “need to see how it works”.

When asked how they thought BRT would affect them personally, nearly 60% of stage workers thought that their own jobs could be at risk.

“I have seen such buses in Tanzania, but I have never heard about them in Uganda. This is my first time to see them (in the video). We have not been informed before. The buses are long like trains, eeh!!!” ... “I didn’t know about it; when you mentioned about BRT I thought ‘Tondeka’ bus. I think we need to be sensitized more about BRT and how it will work” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

The **KOTSA leadership** are clearly concerned at the potential loss of jobs through the introduction of BRT, highlighting the impact on vehicle owners who may have outstanding loans on their vehicles, and that there has been no consultation with KOTSA over the introduction of BRT by the authorities during the planning exercise leading to the 2014 consultants’ report or subsequently.

“The challenge is that the government has not explained to people why they are bringing the buses, yet the buses like Pioneer buses failed. They have not put right paths of how the buses are going to operate. It threatens the future of their leadership. We will end up being unemployed since buses use fewer employees. People may not resist because of state power but they will not be happy. They are not confident that BRT will work in the city” (KOTSA, 2020).

Some of the KOTSA leaders had been able to see BRT at first hand when travelling to other cities, or (in the case of Dar es Salaam) to attend ITF seminars, but believe that “the challenge is that in Uganda public transport is not prioritised as it is done in Dar El Salaam and we may not match their standards. At least let’s improve our public transport by copying from Nairobi which is near what we can afford.” ... “I saw such a bus system in Turkey very effective and well organised, but they can’t pass on roads that have humps like how it is the case in Uganda. We still need to work on our road network if at all we are to introduce such buses” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

**KAMBE leaders** are doubtful about the success of BRT (“In Kampala, we don’t have the roads”), but are sanguine on the impact if BRT does arrive (“BRT will change the boda-boda business, but it will adapt to the new situation”), using the analogy of an anthill – “if you block one side of the anthill, the ants will simply move around to the other side” (KAMBE, 2020). Some are more generally positive about the prospect of development: “It is always good to try out new things” or be prepared to accept the inevitable: “We cannot refuse government preparations” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

Some KAMBE leaders have also been able to visit BRT in other cities. “BRT was possible in Dar El Salaam because Tanzania has had three capital cities that I have known and they are well planned, but here in Uganda there is a lot of congestion. All the big offices like Parliament, courts, embassies are here. You may even find a member of parliament for Nakapiripiti having an office here in the town. Initially Kampala was meant to be a business centre not a capital city. They should try BRT for long distance journeys” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

## Loss of jobs

“The project is not bad because it can reduce jams, but it is a threat to our jobs” (Taxi Service Workers, 2020).

Workers in the paratransit industry are acutely aware of the numbers of people that depend on the taxis for their livelihoods, and that BRT will be operated by a much fewer number of workers.

“The BRT system would be good, but I don’t think this government can really fulfil it. There is no way the BRT bus company will help us as taxi drivers because the taxi feeds or is depended on by nine people which is not the case with the bus. Instead the bus owner needs only a driver and a person at a station who issues tickets, so all the chain of dependants is cut off. Yet this network or chain has been a basis of survival for many people. I recommend that if the government is to help us, let it help us within our sector as taxi operators” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

“One taxi was benefiting more than 20 people: the driver and his family, the conductor and his family, the owner of the taxi and his family, the stage guides and the washing bays including the traffic officers who extort money from them. It is going to affect the whole country at large... Theft and so many offences will rise up which will cause insecurity in the country” (Women Taxi Conductors, 2020).

“Many of the people will be laid off. For instance, the conductors, stage callers, drivers, because only few drivers will be needed to operate BRT buses. It is a great risk that majority of the current taxi drivers will be rendered unemployed and yet they can’t go below a level of driver to become bus ticket issuer. People who sell taxi tyres, those who do the servicing, washing bay boys will all be unemployed. The women who sell tea, food and snacks in the taxi parks and to taxi operators will be affected because they will have nowhere to earn a living as taxis perish from the city centre” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

There is also concern that many owners have borrowed large amounts to invest in ‘new’ taxis without being forewarned of the plans for BRT which could leave them in debt.

“My worry is that some people have invested money in the taxi transport business for instance one invested 800 million in buying new taxis so what is going to happen when BRT begins to operate” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020). “They should have first sensitised us about the buses earlier, like five years ago, so that people could prepare for it in advance, then they wouldn’t have even got loans from the bank to buy more new taxis” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

There is also a fear of a serious rise in street crime and violent gangs in the event of widespread loss of jobs.

“You know what, we are going to experience a high degree of insecurity and theft as former conductors and vendors look for means to survive. They become *kiface* or join *kasolo group* and thugs as a means of survival, snatching people’s phones and bags in town if they are not well absorbed” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

“The government should first consider those who are in the transport system before introducing the buses because it might lead to a high crime rate if people become jobless” (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

## Lack of inclusive planning

“Will the World Bank run the BRT system by itself? So, I think the BRT system would be best run by us who have been in the transport bus after getting training on how the system works so that we have maximum cooperation on the road as public transport service providers” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

There is a general view that there is a lack of respect for the experience and knowledge of paratransit workers in Kampala's public transport industry, and exclusion from the development of plans and ideas for improvement. They think that discussions around BRT are "just talk, because our suggestions will never be respected by government or KCCA. They will take a decision in their favour with an idea of how they profit but not how they would benefit us as people who have been in public transport sector. You just wait and see what they will do; you can never advise them" (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

Some interviewed drivers questioned the logic of the planned BRT routes. "Why not take the Bombo corridor BRT all the way to the Kawempe township, rather than stopping at Bwaise?" (Thomas, 2020). Others think that the distances between stations will still require passengers to use other services, particularly boda-bodas. "People will have to travel further to and from the points they are supposed to board. It will inconvenience some people because they will only park where there are stations. It will incur people more money because they will still have to board boda-bodas to reach (the stations)" (Taxi Service Workers, 2020).

### **Government competence**

"If it is the government to implement it then we forget about the BRT system because many programmes that sounded good have all collapsed and others didn't take off because of government and political interference. The commitment from government to run BRT will not be there and there is no element of sustainability if handled by the government" (Taxi Crews, 2020).

There is a very high degree of cynicism about the competence and ability of the government to successfully deliver any major public transport improvement projects, based on the extent of **corruption** and the historical evidence of **past failures**.

Even those in favour of BRT are pessimistic about whether the system will be operational, or whether it will last long because of corruption. "Our leaders here are so greedy and corrupt they won't be able to construct such roads for the buses. They always do shoddy work and eat all the money, so the roads won't last long for the buses to operate here ... No-one could build such roads here in Uganda because here there is bad politics and corruption. I don't think the roads will be to (the BRT) standard, that shouldn't worry us as boda-boda riders because they will only work for like five years and phase out" (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020).

"BRT would be a very brilliant idea, but I don't think this government can really fulfil that given the politics involved, sectarianism and favouritism (literally said 'mwanawaani' attitude in allocating resources and jobs)" (Taxi Crews, 2020).

Others point to previous failures, such as the introduction of Pioneer buses in 2012 following a taxi drivers' strike, and the UTODA bus Company Awakula Ennume in 2013, both of which are blamed on political interference.

"We have no confidence in the authorities to deliver BRT. If the mere Awakula Ennume and Pioneer have failed in terms of being managed since they would be easy as local bus systems, then how about the BRT? I don't think so" ... "The government cannot run it because when it is introduced you will observe political interference in its operation for selfish gains" (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

“Frankly speaking I don’t see the confidence in government to fulfil this and run BRT. If you take the example of the Pioneer bus company. The company begun with an intention of replacing the taxi. Right now, they overload passengers to the extent that some of them move while standing but the police can never stop or penalize them. The Pioneer buses take beyond their capacities and nobody penalizes them so most of the things here in Uganda are influenced by sectarianism (literally said ‘mwanawaani’ attitude) so likewise there is someone behind Pioneer or Awakula Ennume that is why they break the traffic rules and capacity limits with no impeachment. The BRT system will operate in the same way” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

There is also a more general sense of a succession of new projects that are never fully completed. “There are some people who were relocated (due to planned development) such as Salaama Road but up to now they have not yet constructed the road. And now they are thinking of bringing those buses yet there are so many pending projects that have not been completed. Let them first complete projects before thinking of something new” (Taxi Service Workers, 2020).

### **Paratransit in parallel with BRT?**

“I advise the government to leave the taxis also to operate because when you open a new supermarket in a community you don’t close the retail shops; instead you leave them to operate and the customers choose what works well for them given their status and preferences” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020).

There is a strong demand from taxi crews and stage workers to let the taxis operate in parallel and in competition with BRT. “Let us as taxis be left to operate independently as we watch how BRT will operate for the first 3 years and we learn from them otherwise we shall risk the public transport business” (Taxi Stage Workers, 2020). “When the buses are introduced, they should leave all the vehicles (taxis, buses, boda-boda) to work at the same time so it will be the people's choice to choose what to board” (Taxi Service Workers, 2020).

“The BRT system wouldn’t be bad but our worry is if you bring it please don’t chase us out of our work; let the competition be free and fair for us we shall know how to survive because we well know that the passengers have choices; for instance even right now the passengers that use taxis are not the passengers that use buses or boda-bodas so amidst the introduction of BRT we know that we as taxis shall still have our category of passengers” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

Boda-boda riders recognise that they could still play an important role with the introduction of BRT. “If the buses come, we might face a problem of being chased from the city. If they let us work alongside the buses then it will be good because there are some places a bus can't reach, yet a boda-boda can” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

### **Who will benefit?**

“I have confidence that the government can impose those buses on us because if the government puts an emphasis on something, they eventually put it into action, but I think the government is bringing them to eradicate and harass us the low class people. The government will bring something to chase us from the city” (Taxi Service Workers, 2020).

There is a widespread suspicion that BRT will only benefit the better-off passengers or is proposed as a means of driving the poor off the streets. “Those buses are already planned for the sons of people in the government not for the drivers that have been driving the taxis” (Taxi Service Workers, 2020). By formalising and regulating fixed fares,

the poor could be excluded. “We, the lay people, sometimes have less money for the journey we have to travel so we plead and negotiate with the taxi drivers to take us for less money, yet in the (BRT) buses there won't be any negotiations and the prices are fixed” (Taxi Service Workers, 2020).

There is also a broader awareness that BRT is to be financed through loans that will increase public debt and will eventually have to be paid off through taxation.

“From what I see, it is hard for the government to introduce those buses because those roads have to be wide, to make those roads needs a lot of money yet our government has a lot of debt. It is not good for us to take another loan... I wouldn't support the government to bring buses because we the people are the ones to pay back that loan that the government will get to bring the buses. Even our grandchildren will have to pay the money to cover that loan, so it's better we remain with the taxis we have” (Taxi Service Workers, 2020).

## Potential impact of BRT on paratransit economy and livelihoods

### Taxi Industry

It is impossible to give a precise quantitative assessment of the potential loss of employment and livelihoods in the paratransit services if the current BRT plans are implemented without any mitigation measures. In other words, if paratransit traffic is simply banned from the BRT corridors and there is no attempt to lessen the impact through design of the system or enhancement of the paratransit industry through measures towards formalisation.

The workers potentially affected by BRT include taxi crews, stage workers and service workers. To gain a full picture of the workforce, one would have to include those working from the CBD taxi parks, the stages along the BRT corridors, and the 'unofficial' stages on CBD streets, plus those working in off-road service areas.

With the time and resources available, it has not been possible to undertake a detailed quantitative survey of the corridor stages, unofficial stages or off-road service areas.

Nevertheless, a detailed survey of stages at four major CBD taxi parks was undertaken to identify and determine the number of stages per park, their destinations, and the number of taxis and stage committee workers per stage. **See Appendix: CBD Taxi Park Workforce.**

From this data we are able to make an estimate of the numbers of taxi routes, taxis and crews and stage workers whose routes are affected by the planned BRT corridors (see Appendix: Calculation of taxi jobs and vehicles at risk from BRT corridors). We estimate that there are 52 stages, 3,928 vehicles and 11,206 crew members and stage workers affected in the CBD taxi parks.

<b>Summary of stages, taxis and workforce at risk in CBD taxi parks</b>							
Park	Stages	Jinja Road Corridor		Entebbe Corridor		Bombo Corridor	
		Workforce	Vehicles	Workforce	Vehicles	Workforce	Vehicles
Namayiba Taxi Park	6	0	0	0	0	1,387	515
Usafi Taxi Park	7	147	50	1,565	605	111	80
New Taxi Park	13	944	254	760	208	806	283
Old Taxi Park	26	3,316	1,208	396	146	1,774	579
<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>4,407</b>	<b>1,512</b>	<b>2,721</b>	<b>959</b>	<b>4,078</b>	<b>1,457</b>
<b>Number of stages affected</b>				<b>52</b>			
<b>Total CBD taxi park vehicles at risk</b>				<b>3,928</b>			
<b>Total CBD taxi park jobs at risk from BRT</b>				<b>11,206</b>			

These figures do not include taxis that do not enter the gazetted taxi parks but rather load and drop passenger along the roads and streets, or Kisenyi taxi park, as the number of its stages directly affected by BRT are unknown.

### Service workers

There are numerous service workers that depend on the taxi industry for their livelihoods. Some work in the parks or on the stages, others work in off-road service areas. While there are no accurate figures available, previous estimates of the paratransit workforce from Nairobi's matatu industry (Spooner & Mwanika, 2019) suggest a very approximate **ratio of one service worker for every crew member and stage worker**, which could mean a further **5-6,000 service jobs at risk from the CBD taxi parks alone.**

### New jobs created by BRT

There are no figures available on the anticipated number of jobs created in the Kampala BRT system. However, employment data is available from other BRT operations. There is a direct comparison with Johannesburg for

example, where the first phase of the Rea Vaya BRT system was approximately the same length (25.5 km) as the Kampala project. This generated **830 permanent jobs**: 256 within the bus operating company, 280 in the stations (cashiers, ‘ambassadors’ and marshals), 240 in security and cleaning, and 40 in administration (Ntuli & McCaul , 2011).

### Boda-Boda Industry

The potential impact of BRT on employment among boda-boda riders is even more difficult to calculate, especially as we are yet to know what the authorities plan for regulation of boda-bodas as a consequence of BRT operations. *If boda-bodas were to be banned entirely from the city centre*, many thousands of riders would be affected.

A rough indication of numbers can be found from results of the field research undertaken in February 2020 which simply counted the number of riders in some of the major CBD boda-boda stages and streets with major concentrations of boda-boda, plus the number of boda-boda stages and riders along the three BRT corridors within CBD.

**This gives us a total figure of over 20,000 riders in the CBD alone who could be directly affected by BRT operations, and certainly an under-estimate of the total.**

<b>Sample of major boda-boda stages in CBD</b>		
<b>Stage</b>		<b>Riders</b>
Blue Room		271
Kamalimali		215
Good Shed		198
Mini Price		185
Shoprite		176
City Square		167
Clock Tower		124
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,336</b>
<b>Average riders per CBT stage</b>		<b>191</b>
<b>Sample of streets with major concentration of boda-boda</b>		
<b>Street</b>		<b>Riders</b>
Namirembe Road		1,661
Ben Kiwanuka Street		1,542
Lumu Street		1,301
Entebbe Road		1,292
<b>Total</b>		<b>5,796</b>
<b>Boda-boda riders on proposed BRT corridors within CBD</b>		
<b>BRT Corridor</b>	<b>Stages</b>	<b>Riders</b>
Entebbe Road	62	3,870
Jinja Road	85	5,120
Bombo Road	69	4,250
<b>Total</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>13,240</b>

## BRT and formalisation of the paratransit industry – workforce recommendations

The questionnaire survey included a general open-ended question on potential improvements to working conditions and the Kampala transport system in general, and focus group discussion participants were asked for their ideas to improve the paratransit industries.

### Consultation and inclusive planning

Many suggestions were concerned with demands for **recognition, inclusion and consultation of the taxi and boda-boda industries** in planning processes, particularly in ensuring that locations and facilities of taxi and boda-boda stages are properly addressed as part of the plans for BRT. It was recognised by many that this had to go hand-in-hand with developing a **good system of leadership** and democratic representation and to stop the fighting over leadership positions. But there is evident confusion over whether this meant that the government was to provide that leadership itself (“provide us with good leaders to govern us”), or whether it required stronger leadership from within the industry (“we need strong taxi operators’ organisation and representation”). There was also a specific call for the voice of paratransit workers to be heard in Parliament.

There is also a need for the taxi and boda-boda industry to be consulted on proposed BRT routes. The current route plans (ROM, ARUP, AH, 2014), for example, have attracted criticism that they do not always match where people actually need, or currently use, public transport (Kyukyu, 2020). On the Bombo Road route, for example, one taxi driver explained that the proposed route stops short of the main residential area in Bwaise (Thomas, 2020). It is possible that this and other examples may be the result of economic decisions based on the high cost of compensation to property owners and businesses when building through densely populated areas.

Many suggestions were concerned with the need for **strategic planning** of the taxi industry.

“No-one (in government) is currently looking at the paratransit industry, the previous work was overtaken by politics” (Kyukyu, 2020).

“We should get other bodies like police, KCCA, and the trade union that we work with to directly help us protect our values and also help us to get leaders who can manage the governance of the stages and the division. The elections of boda-boda leaders should be done in a proper way after consulting the people on the ground and stage leaders. (Boda Boda Stage Leaders, 2020).

### Paratransit integration or competition with BRT?

Riders and stage workers recognise that boda-bodas will continue to provide essential feeder services to BRT and believe that they should be left free to provide services side-by-side or in competition with BRT.

“People have different preferences, those who prefer taxis can board them, those who prefer buses can also opt for them. They should let all work at the same time. For example, when the Pioneer buses came, they worked with the taxis and it was up to the people to choose which one to board” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“The government should give equal opportunities to all those in the transport industry to work. Taxis and boda-bodas should work along the buses since all of us are in the same market” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

Some also argue that taxis and boda-bodas are better designed for the inner-city, and that larger buses (including BRT) should be restricted to long-distance commuting and inter-city services.

“Transformation is good for our country, but the problem is that few will benefit from them. They should think of bringing buses that go for long routes not those for short routes in the city. They should leave town service for taxis and boda-bodas those who don't have the capacity to own those buses” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“The government should first create more parks outside the city like in Kawanda on Bombo Road, Nsanji on Masaka Road, Mukono on Jinja Road to cater for those buses and taxis that drive long routes so that they don't enter into the city. The taxis which will remain in the city to do town service should be provided with their own lane” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

### **BRT Operations Ownership**

As one would expect, there are many in the paratransit industry, not just large fleet owners, who would like to have the opportunity of being part of the ownership of BRT operations.

“They should give a chance to those who have been in the transport sector to own the buses even if it means giving it to their organisations like KOTSA to pay in instalments not just to bring new people into the system” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

### **Recruitment of paratransit workers to BRT operations**

Similarly, there are many workers in paratransit who would like the opportunity to be employed by the BRT operating company.

“If the government can train us in computerized bus system rules, ticketing and driving. I think this could integrate us into a BRT system. We need training and orientation if at all they are to take us on. I think the washing bay boys who have been working on taxis can be trained and turned in bus stage security personnel” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

### **Transition**

There is strong demand for a period of transition during the introduction of BRT to give time for taxi and motorbike owners to recoup their investment and the industry as a whole to reorganise.

“Since our bosses have invested a lot of money in buying taxis, let the government give us 5 years grace period to rip from our investment then the taxis can be abolished from the city centre” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

“There are some people who got loans from the bank and some bonds to buy taxis that work in the city so they should not phase them out so fast because people will lose their property like land, houses that they had put as collateral to get those loans” (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“We are not refusing government programmes, but we are speaking about the government we well know and the reality on the ground; they plan for very good policies but putting them in action is a problem and they are the ones who compromise the policies set. We are therefore proposing that the government support us in our taxi transport sub-sector so that we are not taken out of business unprepared. We request for some time to reorganize ourselves before BRT bus system comes” (Taxi Crews, 2020).

### **Formalisation of employment for the paratransit workforce**

There were many suggestions for the regulation and organisation of Kampala’s paratransit industries which would represent significant steps towards formalisation.

Foremost of these were demands for the comprehensive planning and registration (gazetting) of taxi and boda-boda stages – completing the previous work of KCCA. This should include the gazetting of more taxi parks, the removal of illegal or unofficial roadside stages and establishing a central national register of taxi owners and drivers and boda-boda riders.

### **Expansion and regulation of the role of SACCOs**

The leadership of both KOTSA and KAMBE propose the expansion and strong regulation of SACCOs as the potential core of paratransit management and ownership. 70% of taxi stages now have SACCOs, organised into a Kampala-wide cooperative which could form the basis of taxi management. Some had taken the opportunity of visiting Nairobi to learn about the management of the matatu industry through the International Transportworkers Federation (ITF) and had been impressed by the SACCO model under development (KAMBE, 2020).

“We may not resist change, but we have to change with change. If the government intends to bring in buses, we propose the government gives a guarantee to stage workers through their SACCOs to access loans from the bank to own the buses. We should own shares in those buses” (KOTSA, 2020).

Absorb all operators into SACCOs – adapting the Nairobi model (interviewee had visited Matatu workers in Nairobi) – with SACCOs owning the routes and introducing standard targets with the longer-term prospect of regular employment of drivers by KOTSA/SACCO. (Maweje, 2020),

### **Access to finance**

Some respondents requested the government to explore how it could assist with finance, including access to affordable loans to purchase vehicles and insurance, exploration of cooperative ownership and finance through SACCOs, and undertake a review of permit fees and fuel costs.

As described above, the comments from women questionnaire respondents and the focus group discussion among women taxi conductors highlighted the need to end discrimination in opportunities for work as drivers, conductors and other higher paid occupations. This included a clear demand for a finance scheme specifically designed to assist women in the transport industry to develop skills and career opportunities.

### **Working environment**

Workers expressed an urgent need for the upgrading and refurbishment of the taxi parks. It was noted above that the lack of trust between the taxi workforce and the KCCA had led workers to resist previous efforts for fear that it would be used as an excuse to permanently exclude them from the parks and turn the land over for redevelopment.

Yet the parks are evidently in urgent need of work, particularly during periods of heavy rain.

Service and stage workers both demanded the construction of shelter from rain and sun, and food vendors in particular expressed the urgent need for permanent and hygienic working space with access to water and electricity.

As described above, service workers, particularly mechanics and spare-parts dealers, find it very difficult to afford the necessary tools and equipment, and specifically demand action to stop the trade in fake spare parts and equipment.

### **Reduction of congestion, air pollution and improvement of the street environment**

The largest number of proposals from the questionnaire survey were concerned with improvement to the **transport infrastructure**. There were many general proposals to improve the road system: building new roads, widening roads, building flyovers, upgrading junctions, introducing more traffic lanes, improving traffic lights and traffic management technologies. These included specific proposals for:

- new roads designed to accommodate both BRT buses and other vehicles
- improved and expanded parking facilities for taxis and improved major taxi parks
- new taxi parks on the outskirts of the city
- removal of city centre 'illegal' taxi parking, ensuring that all CBD taxis use designated taxi parks
- ban on old vehicles in the city centre
- remove all government official vehicles from the town centre
- restrict the importation of cars into the country
- restrict access for heavy vehicles and long trucks during peak hours
- new and improved traffic light systems
- restrict roadside loading
- reintroduce and expand commuter railway lines
- move long-distance taxis to new stages outside the city centre
- stop the government from producing so many competing different plans

**Private and government-owned cars** are believed to be a major cause of congestion. Respondents suggested that action is needed to remove private cars from the city centre

“Instead of bringing the buses they should widen the roads and put stations where private vehicles are charged for entering the city to reduce jam in town. You may find that one home has like three cars and they are all driven into the city. Then the public vehicles should not pay that fare to encourage people to use them” (Boda-Boda Riders, 2020).

Private cars are the major cause of congestion in the city, which need regulation. Perhaps ban cars from the city centre altogether and provide parking areas on the outskirts for transfer to public transport services (KOTSA, 2020).

There were several proposals to introduce separate **boda-boda lanes** when upgrading roads (or parallel boda-boda lanes to the BRT roadways).

“When modifying the roads, they should cater for a boda-boda lane, it will reduce jam (Boda-Boda Senior Cadres, 2020).

“KCCA doesn't cater for us when they are constructing roads. If they could put provisions for us on the road it would reduce traffic jam. That is why boda-boda riders drive so badly on the road because they have no specific lane they just negotiate their way on the road through the cars” (KAMBE Executive Committee , 2020).

### **Reduction in paratransit corruption**

Many respondents called for changes in the policing of traffic and transport to reduce the levels of harassment and corruption, including the redeployment or reduction of the numbers of police and KCCA officers from the streets, the removal of unqualified police traffic wardens, and improved training for police and KCCA officers to reduce corruption and extortion.

The introduction of cashless fare payments could have a significant impact on corruption and extortion, not from law-enforcement officers, but also from thieves and organised criminal gangs.

## Key findings and recommendations

### Key findings

The proposed introduction of BRT in Kampala will have a significant impact on many thousands of people who depend on paratransit operations for their livelihoods. At the same time, BRT offers a major opportunity for the development of policies, regulation and transport infrastructure that could mitigate against the potential loss of paratransit jobs and reform urban transport towards the formalisation of the industry.

#### Employment relationships and working conditions

In common with most other cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, the market structure of the main paratransit industries (taxi and boda-boda) is dominated by the **target system**, whereby drivers and riders are informally employed by vehicle owners to whom they have to pay a pre-determined daily or weekly “target” or rental fee. This has to be paid from passenger fares collected in addition to fuel, police bribes, payments to stage and service workers and other costs. Anything remaining at the end of the day or week constitutes the net earnings of the taxi crew or boda-boda rider.


**Net earnings** fluctuate enormously, dependant on the age and condition of the vehicle, the weather and the level of congestion. At times, the taxi crew may even make a loss. In-depth interviews suggest that a driver on the target system may typically earn anything between 14-50,000/= per day (420,000/= – 1,500,000/= per month). The majority of boda-boda riders in the questionnaire survey earn less than 25,000/= per day (750,000/= per month), and in-depth interviews suggest that riders on the target system earn considerably less. By comparison, according to the official statistics, the 2017 average (median) earnings for those in “paid employment” in Kampala was 270,000/= per month (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2018).

The target system forces drivers and riders to work **exceptionally long hours**. The majority of taxi crews, stage workers and boda-boda riders work thirteen hours or more each day. 80% work six or seven days per week. It also causes intense competition for passengers on the road and on the stages. The combination of the consequent fatigue and aggressive driving inevitably leads to poor road safety and accidents.

The target-based pattern of employment and **ownership in the boda-boda industry** is shifting. Previously, people with access to capital could purchase fleets of motorbikes to employ riders on the target system. Today, it has become easier for riders to access loans or leasing agreements to own their own boda-bodas or small fleets. Dealerships market their motorbikes as “earning machines”. Nevertheless, while it is becoming easier for riders to escape the target system, many feel equally trapped by high loan interest payments.

Many owner-drivers/riders and small fleet owners in both the boda-boda and taxi industries, attracted by low cost of entry and available credit, have **exceptionally low and precarious profit margins** and **poor financial literacy**.

Boda-boda employment relationships are also changing with the growth of **ride-hailing platforms**, such as SafeBoda and Taxify. These potentially offer better earnings for riders and an



improved service for passengers, but it is a highly competitive market with rival companies undercutting one another's fares in an attempt to increase market share, to the detriment of the riders' livelihoods.

KAMBE is attempting to develop and market its own ride-hailing platform, in response to the popularity of SafeBoda and other companies. While it is a good idea to develop its own ride-hailing application as a collective benefit to KAMBE members, it appears that the leadership may have underestimated the cost of marketing, training and recruitment, as well as the costs of technical development and back-office support. Their would-be competitors in the market (SafeBoda, Taxify etc) include major corporations who raise millions of dollars of investment in an attempt to increase market share, under-cutting one another in the process. There seems little prospect that KAMBE could become a serious competitor in this market, especially while trying to improve the livelihoods and working conditions for the members.

In addition to earnings and working hours, **other major issues** faced by all paratransit workers include police corruption and harassment, social discrimination and lack of respect from passengers and the general public, gender discrimination and sexual harassment, poor working conditions, poor and disunited leadership and crime.

### **Inclusive planning**

There is no evidence of serious attempts to achieve this, either from evidence provided by boda-boda workers and their elected representatives during this survey, or from research findings. A 2019 case study of social dialogue in Uganda's boda-boda industry concluded that "There has been a very low level of engagement with regard to the inclusion of boda-bodas as far as the enactment of laws and regulations governing the transport sector is concerned. This is because current labour laws do not recognise informal sector players hence there is no obligation for their consultation and engagement in the process" (Munu, 2019).

### **Organisation**

There are two main organisations that dominate the representation of paratransit workers – KOTSA (taxi industry) and KAMBE (boda-bodas). Both have a large membership but need to substantially build their central management and administrative capacities and improve their democratic accountability and communications with the membership on the ground.

The development of stage-based SACCOs for both taxi and boda-boda workers could be a significant route towards better organisation, regulation and accountability. In the taxi industry, these could be immediately improved and strengthened by extending SACCO membership beyond drivers to include conductors and other stage workers.

There is considerable confusion about the respective roles of organisations (KOTSA and KAMBE) which represent the interests of the workforce and negotiates on their behalf with the authorities, and the authorities themselves (KCCA and national government agencies) responsible for the planning and management of the city's transport system. The roots of this confusion lie in the history of politicisation, corruption and violence surrounding the attempts to regulate paratransit since the 1980s, which continues today.

### **Attitudes towards BRT**

The majority of workers in paratransit have heard about BRT, mostly through the media or word of mouth, although there is still some confusion in understanding the difference between BRT and the introduction of larger buses on

existing roads in competition with other traffic. Attitudes towards BRT vary. A substantial minority are positive about the project, but the majority are opposed, based on **potential loss of jobs** and the **perception of government incompetence and corruption** in any major transport infrastructure initiative. Boda-boda riders fear less from job loss and are more confident that they can co-exist with BRT.

It has been also amply illustrated from the survey and from academic sources that the politicisation of the boda-boda industry is a serious obstacle to the achievement of sustained and serious consultation. “The link to politicians with vested interests presents the biggest obstructing condition to social dialogue as public servants ... see it as interfering with their work by undermining constructive dialogue...” (Munu, 2019).

Overcoming boda-boda politicisation in Kampala “would require the central government to commit to supporting institutionalized interaction between informal organizations and the local authorities that engage with them on a day-to-day basis, rather than intervening to undermine this interaction and keep informal workers’ organizations in disarray” (Goodfellow & Titeca, 2012).

### Environmental impact

Paratransit in Kampala is a significant contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Preliminary research by GLI estimates that the 12cc-500cc motorbikes, typical in Kampala, emit approximately 84gm of CO<sub>2</sub> per kilometre. Assuming that boda-bodas typically ride 50km per day, this produces nearly 460,000 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> per year. In addition, 25,000 taxis travel around 60km per day. The average CO<sub>2</sub> output of a new Toyota Hiace is estimated to be 221.0g/km, which would produce a further 121,000 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> per year, but this is certainly an under-estimate, given the age and condition of Kampala’s motorbikes and taxis.

The combined emissions of Kampala’s informal passenger transport could therefore be approximately 581,000 tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per year, representing more than 10% of Uganda’s entire CO<sub>2</sub> emissions<sup>2</sup>.

### Recommendations

In 2015, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted a **Recommendation Concerning the Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy**, known as ‘R204’ (ILO, 2015). Although a Recommendation does not carry the same weight as a Convention, it remains an important set of guidelines to which governments and inter-governmental organisations are encouraged to respect when developing policies addressing the transformation of informal industries and services.

In the context of the Kampala paratransit workforce and the introduction of BRT, R204 includes **ten key recommendations** that provide a framework for discussions and negotiations by all stakeholders in the development of policies and practical steps towards the integration and formalisation of paratransit workforce.

## 1. Livelihoods

“take urgent and appropriate measures to enable the transition of workers and economic units from the informal to the formal economy, while ensuring the **preservation and improvement of existing livelihoods ... and respecting workers’ fundamental rights, and ensuring opportunities for income security, livelihoods and entrepreneurship during the transition**”

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<sup>2</sup> Based on 2017 national data on Uganda from UNFCCC

**Recommendation:** Work with KOTSA and KAMBE to explore the potential of training programmes for potential or existing owner-drivers, owner-riders and small fleet owners to improve financial literacy and business development skills.

**Recommendation:** Support KAMBE, KOTSA and KCCA to explore possible alternative business models in the boda-boda and taxi industries that may have the potential to improve livelihoods, reduce working hours (and therefore improve road safety) and address the problems of over-supply and greenhouse gas emissions. This could include

- formalisation of stages
- financing programmes that encourage owner-riders and owner-drivers as an alternative to the target system
- development of the role of SACCOs or other cooperative models to encourage formal employment relationships with riders and taxi crews
- regulation of ride-hailing companies

**Recommendation:** Encourage or facilitate discussions between KAMBE, Centenary Bank and other lending institutions and motorcycle dealerships (Boxer/TVS) to explore mandatory branding (helmets, petrol tanks, etc) as conditions of loans.

**Recommendation:** Sensitively initiate discussion and negotiation with KAMBE and KOTSA to consolidate the registration of stages and routes through branding of vehicles and motorbikes

## 2. Active participation

“in designing, implementing and evaluating policies and programmes of relevance to the informal economy, including its formalization, ... consult with and promote **active participation** of representatives of membership-based representative organizations of workers and economic units in the informal economy

The highest priority must be to **build trust, understanding and mutual respect**, particularly between the taxi and boda-boda workforce and KCCA.

**Recommendation:** Support a programme of training events for taxi and boda-boda stage leaders and KCCA representatives (both separately and together) that provide ‘safe spaces’ for open-ended informal discussions on respective frustrations and concerns, explore respective rights and responsibilities, and identify practical steps to build trust, understanding and respect.

**Recommendation:** Facilitate meetings between the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, ATGWU, NUDCAW and representatives of the ILO to review the recognition and inclusion of informal workers in labour law and participation in tripartite structures and processes.

**Recommendation:** Engage representatives of the paratransit workforce, particularly in the boda-boda industry, in the planning of BRT, the integration of paratransit services in Kampala’s passenger transport as a whole, and the development of policies and programmes to incrementally formalise the informal transport economy.

**Recommendation:** Encourage and facilitate the participation of representatives of KAMBE, KOTSA and KCCA in the forthcoming ILO tripartite technical meeting, to be held in Geneva, 21-25 September 2020, specifically addressing the application of R204 for the informal transport industry (ILO, 2020).

### 3. Working conditions

“take immediate measures to address the **unsafe and unhealthy working conditions** that often characterize work in the informal economy; and promote and extend occupational safety and health protection to employers and workers in the informal economy

Working conditions in the taxi parks, stages and service areas are extremely poor. There has been no attempt to maintain or upgrade the taxi parks for a long time. There is no shelter from rain or sun, poor or non-existent sanitation, and very unhygienic facilities for the preparation and serving of food.

**Recommendation:** Immediately start a sensitive process of dialogue, discussion and confidence-building between KOTSA and KCCA towards an agreed plan for the refurbishment of CBD taxi parks, to include:

- Resurfacing of the park with adequate drainage
- Construction of shelter from sun and rain at each stage within the park
- Provision of hygienic working space for food vendors with affordable access to electricity and clean water

There is very little awareness in the paratransit industry on the effects of constant exposure to exhaust emissions on one’s health, the impact of poor air quality on Uganda’s development, and the contribution of paratransit emissions to climate change.

**Recommendation:** Undertake a detailed study of the environmental impact of paratransit operations in Kampala, with particular reference to greenhouse gas emissions. Provide support to KOTSA, KAMBE and KCCA to develop practical proposals for the reduction in harmful emissions.

### 4. Social Protection

“extend in law and practice, to all workers in the informal economy, **social security, maternity protection, decent working conditions and a minimum wage**

In theory, every boda-boda stage should have a SACCO and/or welfare schemes for riders, and banks are legally obliged to match SACCO savings with loans. Yet politicians undermine this by politicisation with promises of large donations into the funds in attempts to attract votes from the boda-boda workforce. As a consequence, the collection of voluntary contributions from members is dying. Regular contributions to NSSF are rare.

**Recommendation:** Introduce or strengthen regulations for due diligence in the administration of stage based SACCOs and welfare schemes to ensure regular contributions by members and proper use of the funds and provide training for administrators to resist political and financial corruption.

**Recommendation:** Establish discussions between KOTSA, KAMBE and KCCA and NSSF management to explore how paratransit workers can register and contribute to NSSF and how NSSF processes can be adapted to suit the needs of the paratransit workforce.

### 5. Gender equality

“encourage the provision of and access to affordable quality childcare and other care services in order to **promote gender equality in entrepreneurship** and employment opportunities and to enable the transition to the formal economy

The Kampala paratransit industry is dominated by men. Women in the taxi industry complain of harassment and discrimination from vehicle owners, stage workers and passengers. There is a particular problem in discrimination against women in access to the more skilled and highly paid occupations.

**Recommendation:** Establish a forum to discuss and develop policies and programmes to promote gender equality in paratransit, involving women representatives from KOTSA and KAMBE, owner representatives, KCCA and the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. This to include consideration of potential financing programmes to assist women to gain access to training and capital to operate taxis and boda-bodas, and public education programmes to assert women's economic rights in the industry and reduce discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace.

## 6. Corruption

**“take measures to promote anti- corruption efforts and good governance**

Police corruption and extortion is universally despised throughout the paratransit workforce. Police demands for bribes or unreceipted 'fines' are a serious problem for workers' livelihoods, the maintenance of any trust between police and paratransit industry and respect for traffic regulations. This is clearly a deep-rooted problem and there are no signs of serious attempts to combat it by the authorities.

**Recommendation:** Begin to build dialogue between police and paratransit workers, starting with the inclusion of ATGWU, KOTSA and KAMBE representatives in discussions during police training, working through police Liaison Officers.

## 7. Access to public procurement

**“promote access to public procurement ... through measures such as adapting procurement procedures and volumes, providing training and advice on participating in public tenders, and reserving quotas for these economic units**

There have been several attempts to include paratransit owners, workers and their associations in the ownership of companies and cooperatives that have tendered for BRT operations (Accra, Lagos, Johannesburg and elsewhere), but with mixed and generally disappointing results. While the inclusion of the paratransit industry in the planning of BRT operations is essential, it is important to recognise that the overall BRT operations business model assumes that it can be successful with no state subsidy, or even that it can generate tax revenues for the state. This has proved to be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

**Recommendation:** Provide independent advice and consultation to paratransit industry representatives (both owners and workforce) on BRT financial operations and contracting arrangements at the earliest opportunity and include them in negotiations and consultation on the appropriate design of BRT operating contracts, fares policy, and procurement and tendering procedures.

## 8. Communications and capacity-building

**“take measures to ensure the effective provision of information, assistance in complying with the relevant laws and regulations, and capacity building for relevant actors**

It is noticeable that although the majority of paratransit workers are to some extent aware of BRT, most of them learned of it through the media or by word of mouth, rather than from KOTSA, KAMBE or KCCA and there is little

clarity about what BRT really involves. There is particular confusion between BRT and traditional bus services such as Pioneer.

**Recommendation:** Encourage KAMBE, KOTSA and KCCA to work together in developing a communications strategy for the paratransit workforce that provides a better understanding of BRT and its implications for Kampala. As a first step, this should involve support for KAMBE, KOTSA and KCCA representatives to undertake a joint field visit to DART BRT in Dar es Salaam, including meetings with transport trade unions and representatives of paratransit workers and owners, as well as Dar es Salaam Rapid Transit Agency and city authorities.

Both KOTSA and KAMBE have a large membership, but an under-developed capacity to provide the representation and services required by the members, and there is considerable confusion among paratransit workers about whether such organisations are there to defend and advance their interests through negotiation with the authorities, to implement and police the authorities' policies and regulations and impose discipline on the stages, or to do both.

**Recommendation:** Support a sustained capacity-development programme for KOTSA and KAMBE designed to:

- Develop a deeper understanding about principles and values of democratic membership-based organisations and their role in representing the interests of the members to those authorities and institutions that affect their livelihoods and rights and negotiating on their behalf.
- Strengthen representation and organisation at division and parish level, to bridge the gap between stages and the national leadership.
- Review and strengthen dues payment, financial procedures, record-keeping and reporting towards financial sustainability, the appointment of more staff and improved services to the membership, and transparent financial accountability.

**Recommendation:** Improve communications with the travelling public to encourage or enforce the use of designated stages rather than demanding boarding and alighting along routes.

**Recommendation:** Improve communications between boda-boda riders and taxi drivers to reduce conflict and tensions between the two.

## 9. Access to public space

**“promote local development strategies, including regulated access for use of public space**

Relationships between KCCA and the paratransit workforce are particularly difficult as a result of KCCA operations to enforce regulations on the streets, on stages, and in the taxi parks, particularly when violence is used to arrest vendors and confiscate goods. This is a serious obstacle to the development of a productive and stable relationship between KCCA and the workforce.

**Recommendation:** Within the context of proposals for active participation and anti-corruption (above), establish a permanent forum for KCCA, the police, KAMBE, KOTSA and representatives of vendors and service workers operating in or close to stages and parks. This should meet regularly for consultation and joint planning of public space that secures the rights of those whose livelihoods depend on the use of public space while achieving the minimum of disruption and hindrance to transport operations, passengers and pedestrians.

## 10. Complaints procedures

**“put in place efficient and accessible complaint and appeal procedures”**

As detailed plans for the introduction of BRT (or other major transport infrastructure projects) develop, it is essential that there are clear procedures for paratransit representative organisations to raise complaints or concerns with the planners and governing authorities.

**Recommendation:** Facilitate negotiations between KCCA and the relevant ministries and membership-based organisations in the paratransit industry to agree appropriate complaints procedures.

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## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Questionnaire sampling framework

Corridors and stations	Target number of questionnaires						
	Taxi Crew	Taxi Stage	Taxi Service	Boda-Boda Riders	Boda-Boda Stage	Boda-Boda Service	Total
<b>Bombo Corridor</b>							
City Square Station	8	10	12	13	3	7	53
Watoto-Bat Valley Station		2	2	10	3	7	24
YMCA-Wandegeya Station	5	4	2	10	3	7	31
Mulago Hospital Station		4	2	10	3	6	25
Kubbiri Station		4	3	10	3	7	27
Kalerwe Market Station	8	4	6	10	3	6	37
Bwaise terminal	4	5	6	10	3	7	35
<b>TOTAL BOMBO CORRIDOR</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>232</b>
<b>Entebbe Corridor</b>							
Shoprite Station/USAF	18	14	14	13	3	5	67
Queens Way Station				7	3	5	15
Katwe Station	5	7	7	7	3	5	34
Kibuye Station	10	7	7	9	3	5	41
Najjanankumbi Station				2	3	5	10
Stella Station				7	3	5	15
Freedom City Station				7	3	2	12
Bata Station				7	3	5	15
Zana				7	3	5	15
Zana Terminal	5	5	5	7	3	5	30
<b>TOTAL ENTEBBE CORRIDOR</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>254</b>
<b>Jinja Corridor</b>							
Railway Station/Old Taxi park	10	10	10	6	3	3	42
Centenary Park Station	5	3		2	3	3	16
Jinja Road Police Station							0
Lugogo Game Station	3	2	4	6	3	2	20
Nakawa Market Station	5	7	5	6	3	10	36
Spear Motors Station	5	2	2	6	3	1	19
Kyambogo University Station			3	5	3		11
Banda Main Station	5	7		6	3	10	31
Banda Market Station				6	3	5	14
Namugongo Station			4	6	3	5	18
Kireka	5	2	5	6	3	8	29
Kireka Terminal				6	3		9
<b>TOTAL JINJA CORRIDOR</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>TOTAL QUESTIONNAIRES</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>731</b>

## Appendix 2: CBD Taxi Park Workforce

### Namayiba Taxi Park

Stage	Committee	Drivers	Conductors	Total Workforce	Vehicles	Workers per Vehicle
Luweero	12	159	162	333	129	2.58
Nakasongola	17	191	200	408	185	2.21
Kikyusa	6	34	200	240	27	8.89
Amolatar	6	26	30	62	22	2.82
Nakaseke	8	74	79	161	71	2.27
Ssemuto	10	85	88	183	81	2.26
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>569</b>	<b>759</b>	<b>1,387</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>1.24</b>

### Usafi Taxi Park

Stage	Committee	Drivers	Conductors	Total Workforce	Vehicles	Workers per Vehicle
Nateete	6	50	40	96	35	2.74
Kabuusu / Sembuule / Kitebi	8	60	50	118	50	2.36
Nansana / Wakiso / Kakirir / Busunju	7	40	35	82	25	3.28
Namasuba Zana	8	80	65	153	70	2.19
Derico / Kikajjo	10	120	110	240	100	2.40
Ggaba	7	40	35	82	20	4.10
Busabala	10	80	70	160	65	2.46
Entebbe	15	550	500	1,065	400	2.66
Kajjansi	7	100	80	187	70	2.67
Mpererwe / Kalerwe	6	65	40	111	80	1.39
Salama / Munyonyo	6	90	85	181	80	2.26
Dinia / Kabowa / Wankulukuku	6	70	40	116	30	3.87
Nyanama	7	65	40	112	30	3.73
Kasenya	8	50	60	118	40	2.95
Kasubi Namungona / Nansana	7	50	40	97	40	2.43
Jinja	6	25	20	51	15	3.40
Bweyogerere	6	50	40	96	35	2.74
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>1,585</b>	<b>1,350</b>	<b>3,065</b>	<b>1,185</b>	<b>2.80</b>

### New Taxi Park

Stage	Committee	Drivers	Conductors	Total Workforce	Vehicles	Workers per Vehicle
Bukomero Kateera	7	39	28	74	35	2.11
Bulo Ngando	10	60	70	140	70	2.00
Buloba Bulenga	7	106	120	233	86	2.71
Bunnamwaya	10	89	100	199	56	3.55
Busega Lunguja	7	70	120	197	53	3.72
Bwaise Katooke	6	60	130	196	46	4.26
Bweyogerere	7	40	78	125	37	3.38
Entebbe	10	110	135	255	88	2.90
Fort Portal Kagadi	14	56	49	119	46	2.59
Gayaza	6	89	130	225	71	3.17
Ggomba	12	51	110	173	39	4.44
Hoima	11	73	88	172	62	2.77
Jinja	7	62	143	212	47	4.51
Kajjansi	10	99	138	247	68	3.63

Kamwokya	7	145	180	332	105	3.16
Kasanje Nakawuka	9	37	78	124	30	4.13
Kawanda Matugga	7	58	112	177	42	4.21
Kawempe Maganjo	10	99	137	246	73	3.37
Kawolo Lugazi	6	53	80	139	41	3.39
Kayabwe	7	80	108	195	56	3.48
Kibibi Ggombe	12	79	166	257	63	4.08
Kiboga Ntwetwe	8	70	95	173	54	3.20
Kigumba Ggulu	9	36	34	79	28	2.82
Luzira	8	115	128	251	78	3.22
Makerere	9	36	34	79	69	1.14
Masaka 'A'	15	176	200	391	153	2.56
Masaka 'C'	8	89	148	245	43	5.70
Masindi	9	26	28	63	20	3.15
Masuulita	6	22	50	78	21	3.71
Mbarara Lyantonde	6	34	58	98	32	3.06
Mengo Rubaga Kosovo	8	70	125	203	64	3.17
Mityana Mubende	15	130	335	480	185	2.59
Mpigi	6	86	163	255	72	3.54
Mukono	10	63	144	217	51	4.25
Mulago Nsooba	8	80	168	256	70	3.66
Namasuba Zzana	8	61	189	258	52	4.96
Nateete Kirinnyabigo	7	83	160	250	78	3.21
Nateete Wakaliga	6	26	119	151	21	7.19
Ndeeba Ssemuule	8	93	143	244	80	3.05
Nsangi Kyengera	18	112	204	334	101	3.31
Ntinda Kiwatule	7	56	245	308	47	6.55
Zirobwe	6	45	122	173	42	4.12
<b>Total</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>3,064</b>	<b>5,192</b>	<b>8,623</b>	<b>2,575</b>	<b>3.31</b>

### Old Taxi Park

Stage	Committee	Drivers	Conductors	Total Workforce	Vehicles	Workers per Vehicle
Bugerere 'A'	12	52	52	116	68	1.71
Bugerere 'B'	8	132	166	306	100	3.06
Busia	6	61	79	146	57	2.56
Bwaise	8	142	163	313	130	2.41
Bweyogerere 'A'	10	84	90	184	71	2.59
Bweyogerere 'B'	9	101	159	269	98	2.74
Bweyogerere 'C'	9	64	156	229	66	3.47
Gayaza	8	98	117	223	87	2.56
Ggaba	7	62	113	182	54	3.37
Jina 'B'	6	56	70	132	49	2.69
Jinja 'A'	7	102	89	198	97	2.04
Kalerwe Ttula	9	51	65	125	42	2.98
Kamwokya	8	98	167	273	91	3.00
Katosi	8	62	69	139	55	2.53
Kawempe Kagoma	9	79	106	194	71	2.73
Kawolo Lugazi	6	65	83	154	62	2.48
Kibuli	10	59	111	180	56	3.21
Kibuye	6	80	106	192	77	2.49
Luzira 'A'	6	50	136	192	46	4.17
Luzira 'B'	7	75	142	224	68	3.29
Makerere	8	80	189	277	72	3.85
Makindye Nabisaalu	9	95	110	214	81	2.64
Mbale Tororo	9	52	85	146	48	3.04

Mbuya Kinawattaka	8	89	157	254	79	3.22
Mengo Rubaga	9	80	191	280	69	4.06
Mpererwe	8	102	183	293	96	3.05
Mukono 'A'	6	94	67	167	92	1.82
Mukono 'B'	7	98	137	242	73	3.32
Mulago	10	87	252	349	81	4.31
Muyenga	8	83	100	191	79	2.42
Namugongo	10	98	137	245	88	2.78
Namuwongo	9	75	143	227	70	3.24
Nateete Kirinnyabigo	12	85	84	181	72	2.51
Nateete Wakaliga	9	62	107	178	58	3.07
Ntinda Kiwatule	6	97	154	257	90	2.86
Salaama Munyonyo	9	99	106	214	92	2.33
<b>Total</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>2,949</b>	<b>4,441</b>	<b>7,686</b>	<b>2,685</b>	<b>2.49</b>

<b>Total CBD Taxi Park Workforce</b>	<b>Committee</b>	<b>Drivers</b>	<b>Conductors</b>	<b>Total Workforce</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Workers per Vehicle</b>
	<b>852</b>	<b>8,167</b>	<b>11,742</b>	<b>20,761</b>	<b>6,960</b>	<b>2.98</b>

### Appendix 3: Calculation of taxi jobs and vehicles at risk from BRT corridors

<b>CBD Stages with routes operating in proposed BRT Corridors</b>						
<b>Stage</b>	<b>Jinja Road Corridor</b>		<b>Entebbe Corridor</b>		<b>Bombo Corridor</b>	
<b>Namayiba Taxi Park</b>	<b>Workforce</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Workforce</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>	<b>Workforce</b>	<b>Vehicles</b>
Luweero					333	129
Nakasongola					408	185
Kikyusa					240	27
Amolatar					62	22
Nakaseke					161	71
Ssemuto					183	81
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,387</b>	<b>515</b>
<b>Usafi Taxi Park</b>						
Namasuba Zana			153	70		
Busabala			160	65		
Entebbe			1,065	400		
Kajjansi			187	70		
Mpererwe / Kalerwe					111	80
Jinja	51	15				
Bweyogerere	96	35				
<b>Total</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>1,565</b>	<b>605</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>80</b>
<b>New Taxi Park</b>						
Bweyogerere	125	37				
Entebbe			255	88		
Gayaza					225	71
Jinja	212	47				
Kajjansi			247	68		
Kawanda Matugga					177	42
Kawempe Maganjo					246	73
Kawolo Lugazi	139	41				
Kigumba Ggulu					79	28
Luzira	251	78				
Makerere					79	69
Mukono	217	51				
Namasuba Zzana			258	52		
<b>Total</b>	<b>944</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>806</b>	<b>283</b>
<b>Old Taxi Park</b>						
Bugerere 'A'	116	68				
Bugerere 'B'	306	100				
Busia	146	57				
Bwaise					313	130
Bweyogerere 'A'	184	71				
Bweyogerere 'B'	269	98				
Bweyogerere 'C'	229	66				
Gayaza					223	87
Ggaba			182	54		
Jina 'B'	132	49				
Jinja 'A'	198	97				
Kalerwe Ttula					125	42
Katosi	139	55				
Kawempe Kagoma					194	71
Kawolo Lugazi	154	62				
Luzira 'A'	192	46				
Luzira 'B'	224	68				
Makerere					277	72
Mbale Tororo	146	48				
Mpererwe					293	96
Mukono 'A'	167	92				
Mukono 'B'	242	73				
Mulago					349	81
Namugongo	245	88				
Namuwongo	227	70				
Salaama Munyonyo			214	92		
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,316</b>	<b>1,208</b>	<b>396</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>1,774</b>	<b>579</b>
<b>Total per BRT Corridors</b>	<b>4,407</b>	<b>1,512</b>	<b>2,721</b>	<b>959</b>	<b>4,078</b>	<b>1,457</b>
<b>Total CBD Taxi Park vehicles at risk</b>		<b>3,928</b>				
<b>Total CBD Taxi Park jobs at risk from BRT</b>		<b>11,206</b>				

## Appendix 4: Taxi Workers Sampling Points

	Target number of questionnaires						
	Taxi Crew	Taxi Stage	Taxi Service	Boda-Boda Riders	Boda-Boda Stage	Boda-Boda Service	Total
<b>Bombo Corridor</b>							
City Square Station	8	10	12	13	3	7	53
Watoto-Bat Valley Station		2	2	10	3	7	24
YMCA-Wandegeya Station	5	4	2	10	3	7	31
Mulago Hospital Station		4	2	10	3	6	25
Kubbiri Station		4	3	10	3	7	27
Kalerwe Market Station	8	4	6	10	3	6	37
Bwaise terminal	4	5	6	10	3	7	35
<b>TOTAL BOMBO CORRIDOR</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>232</b>
<b>Entebbe Corridor</b>							
Shoprite Station/USAF	18	14	14	13	3	5	67
Queens Way Station				7	3	5	15
Katwe Station	5	7	7	7	3	5	34
Kibuye Station	10	7	7	9	3	5	41
Najjanankumbi Station				2	3	5	10
Stella Station				7	3	5	15
Freedom City Station				7	3	2	12
Bata Bata Station				7	3	5	15
Zana				7	3	5	15
Zana Terminal	5	5	5	7	3	5	30
<b>TOTAL ENTEBBE CORRIDOR</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>254</b>
<b>Jinja Corridor</b>							
Railway Station/Old Taxi park	10	10	10	6	3	3	42
Centenary Park Station	5	3		2	3	3	16
Jinja Road Police Station							0
Lugogo Game Station	3	2	4	6	3	2	20
Nakawa Market Station	5	7	5	6	3	10	36
Spear Motors Station	5	2	2	6	3	1	19
Kyambogo University Station			3	5	3		11
Banda Main Station	5	7		6	3	10	31
Banda Market Station				6	3	5	14
Namugongo Station			4	6	3	5	18
Kireka	5	2	5	6	3	8	29
Kireka Terminal				6	3		9
<b>TOTAL JINJA CORRIDOR</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>245</b>
<b>TOTAL QUESTIONNAIRES</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>731</b>

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May 2020